



Texas Border Security:
A Strategic Military Assessment

September 2011



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Barry R. McCaffrey

Robert H. Scales PhD

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

TODD STAPLES
COMMISSIONER



September 26, 2011

Dear Fellow Texan:

I am pleased to deliver to you this important report entitled “Texas Border Security: A Strategic Military Assessment.” This report is the culmination of many efforts that started with rural farmers and ranchers bringing pleas for a secure border to me.

The 82nd Texas Legislature recognized this critical issue and the numerous accounts of cross-border violence and tasked the Texas Department of Agriculture via House Bill 4, to conduct:
“an assessment of the impact of illegal activity along the Texas-Mexico border on rural landowners and the agriculture industry and working in conjunction with other appropriate entities to develop recommendations to enhance border security.”

In accomplishing this legislative directive, the Texas Department of Agriculture joined with the Texas Department of Public Safety to jointly commission retired four-star Army General Barry McCaffrey and retired Army Major-General Robert Scales for this unique and strategic assessment.

General Barry McCaffrey is the former Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy under President Bill Clinton and former Commander of all U.S. troops in Central and South America. Major-General Robert Scales is the former Commandant of the United States Army War College.

The report offers a military perspective on how to best incorporate strategic, operational and tactical measures to secure the increasingly hostile border regions along the Rio Grande River. It also provides sobering evidence of cartel criminals gaining ground on Texas soil.

As Texas continues to seek and deliver solutions to this attack on our nation’s sovereignty, I hope you will find this report enlightening and helpful in our collaborative efforts. We must continue this effort until the rights of property owners to live and work are upheld without threat of violence.


Sincerely yours,

Todd Staples



TEXAS BORDER SECURITY: *A STRATEGIC MILITARY ASSESSMENT*

Barry R. McCaffrey
Robert H. Scales, PhD





Biographic Summary of General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (Ret.)

General Barry R. McCaffrey is President of his own consulting firm based in Arlington, Virginia (www.mccaffreyassociates.com). He serves as a national security and terrorism analyst for NBC News. The Washington Speakers Bureau (www.washingtonspeakers.com) exclusively represents his speeches.

General McCaffrey served as the Bradley Distinguished Professor of International Security Studies from January 2001 to May 2005; and then as an Adjunct Professor of International Security Studies from May 2005 to December 2010 at the United States Military Academy at West Point, NY.

General McCaffrey graduated from Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachusetts and the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He holds a Master of Arts degree in civil government from American University. He attended the Harvard University National Security Program as well as the Business School Executive Education Program. General McCaffrey is a member Phi Kappa Phi, a national honor society dedicated to the recognition and promotion of academic excellence in all disciplines. In May 2010, he was honored as a Distinguished Graduate by the West Point Association of Graduates at the United States Military Academy.

He has been elected to the Board of Directors of CRC Health Corporation, the National Association of Drug Court Professionals (NADCP), and the Atlantic Council of the United States. He is also: a member of the Council on Foreign Relations; an Associate of the Inter-American Dialogue; Chairman of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Education Center Advisory Board; and a member of the Board of Advisors of the National Infantry Foundation, as well as the National Armor & Cavalry Heritage Foundation. General McCaffrey has had a long association with the Phoenix House Foundation, a non-profit dedicated to drug and alcohol abuse treatment, prevention and therapy.

General McCaffrey stepped down as the Director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in January 2001. He was confirmed to the position by unanimous vote of the U.S. Senate in February 1996 and served as a member of the President's Cabinet and the National Security Council for drug-related issues. As ONDCP Director, he coordinated the \$19 billion federal drug control budget and developed the *U.S. National Drug Control Strategy*.

General McCaffrey is active in national and international security affairs. He co-chaired the Atlantic Council of the United States NATO Counterterrorism Working Group, leading a delegation to Moscow, Mons, Brussels and Warsaw. In 2008, he participated as member of the Secretary of Public Safety Genaro Garcia Luna's Council of International Experts which concentrates on Mexico's national security within their police and government agencies. In 2004, he addressed the "Security of the Americas Conference" in Mexico City and met with senior officials of the Mexican Government. In April 2004, General McCaffrey helped release the CSIS Bi-national Commission Reports on Migration and Border Security. In February 2002, General McCaffrey visited Cuba and participated in a small group session with Fidel and Raul Castro discussing U.S.-Cuba policies. His article on Cuba can be found at www.mccaffreyassociates.com. General McCaffrey periodically conducts political-military evaluations of Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kuwait, Colombia, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia. His After Action Reports on all these trips are available at www.mccaffreyassociates.com.

Among the honors he has received are: Health and Human Services Lifetime Achievement Award For Extraordinary Achievement in the Field of Substance Abuse Prevention (2004); recognized as one of the 500 Most Influential People in American Foreign Policy by World Affairs Councils of America (2004); the Department of State's Superior Honor Award for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; the Central Intelligence Agency Great Seal Medallion; the United States Coast Guard Distinguished Public Service Award; the NAACP Roy Wilkins Renown Service Award; the Norman E. Zinberg Award of the Harvard Medical School; the Federal Law Enforcement Foundation's National Service Award; the Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America Lifetime Achievement Award; and decorations from France, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. Also, General McCaffrey was given the National Leadership Award by the Community Anti-Drug Coalitions of America (2007); Society of American Military Engineers (SAME) "Golden Eagle" recognition (2007); inducted into the US Army Ranger Hall of Fame at US Army Infantry Center, Ft. Benning, GA (2007); The Lifetime of Achievement Award at the American Red Cross Annual Fire & Ice Ball in Washington, DC (2008). Southwest Association of Buffalo Soldiers' "Spirit of the Buffalo Soldier Award" (2008); the W. Stuart Symington Award from the Air Force Association (2008); the National Narcotics Officers' Associations' Coalition's J Dennis Hastert Lifetime Achievement Award (2009); and the "Footsie" Britt Award by The Society of the 30th Infantry Regiment (2010); Government Security News Extraordinary Leadership & Service in Homeland Security Award (2010).

Prior to confirmation as the National Drug Policy Director, General McCaffrey served as the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces Southern Command coordinating national security operations in Latin America. During his military career, he served overseas for thirteen years and completed four combat tours. He commanded the 24th Infantry Division (Mech) during the Desert Storm 400-kilometer left hook attack into Iraq. At retirement from active duty, he was the most highly decorated four-star general in the U.S. Army. He twice received the Distinguished Service Cross, the nation's second highest medal for valor. He was also awarded two Silver Stars and received three Purple Heart medals for wounds sustained in combat. General McCaffrey served as the assistant to General Colin Powell and supported the Chairman as the JCS advisor to the Secretary of State and the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.

Effective 30 August 2011



Biographic Summary of MG Robert H. Scales, PhD, USA (Ret)

Retired General (Dr.) Robert Scales is one of America's best known and most respected authorities on land warfare. He is currently President of Colgen, LP, a consulting firm specializing in issues relating to landpower, wargaming and strategic leadership. Prior to joining the private sector Dr. Scales served over thirty years in the Army, retiring as a Major General. He commanded two units in Vietnam, winning the Silver Star for action during the battles around Dong Ap Bia (Hamburger Hill) during the summer of 1969. Subsequently, he served in command and staff positions in the United States, Germany, and Korea and ended his military career as Commandant of the United States Army War College. In 1995 he created the Army After Next program which was the Army's first attempt to build a strategic game and operational concept for future land warfare. He has written and lectured on warfare to academic, government, military, and business groups in the United States, Australia, Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and South America. He is the author of two books on military history: *Certain Victory*, the official account of the Army in the Gulf War and *Firepower in Limited War*, a history of the evolution of firepower doctrine since the end of the Korean War. In addition he is an authority on contemporary and future warfare. Concepts and ideas contained in his writings and studies have significantly influenced the course of contemporary modernization and reform within the military. He has written two books on the theory of warfare: *Future Warfare*, a strategic anthology on America's wars to come and *Yellow Smoke: the Future of Land Warfare for America's Military*. He was the only serving officer to have written books subsequently selected for inclusion in the official reading lists of three services; *Certain Victory* for the Army, *Firepower* for the Marine Corps and *Yellow Smoke* for the Navy. Congressman Ike Skelton has included *Yellow Smoke* in his National Security Book List sponsored by National Defense University. His latest work, *The Iraq War: a Military History*, written with Williamson Murray has been reviewed very favorably by the New York Times, Atlantic and Foreign Affairs. He is a frequent consultant with the senior leadership of every service in the Department of Defense as well as many allied militaries. He is senior military analyst for The BBC, National Public Radio and Fox News Network. He has appeared as a commentator on The History Channel, The Discovery Channel, PBS, TLC and Star Television. His commentary is carried frequently on all major television outlets in the Peoples Republic of China. He has written for and been frequently quoted in The New York Post, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Times, Time Magazine, Newsweek, Roll Call and virtually every service defense periodical and media network on issues relating to military history and defense policy. He is a graduate of West Point and earned his PhD in history from Duke University.

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Texas Border Security: A Strategic Military Assessment

Barry R. McCaffrey and Robert H. Scales, PhD

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	9
Strategic, Operational and Tactical Levels of Conflict	9
Strategic	9
Operational	10
Tactical	10
Texas as a Narco-Sanctuary	10
Organization for Combat	12
BSOC-UCs/JOICs	12
Texas Rangers Lead the Fight	13
A Successful System Under Threat	14
RECOMMENDATIONS	14
▪ Communications and the Network	14
▪ Operations	14
▪ Intelligence	15
▪ Technology	15
▪ Learning	15

TEXAS BORDER SECURITY REPORT

I. PURPOSE	17
A. The Task	17
B. The Approach	17
C. The Bottom Line	18

II. A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE	18
A. Strategic	18
B. Operational	19
C. Tactical	19
III. BACKGROUND	20
A. Mexico: Our Vulnerable Center of Gravity	20
B. Central & South America’s Drug Trafficking Crisis	21
IV. BEYOND SPECULATION – CARTEL ACTIVITY IN TEXAS	23
A. Focus on Texas	24
B. Beyond the U.S./Mexico Border	24
C. Cartel Violations of Texas Sovereignty	25
D. Beyond Crime: The Impact of Cartel Control of the SW Border Counties	27
V. TEXAS – THE DECISION POINT	29
A. Decision Point	29
B. Why Texas	30
C. The Economic Impact of Cartel Penetration	31
VI. TEXAS & FEDERAL AGENCIES – SOLVING BORDER SECURITY PROBLEMS TOGETHER	32
A. A Common Approach	32
B. Obstacles to be Overcome	32
C. A Commitment to Cooperation	33
D. The Texas Campaign	33
VII. THE TEXAS EXPERIMENT – HOW IT WORKS	34

A. The Texas Border Security Campaign Plan (2009-2011)	35
B. Border Security Council	35
C. Unified Commands (UCs) and Joint Operations and Intelligence Centers (JOICs)	36
D. The Border Security Operations Center (BSOC)	37
VIII. TEXAS BORDER COMMUNICATONS OPERABILITY & INTEROPERABILITY	39
IX. OUTCOMES AND PRODUCTS	40
A. TxMAP	41
B. DPS-BSOC: A Collaborative Learning System	41
C. Autonomous Surveillance Platform (ASP)	42
D. Ranger Reconnaissance Teams	43
X. THE CONDUCT OF MILITARY-STYLE OPERATIONS: OPERATION BORDER STAR	44
A. Purpose	44
B. An Instructive Anecdote	44
C. Operation Blue Heron: Ranger Reconnaissance Teams in Action	45
XI. TEXAS AS A LABORATORY FOR A NATIONAL EFFORT	47
A. Strategic	47
B. Operational	48
C. Tactical	49
TEXAS BORDER SECURITY BIBLIOGRAPHY	51

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TEXAS BORDER SECURITY: A STRATEGIC MILITARY ASSESSMENT

Executive Summary

During the past two years the state of Texas has become increasingly threatened by the spread of Mexican cartel organized crime. The threat reflects a change in the strategic intent of the cartels to move their operations into the United States. In effect, the cartels seek to create a “sanitary zone” inside the Texas border -- one county deep -- that will provide sanctuary from Mexican law enforcement and, at the same time, enable the cartels to transform Texas’ border counties into narcotics transshipment points for continued transport and distribution into the continental United States. To achieve their objectives the cartels are relying increasingly on organized gangs to provide expendable and unaccountable manpower to do their dirty work. These gangs are recruited on the streets of Texas cities and inside Texas prisons by top-tier gangs who work in conjunction with the cartels.

Strategic, Operational and Tactical Levels of Conflict

The authors of this report, both retired senior military executives bring more than 80 years of military and governmental service to their perspective on Texas border security viewed in terms of the classic levels of conflict: *strategic, operational and tactical*.

Strategic

America’s fight against narco-terrorism, when viewed at the strategic level, takes on the classic trappings of a real war. Crime, gangs and terrorism have converged in such a way that they form a collective threat to the national security of the United States. America is being assaulted not just from across our southern border but from across the hemisphere and beyond. All of Central and South America have become an interconnected source of violence and terrorism. Drug cartels exploit porous borders using all the traditional elements of military force, including command and control, logistics, intelligence, information operations and the application of increasingly deadly firepower. The intention is to increasingly bring governments at all levels throughout the Americas under the influence of international cartels.

Operational

In the United States the operational level of the campaign against cartel terrorism is manifested at the state. Texas has become critical terrain and operational ground zero in the cartel's effort to expand into the United States. Texas has an expansive border with drug cartels controlling multiple shipping lanes into the state. Texas' location as the geographic center of the U.S. allows for easier distribution of drugs and people. In effect, the fight for control of the border counties along the Rio Grande has become the operational center of gravity for the cartels and federal, state and local forces that oppose them.

Tactical

At the tactical level of war the cartels seek to gain advantage by exploiting the creases between U.S. federal and state border agencies, and the separation that exists between Mexican and American crime-fighting agencies. Border law enforcement and political officials are the tactical focal point. Sadly, the tactical level is poorly resourced and the most vulnerable to corruption by cartels. To win the tactical fight the counties must have augmentation, oversight and close support from operational and strategic forces.

History has shown that a common border offers an enemy sanctuary zone and the opportunity to expand his battlespace in depth and complexity. Our border with Mexico is no exception. Criminality spawned in Mexico is spilling over into the United States. Texas is the tactical close combat zone and frontline in this conflict. Texans have been assaulted by cross-border gangs and narco-terrorist activities. In response, Texas has been the most aggressive and creative in confronting the threat of what has come to be a narco-terrorist military-style campaign being waged against them.

Texas as a Narco-Sanctuary

A successful sanctuary permits insurgents to move freely and operate on whichever side offers greater security. In a curious twist of irony, the more successful the Mexican military becomes in confronting the cartels, the greater likelihood that cartels will take the active fight into Texas as they compete against each other in the battle to control distribution territories and corridors

Federal authorities are reluctant to admit to the increasing cross-border campaign by narco-terrorists. Until lately, denial has been facilitated by a dearth of evidence that an organized and substantial campaign exists inside Texas. Evidence collected for this report, principally

from Texas border counties, reveals a palpable sense of frustration concerning the effectiveness of U.S. federal border operations.

Accounts of this violence, both data driven and anecdotal, compiled by federal agencies, Congressional testimony and the Texas Department of Agriculture underscores the daily activity and constant threat of a larger presence of narco-terrorists than previously thought. The Federal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) does not attribute many narco-crimes to the cartels. Many cross-border crimes are routinely not reported by border farmers and ranchers due to fear of retribution from cartels.

The cartel's foot soldiers who fight the tactical battle in Texas are "transnational gang" members many of whom are drawn from prison gangs such as the Mexican Mafia, Texas Syndicate, Tango Blast, Barrio Azteca and others that formed in U.S. prisons for self-preservation and protection from other gangs. These transnational gangs not only have continued to expand in Texas and the nation but constitute a very tightly knit network of cooperation and connectivity that has been growing between prison gangs and Mexican cartels.

Impact on Texans

Fear and anxiety levels among Texas farmers and ranchers have grown enormously during the past two years. Farmers, ranchers and other citizens in border communities are caught in the crossfire of escalating cross-border violence resulting in large part from conflicts between cartels, paramilitary enforcement groups and transnational gangs struggling for control of key drug and illegal alien smuggling routes into the U.S. from El Paso to Brownsville. Some Texas farmers and ranchers have even abandoned their livelihoods to move their families to safer ground.

Living and conducting business in a Texas border county is tantamount to living in a war zone in which civil authorities, law enforcement agencies as well as citizens are under attack around the clock. The Rio Grande River offers little solace to the echoes of gunshots and explosions. News of shootings, murders, kidnappings, beheadings, mass graves and other acts of violence coming across the border go far beyond any definition of "spillover violence."

Texas Joins the War

Because Texas is the frontline in this conflict and because its citizens and institutions are most affected, the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) has developed a comprehensive military-like operational campaign against narco-terrorists. This effort is still growing and changing in response to an adaptive and ruthless enemy that still harbors an intense desire to take its campaign into the United States. Five years of effort to curtail narco-terrorist intrusion has given the Texas DPS and its state and local partners enormous and hard-won experience in the art and science of fighting the southwest border war.

Beginning in 2006, Texas began a series of high-intensity, sequential, short-duration operations that resulted in crime reductions ranging from 25 percent to as high as 75 percent as smuggling operations decreased. Later, the state expanded and lengthened these operations by increasing the patrol presence along the Texas-Mexico border. Governor Perry was able to achieve this expansion of effort by leveraging various discretionary grants to increase local and state patrol capacity along the border through overtime payments and the purchase of communications and surveillance equipment as well as new vehicles and weapons. The governor also committed Texas military forces to support these operations.

To gain support from the citizenry, in 2007 the Texas Legislature created the Border Security Council (BSC) charged with advising the governor regarding the allocation of discretionary state homeland security funds. The BSC held a series of public hearings and received testimony from business owners, law enforcement officers, local elected officials and private citizens and then produced a comprehensive report and recommendations on border security issues for the governor and Texas Legislature.

Organization for Combat

BSOC-UCs/JOICs

The state of Texas organized for combat in a manner familiar to the military by creating six Unified Commands (UCs) each staffed with a Joint Operations and Intelligence Center (JOICs) located principally within Texas cities most threatened by cartel violence. This Texas effort, led by the Texas Rangers, is dependent on a cooperative relationship based not on command authority, but on a shared relationship, trust and commitment to work together.

This cooperative group of players is represented by federal, state, local and military components. The heart and operational engine of the Texas border security effort is located

in Austin within the Border Security Operations Center (BSOC). All unified command and joint players intersect in a single facility administered by the Texas Ranger Division of the DPS. The BSOC collects and shares information from all state, local and federal agencies.

Six years of experience has produced a collaborative interagency network that has grown by establishing trust and confidence among network participants from strategic through tactical. The comity engendered through successful operation allows the BSOC team to chip away at bureaucratic cultures and mindsets. Such experience serves to generate interpersonal incentives and rewards selflessness and a commitment to collaborative behavior.

Years of experimentation and field operations have yielded a wealth of lessons learned as well as new materiel, tactics and doctrine unique to Texas but capable of being shared by other state and federal border security agencies. The BSOC operates using a statewide mapping system that graphically displays and shares with unified commands and federal agencies a crime map that includes all drug, cash and weapons seizures. It fuses information from other state and federal agencies. Texas has developed cheap and effective locally procured wildlife cameras linked to the Internet that are capable of passing images in real time to state authorities.

Texas Rangers Lead the Fight

The first principle of Texas border security operations is to empower local law enforcement. Soldiers often say that bad strategies cannot be salvaged by good tactics--- but bad tactics can defeat a good strategy. This saying simply reinforces the truism that no national strategy that seeks to defeat narco-terrorism can be adequately confronted unless tactical units, such as local police and federal border security stations, are properly staffed, resourced, competent and well-led.

The Texas Rangers lead a cooperative program that brings together a ground, air and marine assault capability. Ranger Reconnaissance Teams are the tactical combat elements in the war against narco-terrorists. Each participating federal, state and local agency voluntarily adds its unique capabilities to the teams. The Texas Highway Patrol acts as an outer perimeter for the Rangers by funneling traffic toward Ranger border positions. Tactical contact teams, deploying along the Rio Grande in small, concealed positions, are able to respond immediately to intelligence from Autonomous Surveillance Platform (ASP) units, DPS and National Guard surveillance helicopters, as well as calls to UCs from local

police or citizens. DPS Dive Teams conduct SONAR scans of the Rio Grande and assist in recovery of vehicles and contraband in splashdown areas.

Resources remain the greatest impediment to the expansion and continued success of the Rangers' border war against the cartels. Budget cuts for DHS, its Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG) have severely constrained the ability of Texas to rely on its federal partners and their resources to expand border operations.

A Successful System Under Threat

Years of collective effort by Texas law enforcement have yielded a remarkably flexible and efficient system of border protection that involves all levels of command from federal to local. This system is under threat not only by an increasingly ruthless and adaptive enemy but also by an increasingly diminished budget.

Without question, the future success of this effort will depend on the ability of the state of Texas, local and federal agencies to work together to expand their war against intrusion by cartels. The bottom line, however, is that while today Texas is the frontline in this escalating war, the potential consequences of success or failure will affect our entire nation. Thus, it is up to the nation to support Texas in its efforts to defeat this transnational criminal enterprise.

Texas Border Security: A Strategic Military Assessment

Recommendations

Communications and the Network: A truly seamless joint effort between federal, state and local law enforcement cannot occur unless all of the players are connected by an integrated broadband system. Such a system must network all land, air and maritime communications systems. It also must be robust enough to connect the smallest border town police departments (with adequate cyber-security controls) to the most sophisticated national domestic intelligence networks. Only a consortium of federal and state and local resources can make such an expansive effort affordable and successful.

Operations: The success of border operations by the Texas Rangers should serve as a template for the future. Federal border security agencies should continue to support and enhance the current joint operational framework established by the state of Texas and

tactically implemented by the Texas Rangers. Reform at that operational level is dependent on bringing more “boots on the ground” to the fight for border security to include a greater participation by the National Guard under state control. All agencies involved should develop a framework and establish an alliance for integrated cross border planning, intelligence sharing, communications and synchronized operations. Such an effort must include all legal, procedural and policy changes necessary to break down bureaucratic, cultural and mind-set barriers that currently exist between front line local, state and federal participants.

Intelligence: Reform of the border security intelligence system must begin with more sophisticated cross-border technical and human intelligence collection about the enemy coupled with the ability to offer a clearer digital picture of the battlefield to border tactical forces. Key to this effort must be a quantum improvement in the ability of the federal intelligence agencies to gather, analyze and disseminate actionable intelligence and information in real time with state and local law enforcement. Federal support is also needed to accelerate enhancement of the Department of Public Safety’s TxMAP system for Intelligence mapping and data base support.

Technology: The state of Texas should develop a plan for Federal funding and participation in a “Joint Technology Development Center.” The creation of a joint Federal and state “skunk works” effort would combine federal financial and scientific research assets with the proven success of Texas’ efforts to apply off the shelf technologies to winning the battle for border security. Such an effort would focus on technologies to detect, track, assess, classify, interdict and prosecute criminals along the Southwest border region. Technological areas with the most promise include meshing networks, low cost un-manned ground sensors, ground surveillance radars, remote cameras, aerial platforms, thermal and night vision capabilities, command and control facilities, state of the art weapons and sighting systems as well as identification systems connected to dynamic and inclusive data bases.

Learning: No amount of well-intended effort will completely eliminate the natural operational friction that exists between disparate federal, state and local agencies confronting these lethal and well-resourced Mexican criminal cartels. Decades of experience in fighting our nation’s foreign wars have shown time and again that reducing operational friction can best be achieved by a system that enhances shared awareness and mutual understanding. To this end, Texas should establish an effort that teaches all participants “how Texas border operations work.” The Texas effort would be based on proven joint military programs. The Texas and federal partners must bring together all

participants into a single in-resident and virtual classroom to learn the detailed procedures, statutes, organizations, doctrine, tactical methods and rules of engagement. Faculty and funding would be shared by experienced operators from all levels of law enforcement, federal to local.

Texas Border Security: A Strategic Military Assessment

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Robert H. Scales, PhD

"We are in a war. We are in a war and I'm not going to sugar coat it by any means. We are in a war and it is what it is." -- Arthur Barrera, Texas Ranger

I. PURPOSE

A: The Task

In June 2011, Texas Department of Agriculture Commissioner Todd Staples requested that two senior military officers, Gen. Barry McCaffrey (Ret.) and Gen. Robert Scales (Ret.), develop and recommend a military-style strategy and operational and tactical requirements to secure the Texas portion of the U.S.-Mexico border. He also requested specific information related to the financial, manpower, technology and other resources needed to secure the Texas-Mexico border; and ways in which the roles and resources of U.S. federal agencies could be optimally deployed to facilitate implementation of these recommendations.

B: The Approach

This paper will delineate the terrorist template in order to highlight the magnitude and dynamics of the growth of lawlessness in Mexico and the threats the drug cartels pose to the people of Texas; and to focus attention on the success of a Texas-led effort to take back our nation's southwest border. The paper will then describe efforts made by U.S Federal and Texas law enforcement agencies to confront this growing threat. The intent is to use Texas as a model for a nationwide campaign that will stem the cross-border intrusion of these dangerous and insidious criminal groups.

It will give cost-effective, evidence-based solutions for the future with the aspiration that defending our Southwest border will become a priority for the nation.

C: The Bottom Line: Mexican Cartels Seek to Create a “Sanitary Zone” Inside the United States

This paper will be the first to conclude that the cartels are following a twofold strategic plan:

1. First, to create a “sanitary zone” inside the Texas border -- one county deep -- that will provide sanctuary from Mexican law enforcement and, at the same time, enable the cartels to transform Texas’ border counties into narcotics transshipment points for continued transport and distribution into the continental United States.
2. Second, to increasingly rely on organized gangs to provide expendable and unaccountable manpower to do their dirty work inside Texas and elsewhere in the country. These gangs are recruited on the streets of Texas cities and inside Texas prisons by top-tier gangs who work in conjunction with the cartels.

II: A Military Perspective

Senior military leaders customarily analyze conflicts such as these from the three levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical. This construct applies to all forms of human conflict, including narco-terrorism. The authors will therefore exploit the classic three levels of war as a template for viewing the Texas border security challenge.

A: Strategic

From the view of international crime and conflict, America’s fight against narco-terrorism, when viewed at the strategic level, takes on the classic trappings of a real war. Crime, gangs and terrorism have converged in such a way that they form a collective threat to the national security of the United States. As Robert Killebrew writes in his superb study “Crime Wars”:

“Crime, terrorism, and insurgency are interwoven in new and dangerous ways that threaten not just the welfare but also the security of societies in the Western Hemisphere. Scale and capability have made the cartels an insurgent threat as well as a criminal one.”

To make the case that narco-terrorism crosses the line from crime to war at the strategic level demands that the threat must extend beyond our border. Clearly, America is being assaulted not just from across our southern border but from across the hemisphere and

beyond. All of Central and South America have become an interconnected source of crime, violence and terrorism. Drug cartels exploit porous borders using all the traditional elements of military force, including command and control, logistics, intelligence, information operations and the application of increasingly deadly firepower. The intent is to increasingly bring governments at all levels throughout the Americas under the influence of international cartels.

Today's crime wars and narco-terrorism affect the national security situation and policies of nation states from Bolivia to Columbia, Guatemala, Mexico and the United States. Local law enforcement simply are not equipped to prosecute these wars. We must now begin to collect the level of force protection traditionally used in classic warfare if we are to match and eventually defeat increasingly effective strategic forces of cartels, gangs and the corrupt national level forces that protect them.

B: Operational

In the United States the operational level of the campaign against cartel terrorism is manifested at the state level. Operational campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. The four border states (California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas) are the operational center of gravity and the point of conflict through which the U.S. federal agencies implement national anti-drug strategy as outlined by the commander-in-chief.

State territory gives cartels the operational depth they need to translate cross-border tactical success into their strategic objective of profiting from the distribution of narcotics throughout our country. Exploiting the internal workings of state affairs and occupying state terrain gives the cartels depth to maneuver and the ability to extend their battlespace into secure regions beyond the reach of an expanding Mexican domestic anti-cartel campaign. Among the four border states, Texas has become critical terrain and operational ground zero in the cartel's effort to expand into the United States. Texas has an expansive border with drug cartels controlling multiple shipping lanes into the state. Texas' location as the geographic center of the U.S. allows for easier distribution of drugs and people.

C: Tactical

As we have seen in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, wars are won or lost at the tactical level. The narco-terrorist war is no different. The tactical level of war is where enemies collide in the close fight. At the tactical level the cartels seek to gain advantage by exploiting the creases between U.S. federal and state border agencies, and the separation that exists

between Mexican and American crime-fighting agencies. Border law enforcement and political officials are the tactical focus point. Sadly, the tactical level is poorly resourced and is the most vulnerable to corruption by cartels. To win the tactical fight the counties must have augmentation, oversight and close support from operational and strategic forces.

III. BACKGROUND

A: Mexico: Our Vulnerable Center of Gravity

America's hunger for illicit drugs and the Mexican criminal structure to supply them have created an internal war in Mexico that has stripped that country of its internal security to the extent that a virtual state of siege now exists adjacent to our own southwestern states. The Mexican people are sad inheritors of tragic conditions spawned by this incipient war, including over 40,000 murdered, many thousands kidnapped, commerce diminished, and civil society in Mexico's northern states severely deteriorated. The terror inflicted on the Mexican people can no longer be characterized as mere wanton criminality. Conditions in Mexico have become so horrific as to approach a civil war, driven by terrorists motivated by profit and greed rather than ideology or radical religion. Conditions in Mexico are akin to the beginnings of a terrorist failed state, and the impact of these conditions on the state of Texas and its citizens is both dramatic and far-reaching.

Texas Department of Public Safety Director Steven McCraw has testified to the fact that over the last 18 months, six of seven cartels have established command and control facilities in Texas cities that rival even the most sophisticated battalion or brigade level combat headquarters. Texas has suffered 22 murders, 24 assaults, 15 shootings and five kidnappings related to the cartels. A troubling and insidious threat is the use of criminal gangs by the cartels, particularly along southwestern border counties that have less than 10 percent of the population, but account for almost 20 percent of juvenile gang-related crimes. Within the last year, the number of Texas prison gangs that work directly with the Mexican cartels has increased from four to 12.

The long-term effect on the public safety of Texans is profound in that almost two-thirds of criminal activity in Texas is gang-related. The cartels are beginning to make a significant investment in future gang activity by recruiting school-age children to support cartel enterprises.

1. **From Local to Transnational Gangs:** The cartel's intrusion inside the United States is tied to dozens of transnational gangs trained by the cartels and operating as agents in the metropolitan areas, cities, suburbs and towns of Texas. Collectively they

constitute a vast network of satellite criminal business enterprises that act as the marketing, enforcement, contraband distribution and money-laundering network for the cartels. Cartel-gang alliances have been developed within Texas prisons and these associations are growing. Likewise, regional alliances exist between specific gangs and specific cartels. Because minors are exempt from the full force of prosecution, cartels and gangs use juveniles for smuggling, cross-border scouting, in-school recruiting, drug sales and, sadly, even assassinations. The two biggest gang organizations in Texas, the Mexican Mafia and the Texas Syndicate, work as “subcontractors” for Mexican cartels both to enforce narco-trafficking and to transport drugs on U.S. soil.

2. **Increasing Cooperation Among Gangs:** Many "transnational gang" members come to the United States from Central American gangs formed in part by refugees who fled the wars in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras in the 1980s and were deported back to their home countries. These gangs not only have continued to expand in Texas but constitute a very tightly knit network of cooperation and connectivity that has been growing between prison gangs and Mexican cartels. Consensus among police departments suggests that gangs are growing in strength as well as numbers in Texas cities and suburbs. The Houston area and its suburbs, for example, are home to far more gang members than anywhere else in Texas. There are at least 225 documented gangs in the Houston area and surrounding counties with more than 10,000 “documented” members. Gang members have been arrested for home invasions, robbery, kidnapping, murder, extortion, money laundering and drug trafficking. About half of gang members arrested involve drug charges, many at the wholesale level.
3. **Transnational Shipments of Arms as Well as Drugs:** Between \$19 billion and \$39 billion in illicit proceeds move through southwestern border “bulk smuggling” operations to Mexico each year. Illegal firearms accompany bulk cash shipments across the nation, through Texas to the southwestern border. Between FY2005 and FY2010, ATF investigations led to the seizure of over 8,700 guns and the indictment of 1,705 defendants, of whom 1,170 were convicted.

B: Central and South America’s Drug Trafficking Crisis

Today’s crime wars and narco-terrorism affect the national security situation and policies of nation states from Bolivia to Columbia, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mexico and the United States. Thanks to the American

and European thirst for narcotics, virtually all Central and South America states are experiencing an increase in transnational cartel activity.

Narcotics-related homicide rates have gone up in every country in the region, in some cases dramatically. The northern half of the Isthmus, comprising Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, is now the most violent region in the world. Formerly “safe” countries such as Costa Rica and Panama have seen their crime rates related to narcotics increase sharply in the past five years. Border security pressures along the Texas border cast a long shadow much farther south. Murders proliferating in Guatemala, for example, are directly related to drug trafficking. Today, more than one-third of Guatemala is under effective control of criminal narcotics organizations.

Mexico might have shared the fate of other states collapsed through terrorism had it not been for the resolve of President Calderón and his military, and for support given to the Mexican government. U.S. federal agencies have made progress in confronting the narco-terrorist threat through the Mérida Initiative. The rise of extreme violence on our southern border has convinced both the Bush and Obama administrations to increase the U.S. federal presence along the border. The number of DEA and Border Patrol manpower has grown since the start of the narco-wars. Likewise, the military has found a useful role in backstopping civilian border forces and on occasion adding military unique tactical technologies to the border war.

1. **Mérida Initiative and Other Assistance Programs:** In recent years, U.S.-Mexican relations have grown stronger as the two countries have worked together to combat drug trafficking and secure their shared border; however, tensions have intermittently emerged in this bilateral relationship. The cornerstone of this partnership is the Mérida Initiative, which this year includes over \$200 million in assistance.
 - a. Throughout 2009 and 2010, President Calderón and U.S. political leaders have begun to implement a new strategy for the Mérida Initiative focused on combating organized criminal groups trafficking drugs into the United States and illicit weapons and cash into Mexico.
 - b. The Mérida Initiative expanded bilateral and regional cooperation to combat organized crime and criminal gangs and to maximize the effectiveness of efforts against drug, human and weapons trafficking, including judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption and rule of law activities. To date, the U.S. Congress has appropriated a total of \$1.5 billion for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative. The Mérida Initiative also includes about \$300

million in equipment, including three UH-60 and eight Bell 412 helicopters. More than 6,800 federal police investigators, 1,800 penitentiary staff and 4,300 judicial sector personnel have participated in U.S.-funded training events.

- c. Overseen by the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), Department of Defense (DOD) can provide counterdrug assistance under certain circumstances. DOD counternarcotics support to Mexico totaled roughly \$200 million in FY2009-FY2011. DOD will use about \$50 million in FY2011 to improve security along the Mexico-Guatemala-Belize border. DOD support to Mexico in FY2012 may exceed \$75 million.

In spite of these efforts, Mexico remains the principal source of our vulnerability to narco- terrorism at the strategic level of war; and Texas is the state most vulnerable to the spread of instability and violence in Mexico. The “ground truth” of the war against the cartels on the Mexican side is well known: tens of thousands of murders and kidnappings as the cartels fight for control of cross-border movement of drugs and people to the north, and weapons and cash to the south. Narco-terrorists have forced capitulation of certain border cities and towns in order to claim territory for unimpeded transshipment of drugs, which has eroded legitimate commerce as several towns have emptied.

A perspective on the threat to Mexico from a senior Mexican official, Alejandro Poiré, spokesman for Mexico’s National Security Strategy Council, reveals the extent of the Mexican view of the cartel threat. Poiré said that President Calderon is opposed to legalizing drugs as a solution to the violence in Mexico. Most importantly, because of the way in which drug cartels have diversified their criminal activities, he stated further that “the security issue in Mexico is way beyond drug trafficking.” In effect Poiré concluded that cartels are fighting on two fronts: for control of border smuggling corridors and for control of drug distribution networks in the United States.

IV: BEYOND SPECULATION – CARTEL ACTIVITY IN TEXAS

Such violence driven by internal terrorism cannot remain isolated within one nation for very long. History has shown that a common border offers an enemy sanctuary zone and the opportunity to expand his strategic battlespace in depth and complexity. Our border with Mexico is no exception. Criminality spawned in Mexico is spilling over into the United States. Rival gangs affiliated with the Mexican cartels control the drug trade in over 300 American cities and towns, according to the FBI. According to the Justice Department’s National Youth Gang Center, since 1980 the growth of gangs in the United States has been incredibly rapid, from an estimated 286 jurisdictions, which reported the presence of

approximately 2,000 gangs made up of nearly 100,000 members in 1980 to over 30,000 gangs with more than 1 million members in 2011.

About 25 percent of the federal prison population in 2010 was comprised of 55,000 foreign nationals. Their numbers are growing. State and local correctional systems that applied for payments under the federal State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP) in 2009 reported 296,000 illegal aliens who were jailed at least four days for a felony or two misdemeanors. The average incarcerated alien had seven arrests and committed an average of 12 offenses. Twenty-five percent of the aliens had 16 or more offenses.

In 2009 the Federal government spent about \$1.3 billion for the incarceration of aliens in the federal Bureau of Prisons system. Another \$323 million went for payments to states and localities as partial reimbursement for their costs. States and localities are incurring significant additional costs to incarcerate illegal aliens, since the SCAAP payments cover only a small fraction of the total cost. Texas spends \$13.5 million each month just for holding illegal immigrants who are either serving their sentences or awaiting deportation. An estimated 9,000 illegal immigrants are in Texas Department of Criminal Justice custody.

A: Focus on Texas

As in any trans-border conflict, violence is most pronounced at the international point of intersection. Four American states are most affected by this spreading and insidious conflict. This study focuses on Texas because it is the frontline in this conflict and because its citizens and institutions are most affected. Texas shares the longest border with Mexico. Texans have been the first to be assaulted by cross-border gangs and narco-terrorist activities. And, perhaps most importantly, among all border states, Texas has been the most aggressive and creative in confronting the threat of what has come to be a narco-terrorist military-style campaign being waged against them.

B: Beyond the U.S./Mexico Border

The problem with success so far is the assumption that while the economic, financial and social consequences of narco-terrorism has spread to all of the United States, the “war” as an active enterprise ends at the border. This may have been true in the past, but it most certainly is not true today. The reasons are many:

1. The spillover effect of increased violence in Mexico increases the violence on the U.S. side. But over the past two years, the war has intensified on our side due to the intentional design by warring cartels. Virtually every successful insurgency profits

from sanctuary across an international border. The North Koreans had China; The North Vietnamese Army had the Ho Chi Minh Trail along the border with Laos; and the Taliban winters in comfort in the Pashtun regions of Pakistan.

2. A successful sanctuary permits insurgents to move freely and operate on whichever side offers greater security. The narco-terrorist follows the same pattern of behavior where the most lucrative and safer sanctuary lies north of the border. In a curious twist of irony, the more successful the Mexican military becomes in confronting the cartels, the more likely the cartels will take the active fight into the United States as they compete against each other in the battle to control distribution corridors inside Texas.
3. Federal authorities are reluctant to admit to the increasing cross-border campaign by narco-terrorists. Until lately, denial has been facilitated by a dearth of evidence that an organized and substantial campaign exists inside Texas. Evidence collected for this report, principally from Texas border counties, reveals a palpable sense of frustration concerning the effectiveness of U.S. federal border operations. Accounts of this violence, which have been documented by numerous federal agencies, Congressional testimony and the Texas Department of Agriculture underscore the daily activity and constant threat of a larger presence of narco-terrorists than previously thought. The FBI does not differentiate between everyday or “drug-related” homicides, robberies, aggravated assaults, sexual assaults and motor vehicle thefts. They admit that their data for kidnapping, extortion, money laundering, bribery, coercion of public servants, organized crime, arson, fraud, perjury, trespassing, property destruction, weapons offenses, terrorist threat and trafficking of persons are not included in the FBI Uniformed Crime Report as being “drug- or gang-related” crimes. Therefore the collected data is always missing a critical element that would provide fidelity to the actual impact of drug- or gang-related offenses. One reason for this disparity between reported and actual cartel activity in Texas is that the 17,000 local and state law enforcement agencies that provide data to the UCR are not required to categorize these crimes as “drug-related.”

C: Cartel Violations of Texas Sovereignty

Farmers and ranchers whose families have spent generations on the Texas side of the border reflect on how the character and intent of border crossing immigrants have changed over the past three years. They now see most of the intruders on their land as men tattooed

with the marks of cartels, gangs and in some cases Hezbollah members. They are confronted often with border-crossers who demand to use their phones or trucks. Texas homes are now surrounded by strangers who harass the owners until they concede their land for use by the cartels. Farmers refuse to travel at night.

About 75 miles from the Mexican border, Brooks County is not a border county but it contains the Falfurrias Border Patrol checkpoint. Smugglers constantly try to get around that checkpoint and evade local law enforcement. Illegal immigrants from Mexico, Central and South America, Pakistan, India, Africa, China and elsewhere turn up day and night. Rival gangs fight for valuable Brooks County territory to smuggle and also to steal oil from the oil fields and tap pipelines. Decaying human remains litter the landscape. The cost of autopsies and burials of illegal immigrants and the medical treatment of smuggling survivors drain the County's meager budget.

Smugglers regularly cross ranches to move their loads around the checkpoint, cutting fences, breaking water lines and sometimes stealing vehicles. Encounters by ranchers with groups of menacing strangers are commonplace. The situation is so bad that owners of a ranch in Brooks County packed up and left their 38,000 acre ranch because the area has become, as they described it, a war zone. Their home had been broken into, their land littered with garbage and the distinct sounds of gunfire could be heard from their front porch day and night. The ranch runs alongside Farm Road 755 which law enforcement calls a "main smuggling corridor" for the cartels.

Cartels proudly boast they have established training camps inside Texas. They have taken control of urban gangs and now use them like retail franchises to distribute drugs, launder money and arrange for the southward export of deadly firearms. Ranchers may not say much to the media for fear of reprisal or retaliation by the cartels. But they do talk to each other, every day, about what they see, hear and experience. They also have expressed their thoughts and feelings to the Texas Department of Agriculture, which has publicly documented many of those stories at www.ProtectYourTexasBorder.com.

One rancher observed:

"But the Border Patrol, I could tell you that their hands are tied about a lot of stuff. They have to call Washington; even if they are having a gunfight down at the river, they are on the phone. They have to call Washington. The border patrol have boats on the river. They patrol the river. They are not allowed to pick up anybody that's in the water unless they are dead. If there's drug guys loading drugs, all they have to do

is step out and wade out in the water and Border Patrol can't touch them. They are not allowed to go into the water... and they can't do anything about it."

A consensus has emerged among both citizens and state border officials that they believe U.S. federal agencies too often define their way out of the problem. As a consequence, extortions, violence and cartel corruptions of local officials are not routinely reported. Another factor revealed in testimonials by citizens living and earning their livings on the border strongly suggests that intimidation by cartels also is taking its toll on the reporting of border incidents. As one farmer noted:

"We see a lot of things, but we keep our mouths shut about it. We just don't want to be on anybody's hit list. I keep to myself. The people that are doing what they're doing they keep to themselves. If I see something, I ignore it. I look the other way, but there is a problem. It's really bad. Here on the river, you see a lot of stuff and you don't pay attention to it. You walk away. You try to stay in an area where they see you, so if somebody gets caught, they don't say, 'Well they called somebody.' You know, just try to blend in and not create any waves."

D: Beyond Crime: The Impact of Cartel Control of the SW Border Counties

The drug cartels and their criminal elements realize the value in exploiting small communities along the border for storing and breaking down large narcotic loads for further distribution and transportation. The cartels realize that Texas is a big state with limited law enforcement resources to cover vast rural areas. They take advantage of gaps in manpower and response times to push narcotics northward along established smuggling routes such as U.S. 83, U.S. 281, U.S. 77 and the interstate highway system. Narco-terrorist organizations employ a well-organized cadre of "scouts" who use sophisticated communication and observations techniques, encrypted radios and advanced optics to conduct their clandestine surveillance centered principally in the most vulnerable southwestern border counties. These scouts have armed themselves with automatic weapons and have demonstrated an increasing level of willingness to use them against local law enforcement.

Recent intelligence has revealed that criminal organizations, probably working for Los Zetas and the Gulf Cartel, had a strong foothold in Hidalgo County. The Hidalgo County, Sullivan City Police Chief Hernan Guerra was convicted for conspiracy with intent to distribute narcotics and for helping traffickers cross the border. Guerra along with members of Mexican drug cartel cells operating in Houston, El Paso, Corpus Christi and McAllen were among 429 accused traffickers arrested as part of a nationwide sweep in 2010. The seriousness of cartel intrusion into the Southern District of Texas was highlighted by the indictment of 58 people and the seizure of 31,000 pounds of marijuana; 1,300 pounds of

cocaine and an assortment of real estate as well as bank accounts. Subsequent investigations reveal that at least 70 residential lots in Hidalgo County had been purchased with millions of dollars in drug proceeds. In the U.S. Courts, Western District of Texas, which includes San Antonio and El Paso, 69 people were arrested, many with ties to the Juarez cartel.

Border farmers and ranchers suffer economically from cartel violence on both sides of the border. Cartel intrusion into commerce has affected Texas businessmen and farmers:

“Three men approached one of our excavator operators and asked him what he was doing. He said ‘Well, I’m doing my job,’ and they said, ‘Well, we need you to cease excavating, stop clearing the trees and please move off.’ They said ‘OK’, and they said, ‘We’ll be back in about four hours and you need to stop and be gone. And if you’re not gone, then we’ll deal with you then.’ It’s a big concern for me because I’ve got three employees who work down there (along the river) and I’m worried about the employees. I don’t want them to get hurt, injured or even killed.”

As a result of escalating violence, border residents, sadly, are being forced to leave their farms, some of which have been in families for generations:

“After so many years, it’s upsetting, but either you move on or you know it’s dangerous for your family so I didn’t want to put them through that, and we just we just moved on from farming. It’s not a good feeling, when you’ve been doing something all of your life and then you have to change from there to now I’m behind a desk, my hands are so slick that uh I’m not used to that. It’s something very different. I’m used to getting on the tractor, harvesting and you know getting all greased up. It’s just a different feelings most definitely. They are controlling the farmers in the area and it’s really getting very sad.”

Perhaps the least reported aspect of cartel intrusion into the state is the psychological impact of increasingly open and brazen activities along the border. Two years ago cartel agents inside Texas conducted their criminal activities covertly seeking as much as possible not to bring attention and create an atmosphere harmful to their financial successes. Today cartels’ brazenness has opened a new chapter in their activities, suggesting that they no longer fear public exposé. Cartels emblazon their vehicles with marks like large “Z”s or the Ferrari emblem to symbolize their affiliation to their individual cartels. Cartel hit squads have been known to wear uniforms. City gangs no longer hide their franchise activities from police. Ranchers and farmers increasingly find cartel members on their doorstep. When

crossing borders, cartel agents used to avoid local, state and federal border authorities. Today these criminals are willing to confront and sometimes fight openly, ignoring public outrage inside the state. These disturbing events have not only damaged the prosperity of southwestern border counties and cities, they also have had a detrimental impact on the morale of citizens, some of whom have farmed and ranched on the border for generations. Their sentiments reflect that this is not the traditional way of life along the border. It is, in fact a new and heightened level of unease, tension and fear.

As one long term rancher notes:

“When I get up in the morning and step out the door, I’m looking for rattlesnakes and illegals, and I’m packing my gun and my cell phone. When I go down to feed my horses, I have my dog, my pistol and the cell phone. You just have to stay aware. Several months ago, I walked in my tack room and my two big dogs went ballistic, and there were two illegal aliens there. I get more angry than scared because you cannot be scared. You’re just going to have to pull your socks up and just get after it and I’ve got border patrol on speed dial.”

V: TEXAS – THE DECISION POINT

The cartels’ encroachment will exploit the tactical-operational divide along the Texas border in order to extend their controlled territory by about 100 miles inside Texas. The emerging tactical fight to push the cartels back across the border will have enormous strategic consequences for both the United States and Mexico. In effect, Texas has become the cartel’s decisive point in their concept of future operations.

A: Decision Point

At the operational level of war, a decision point is a place that allows a commander to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of the operation. The sanctuary offered by an insecure border offers the cartels potential territory for continued criminal prosperity in the face of a less secure Mexico. It also provides the cartels with a preferred point of decision. Texas law enforcement officials led by Department of Public Safety Director, Steven McCraw, have committed themselves in conjunction with local law enforcement partners to preventing the enemy from establishing a sanitary tactical zone inside Texas.

B: Why Texas? Texas is preferred by the cartels because the state offers the greatest operational reach inside the U.S. and the deepest penetration into the greater American

drug market. The ever-expanding tentacles of drug-related crime are becoming very worrisome in Texas. Two south Texas sheriffs and 70 Customs and Border Patrol officials have been convicted for cartel-related corruption. This is an injustice that dishonors the thousands of law enforcement officers who take pride in their oaths to protect and defend. The cartels have expanded their criminal presence in Texas through human trafficking, kidnapping and other human-related crimes.

1. **Kidnappings:** According to DPS Director McCraw, the FBI in San Antonio reported that there have been 266 kidnappings since 2004, 14 reported in 2004, and 58 in 2009. Kidnappings include Americans kidnapped in Mexico, victims abducted in Texas and taken to Mexico and victims kidnapped in Texas by subjects from Mexico.
2. **Narcotics Seizures:** The depth of penetration inside Texas by the cartels can be measured by the enormous increase in narcotics seizures along the major highways from the Rio Grande to all neighboring states: methamphetamines, 135%; heroin, 2,500%; marijuana, 124%; and cocaine, 24%. Cartel importation of the profits of crime passing south through Texas includes a 168% increase in bulk cash and a 154% increase in weapons seized or purchased in the United States.
3. **Human Smuggling:** The human smuggling of undocumented aliens from Mexico, Central and South America across the southwest Texas border captures much attention from the public and the media. Three-quarters of all aliens who come into the U.S. from terrorist countries, mostly the Middle East, are captured in Texas along the U.S.-Mexico border. These are called “undocumented referrals” from “special-interest countries” such as Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and India. Somali intruders pose a particularly troublesome challenge for Texas law enforcement because they often claim political asylum when apprehended and too often are released into the general population without proper vetting. Global intrusions are merely another source of revenue for the cartels that collect fees from smuggling organizations for their use of cartel-controlled human smuggling routes. But these very special human cargoes are a particularly worrisome and serious threat that may well translate into a tragic, large-scale attack against American territory in the future.

C: The Economic Impact of Cartel Penetration

1. **Growing Threat to Agriculture:** It is very clear from Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) and Texas Department of Agriculture (TDA) data that fear and anxiety levels among Texas farmers and ranchers have grown enormously during the past two years. Farmers, ranchers and other citizens in border communities are caught in the crossfire of escalating cross-border violence resulting in large part from conflicts between cartels, paramilitary enforcement groups and transnational gangs struggling for control of key drug and illegal alien smuggling routes into the U.S. from El Paso to Brownsville. Some Texas farmers and ranchers have even abandoned their livelihoods to move their families to safer ground.
2. **Increased Danger to Texans:** Conditions within these border communities along both sides of the Texas-Mexico border are tantamount to living in a war zone in which civil authorities, law enforcement agencies as well as citizens are under attack around the clock. The river offers little solace to the echoes of gunshots and explosions. Customs and Border Protection (CPB) Deputy Commissioner David Aguilar admitted that the cartels control “several areas along our border with Mexico,” In fact he noted that “the cartels are turning into more of a Mafia-like organization that are specializing not just in one crime, not in the singular fashion.”
3. **Increasing Demand for State Services by Refugees:** In addition to gun battles and other violence at ports of entry, southwestern border communities have been subject at times to the massive influx of evacuees and casualties from Mexico – a mix of innocent civilians as well as criminals – all of whom may be fleeing violence. Such massive spillover overloads the Texas system of local justice and transports innocent victims of border violence to under-funded medical facilities along the border.

American institutions are a long way from being threatened fundamentally by narco-terrorists operating from Mexican sanctuaries. But the experience of Texas in particular provides compelling evidence of the dangers the nation faces from this spreading contagion. Border security is not a border state problem, but a national one that requires national attention.

VI: TEXAS & FEDERAL AGENCIES:

SOLVING BORDER SECURITY PROBLEMS TOGETHER

A: A Common Approach

From their study and past experience, Gen. McCaffrey and Gen. Scales concur that both state and federal agencies agree on a similar operational and tactical approach to cripple transnational crime organizations:

1. First and foremost, both entities agree the strategic challenge is bigger than Texas, or even the United States for that matter. A federal comprehensive strategy is needed to deny cartels the ability to operate not only within the border region, but throughout Mexico, Central and northern South America.
2. The operational center of gravity for this enterprise must be the enemy's leadership. Texas and federal agencies must make a sustained effort to identify, investigate, apprehend, prosecute and eliminate cartel leadership in the U.S. and south of the U.S.-Mexico border.
3. As with any offensive operation, the shortest path to the destruction of the enemy's leadership is to attack his command and control structures, communications, transportation and logistics operations from South to Central America, through Mexico and well into the continental United States.
4. The enemy's greatest strength is his wealth. Thus, a second essential line of operations is to diminish and undermine the cartel's financial and economic power by attacking all components of his financial and economic structure.
5. The top six cartels are a legitimate threat to national security and should be placed on the Foreign Terrorist Organizations List.

B: Obstacles to be Overcome

This rock solid Federal-Texas border security relationship is impeded by two essential problems:

1. Federal agencies must do more to remove bureaucratic, organizational, cultural and mindset barriers that impede full cooperation and collaboration, from information collection and sharing to joint action.
2. A strategic vision is needed to solidify Mexico's and our Central American allies' fight with the drug cartels.

C: A Commitment to Cooperation

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ) and all other U.S. federal agencies, together with DPS, other Texas state agencies and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are fully engaged in fighting threats from cartels along the southwest border and are collectively committed to:

1. Enhancing information sharing and coordination of intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination.
2. Expanding the scope, quality and timeliness of actionable information and intelligence shared among partners.
3. Employing enhanced technology and training to support interdiction efforts.
4. Improving technology to screen vehicles and cargo, the use of cameras for surveillance, license plate readers at POEs and elsewhere, and biometric identification systems.
5. Increasing cooperation with Mexican counterparts.
6. Working on law enforcement and prosecutorial cooperation on both sides of the border.
7. Stemming the southbound flow of cash out of the U.S. into Mexico and countering all forms of money laundering.
8. Interdicting illegal weapons shipments destined for Mexico.
9. Working to strengthen domestic coordination and cooperation on both money laundering and weapons investigations.

D: The Texas Campaign

Texas DPS along with its state and law enforcement partners is committed to disrupting and dismantling drug, cash, arms and human smuggling organizations operating along the southwest border. Even with its current financial and resource limitations, the Texas border security campaign plan includes all of the essential ingredients for success on the border and within Texas. However, sufficient financial resources are lacking to implement a sustainable operation across all the key border security campaign targets discussed in this report.

Effective planning and implementation of an intelligence-driven border security campaign by Texas no doubt can have a significant impact on the operation of cartel and transnational criminal enterprises. But that is not sufficient. The U.S. and Texas must increase their day-to-day and longer-term cooperation with Mexican counterparts through increased information sharing. The U.S. federal government has to take the leadership role by:

1. Broadening the presence and function of U.S. law enforcement liaisons in Mexico;

2. Increasing judicial cooperation with Mexico.
3. Enhancing cooperation with the Mexican government's financial intelligence unit.
4. Expanding bi-lateral efforts to stem the flow of drugs, money and weapons across the shared border.

VII: THE TEXAS EXPERIMENT – HOW IT WORKS

The Texas Department of Public Safety has developed a comprehensive military-like operational campaign against narco-terrorists. This effort is still growing and changing to respond to an adaptive and ruthless enemy that still harbors an intense desire to take its campaign into the United States. Five years of effort to curtail narco-terrorist intrusion has given the Texas DPS and state and local partners enormous and hard-won experience in the art and science of fighting the border war.

What Texas has accomplished provides insights into how the war against this insidious and dangerous enemy can be exploited at the national strategic level. This effort began in earnest with the Border Security Strategy and Operations Plan written at the direction of Governor Perry in 2006. The governor set forth a four-part plan to increase border security and reduce all crime in Texas border counties.

The initial border strategy framework included a substantial increase in local and state law enforcement patrols made possible by a creative program that brought together tactical (local), operational (state) and strategic (national) forces under a state-led coordinated arrangement. This ad hoc partnership allowed for centralized coordination of patrol operations without interfering with the sovereignty of federal and the autonomy of local border enforcement agencies. Centralized coordination and planning opened the door to the creation of an intelligence scheme to drive border operations. A single effort permitted all three levels to combine many disparate border surveillance ideas and technologies together into a single inclusive program.

Beginning in 2006, Texas began a series of high-intensity, sequential, short-duration operations that resulted in crime reductions ranging from 25 percent to as high as 75 percent as smuggling operations decreased. Later, the state expanded and lengthened these operations by increasing the patrol presence along the Texas-Mexico border. Governor Perry was able to achieve this expansion of effort by leveraging various discretionary grants to increase local and state patrol capacity along the border through overtime payments and the purchase of communications and surveillance equipment as

well as new vehicles and weapons. The governor also committed Texas military forces to support these operations.

A: The Texas Border Security Campaign Plan (2009-2011)

Experience gained during the first three years provided the expertise necessary to draft the first Border Security Campaign plan completed in November 2009. The plan was the first and most inclusive operational level plan to counter crime along the Texas-Mexico border, in transit corridors and urban areas. In 2009, the Texas State Legislature allocated \$110 million for border security plus \$24 million to combat transnational gang activity across the state. The infusion of these funds has allowed the plan to be largely implemented through DPS's Operation BORDER STAR and other initiatives. Between 2009 and 2011, the state expanded the geographical focus of Texas border security operations to include the support of interdiction operations along major transit corridors throughout Texas to counter increasing illicit gangs, firearms and motor vehicle theft in major metropolitan such as Houston, Dallas-Fort Worth, Austin, San Antonio and Amarillo.

B: Border Security Council

One very important lesson learned during the formative period of this effort was the need to inform citizens and expand oversight of the program statewide. To achieve this goal, in 2007 the Texas Legislature created the Border Security Council (BSC) charged with advising the governor regarding the allocation of discretionary state homeland security funds. The BSC held a series of five public hearings and received testimony from business owners, law enforcement officers, local elected officials and private citizens. The Council held public hearings in McAllen, Laredo, El Paso, San Antonio, Austin and Corpus Christi. The Council's findings were as consistent as they were insistent. The citizenry demanded funding for additional local law enforcement officers. They counseled that law enforcement efforts to secure the border should not negatively impact on regional and local economies that are forced to use local and state resources to defend a national border.

Other findings were significant in that they concluded the state plan would not succeed without substantially more federal support. The federal government has not sufficiently staffed and equipped the Office of Field Operations at the ports of entry to reduce smuggling, nor have they provided for the secure and efficient movement of people and commodities to and from Mexico. The Council suggested that resources be increased to better detect and deter northbound and southbound smuggling. Border security operations require an even higher effort of coordination, hard work and sacrifice by dedicated local

and state law enforcement officers, Customs and Border Protection and other federal agencies, such as the U.S. Coast Guard. Local, state, and federal law enforcement along the border need enhanced encrypted radio and other communications capability to support operations and better ensure officer safety.

The BSC findings formed the nexus of initiatives that define the Texas operational level effort against narco-terrorism. Generally, border security operations should be expanded to augment southbound inspections to curtail the smuggling of bulk cash, stolen vehicles and weapons to Mexico. The state should expand its use of technology in the border area to include video surveillance, electronic fingerprint booking stations, electronic license plate readers, information-sharing technology systems, night vision goggles and forward-looking infrared radars (FLIR). More state and local money is needed to expand border radio interoperability and fully implement the Texas data exchange in the border region. The council also recommended expanding manpower to include K-9 units at each port of entry in coordination with federal border operations.

C. Unified Commands (UCs) and Joint Operations and Intelligence Centers (JOICs)

Perhaps the most unique aspect of the Texas border security effort is the organizational plan for tying together all participants into a common scheme. The overall plan is structured much like a military-style “joint” command and control pyramid with strategic, operational and tactical elements united within layered “headquarters,” and tied together with world-class communications and training.

The big difference between a military and the Texas solution is that no one in the latter is in command. Instead, the Texas effort led by the Texas Rangers is dependent on a cooperative relationship based not on command authority, but on a shared relationship, trust and commitment to work together. The key coordinating elements are the “unified commands” (UCs). These are headquarters-style organizations created for six border sectors (El Paso, Marfa, Del Rio, Laredo, Rio Grande Valley and Coastal Bend) consisting of multiple jurisdictions with coordinated and shared federal-state-local-tribal responsibilities and resources.

By design, UCs in each sector allow agencies with six regional “joint” legal, geographic and functional authorities to work together effectively and efficiently without diminishing the authority, responsibility or accountability of any agency. UCs typically include: federal agencies (U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, Federal Bureau of Investigation/FBI; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement/ICE; DOJ’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and

Explosives/ATF; Drug Enforcement Agency/DEA; U.S. Coast Guard). Regional agencies include High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas/HIDTA; the Joint Terrorism Task Force/JTTF; State agencies include state military forces; DPS; Texas Parks and Wildlife Department (TPWD); Tribal authorities; County Sheriffs' Offices and municipal police departments, and other law enforcement agencies. UC operations also coordinate and solicit support from and for non-law enforcement government agencies such as: U.S. Postal Service, Department of Transportation, National Parks Service, and private companies such as railroads, UPS and FedEx; and private agencies such as the Civil Air Patrol and the Texas and Southwestern Cattle Raisers Association. The El Paso UC also includes several counties from the state of New Mexico.

UCs promote interagency communication and information sharing They analyze situational developments and produce and distribute recommendations for decisions and actions. They coordinate follow-up actions that are directed through consensus of the UCs. In other words, UCs are decision-making organizations that develop and seek to implement consensual solutions to defeat narco-terrorism at the border.

Every UC has a senior Texas Ranger on board to ensure that unified commands are held together. State, local and federal participants have offered the Texas Rangers the distinct advantage of coordinating the border security effort through a set of facilities and communications shared by all. This cooperative arrangement is connected using a communications network very similar to a military joint unified command. Six state unified tactical commands termed "Joint Operations and Intelligence Centers" (JOICs), are located in El Paso, Big Bend, Del Rio, Laredo, McAllen and the Coastal Bend. These headquarters are in turn linked to Austin and Washington. The JOIC network facilitates coordination among law enforcement agencies by developing a shared understanding of the threat environment. They serve as all-source information components in each of the security sectors producing tactical and strategic intelligence that support border security operations and also statewide anti-smuggling decision-making and activities. It is important to emphasize the UC/JOIC "command and control" system places the greatest emphasis and support at the local/tactical level.

D: The Border Security Operations Center (BSOC)

The heart and operational engine of the Texas border security effort is located in Austin within the Border Security Operations Center. All unified command and joint players intersect in a single facility administered by the Texas Ranger Division of the DPS. The BSOC collects and shares information from all state, local and federal agencies. Six years of

experience has produced a collaborative interagency network that has grown by establishing trust and confidence among network participants from strategic through tactical. The comity engendered through successful operation allows the BSOC team to chip away at bureaucratic cultures and mindsets. Such experience serves to generate interpersonal incentives and rewards selflessness and a commitment to collaborative behavior.

From its inception, BSOC has been augmented by liaison personnel from the U.S. Border Patrol and Texas military forces. Also joining the effort are liaison officers from U.S. federal and state agencies to participate in planning, coordinating and resourcing the tactical unified commands. All partners in the war on narco-terrorism in Texas come together at BSOC to develop strategic and operational plans, superintend military-styled after action reviews following each joint operation on the Rio Grande. Collectively, state, local and federal participants work to identify resource shortfalls.

In a manner very similar to a military division level headquarters, BSOC staff assimilates and analyzes information from each local unified command and sector with the intention of developing a dynamic Common Operational Picture for prioritization of statewide, regional and local law enforcement operations. The Ranger leadership commands all of the tactical “close combat” field operators such as the Texas Highway Patrol (THP), as well as various combined Strike, Ranger Reconnaissance, Criminal Intelligence, Counter Terrorism, and DPS Aviation teams.

Today, the BSOC forms the centerpiece of an informed, knowledgeable group of men and women who have learned the art of strategic thinking, operational and tactical innovation, and proactive intelligence development. The greatest challenge for the system today is at the tactical/local level of law enforcement where the potential for cartels to corrupt public officials and law enforcement personnel is greatest. Local municipal and law enforcement levels, including ranchers and their organizations, are empowered by their Texas state partners with actionable intelligence, surveillance and other real-time information that triggers appropriate responses to reduce “vulnerabilities” to criminality and corruption at and near the border.

As an example of the benefits, the Texas Department of Public Safety’s Border Auto Theft Information Center (BATIC) receives thousands of inquiries every week for information on suspicious vehicles. Many of these are from requesting officers, but a great many are from citizens. Ranchers routinely observe and report cartel vehicles as they crash through fences or speed through properties.

VIII: Texas Border Communications Operability & Interoperability

Experience in modern warfare conclusively demonstrates that no campaign can be implemented successfully without a seamless communications network that ties together every participant from tactical to strategic. Texas is a big state with an even bigger appetite for radios and telecommunications equipment. A significant portion of the international border between El Paso and Brownsville is very rural with no terrestrial radio or cell phone communications of any kind. Urban areas along the southwestern border typically operate proprietary radio systems different from rural areas like the lower Rio Grande Valley.

Many current radio systems, towers and antennas in southwestern border counties and elsewhere are 25-30 years old and cannot be maintained. A huge proliferation of locally bought radios has led to a crisis in interoperability that has forced law enforcement agencies and first responders to improvise ways to talk to each other across incompatible police, sheriff's and fire department radios. Newer, secure mobile data terminals for police and emergency vehicles are not commonly used to communicate with central dispatch offices, Texas and federal criminal information databases.

Texas developed a temporary fix to the interoperability problem through the use of mobile teams mounted in trailers and vehicles capable of being dispatched in emergencies to "plug" holes in radio coverage. Texas DPS can activate Communications Emergency Operations Teams as needed to respond to southwestern border region problems. These teams usually work in conjunction with the emergency communications fleet consisting of mobile communications trailers and generators.

Local "tactical" operations are managed from the Mobile Command Center, a 53 foot-long semi-trailer. It provides satellite connection to the DPS computer network, telephone, fax, television, wireless Internet, numerous LCD monitors, aircraft video downlinks and radios on various law enforcement frequencies. In addition, two 40foot and one 30 foot mobile communications trailers are equipped with radios on various law enforcement frequencies as well as a radio gateway for interconnection between the frequency bands. Satellites provide connections to DPS computer networks, telephone, fax and television for access to news and weather channels. Flat panel LCD monitors provide control of the radios and the DPS Computer Aided Dispatch system.

DPS has equipped nine other Field Support Units with television, Internet and radio communications all powered by on-board diesel generators. Six other units are strategically located throughout the state, one in each region, to provide communications support to

any incident or disaster. These mobile platforms are useful in emergencies and during occasional tactical operations, but they fail by a large margin to fix existing interoperability problems. Too often when incidents occur sheriffs, fire departments, volunteer firefighters and other law enforcement agencies are unable to report or communicate with each other or with counterparts on the other side of the U.S. border.

Texas is committed to developing a statewide “system of systems” that will link all law enforcement and emergency responders together. The state will never have the funds to replace local telecommunications with a single set of common equipment. So the scheme currently under development is a cooperative one that allows regional systems to operate independently with added capability when needed to communicate with other regions and agencies through a state-hosted gateway.

This Texas Radio Coalition system (TxRC) represents Texas' 5,300 public safety and emergency response agencies. It was formed in 2006 to begin improving the disjointed approaches to public safety and emergency response communications across Texas. Before the TxRC, there was no statewide user group specifically constituted to examine communications problems across Texas. To date, the TxRC effort has made great progress in forming partnerships between local, state and federal agencies that previously had never shared a common network. In addition, the state DPS has agreed to take responsibility for implementing the state public safety wireless communications strategy, which includes oversight of the distribution of grant funds among all state agencies.

Thanks to TxRC, Texas has a plan to create a common statewide communications system. Unfortunately, the system will be expensive and is entirely dependent on funding from the federal government for implementation. The state of Texas estimates that the southwestern border region of Texas will need at least \$150 million to fill basic operability and interoperability communications gaps to meet modern standards.

IX: OUTCOMES AND PRODUCTS

Five years of operational, organizational and experimental effort by the Texas Department of Public Safety has proven the value of several programs and initiatives. Some are similar to those of other states and the federal government. Others are unique to the state of Texas.

A: TxMAP

Texas DPS developed TxMAP as a statewide mapping capability to complement its common JOIC communications system. TxMAP graphically, and in near real-time, displays and shares with UCs and federal agencies a crime map that includes all drug, cash and weapons seizures. It fuses information from other agencies such as ICE arrest and seizure data. The system ties together operational incident reports, THP seizure reports and air sightings and includes a common operating picture shared by all levels from tactical to strategic.

The unique TxMAP software and database allows all agencies in Texas to track the movement of criminal elements and to associate and link seemingly unrelated crimes. The system offers all UCs in Texas the ability to video conference. JOICs routinely use the system to assign law enforcement patrols to specific crime “hot spots” across the state.

The TxMAP image server is smart and versatile. Software in the server matches the received image to a sensor that provides geographical coordinates and places an icon representing the sensor on a map. Then the system then frames the image in red and broadcasts it to pre-selected multiple addresses including CBP checkpoints, sheriffs’ dispatch centers, ranchers, and local law enforcement officers. This notification process is facilitated by smartphones and a quality cell network.

B: DPS-BSOC: A Collaborative Learning System

The Texas DPS has been committed to the development of a border security training and educational strategy focused on developing a “community of interest” among all agencies participating in the war against the cartels.

The training is run out of the BSOC in Austin and provides a decentralized statewide program intended to mitigate the bureaucratic limitations of traditional public sector institutions. The DPS-BSOC training and educational scheme links participants including state military forces, U.S. Coast Guard, THP and such federal agencies as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and DHS, and local law enforcement agencies.

This multiagency information-sharing enterprise also serves as an unofficial and unstructured leadership development and talent management network. BSOC leadership reiterated the importance of developing Texas law enforcement initiatives that incentivize and reward strategic thinking and operational and tactical innovation.

As a key strategy for the war on cartels, the BSOC is committed to creating a collaborative and decentralized versus top-down statewide and border law enforcement operational

environment that leverages the Internet and related technology, thus enabling participants to become part of an adaptive learning organization.

C: Autonomous Surveillance Platform (ASP)

In November 2005, the federal Department of Homeland Security launched the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program aimed at securing U.S. borders and reducing illegal immigration. The SBI program was supposed to employ radars, sensors and cameras to detect, identify and classify the threat level associated with an illegal entry into the United States between the ports of entry. In addition, SBI tactical infrastructure (fencing, roads, and lighting) was intended to enhance U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agents' ability to respond to illegal entry.

Most assessments admit that the SBI experiment failed due to cost and technology shortfalls. The cost per mile to build southwestern border fencing was prohibitive and the SBINet system was never proven to be technologically feasible. Nevertheless, by late 2008 about \$2.4 billion had been allocated to complete approximately 670 miles of vehicle and pedestrian fencing along the roughly 2,000 miles of border between the United States and Mexico. Proposals to build security fences along the U.S.-Mexico border also inflamed sentiment in Mexico and the U.S. Texas DPS concludes that a fence from Brownsville to El Paso would simply be too expensive to build and keep under surveillance. A strategic fence effort would limit fence building to established crossing points, ports of entry and metropolitan areas.

Recently DPS has developed and deployed a low-cost, low-tech surveillance system. This Autonomous Surveillance Platform (ASP) began with a test system of several cameras along the border. The technological heart of ASP is nothing more than small, comparatively inexpensive "wildlife" cameras linked to the Internet. These small palm-sized ASP cameras contain an infrared sensor that captures remarkably good images triggered by body heat or detected motion. The cameras transmit jpeg files via cellphone to an image server that, in turn, passes the images on to both TxMAP and other e-mail addresses accessible by desktop PCs or mobile devices. The current limit of the infrared flash used at night is about 40 feet. With an external or long-range antenna, the cameras can operate in areas with marginal cell phone coverage. Without a trigger, the camera reports on its own "health" with a single image once a day. During the test period, ASP camera observations resulted in over 300 border interdictions of cartel scouts and coyotes.

D: Ranger Reconnaissance Teams

The Texas Rangers have been the lead coordinating force behind the Texas border security effort. This remarkably small group has assumed leadership in Texas for stopping the encroachment of the cartels into the state. The tactical manifestation of this effort is the Ranger Reconnaissance Teams (RRTs).

The Rangers are the mission lead for a cooperative program that brings together a coordinated ground, air and marine assault capability. Each participating federal, state and local agency voluntarily adds its unique capabilities to the tactical battle. The THP acts as an outer perimeter for the Rangers by funneling traffic toward Ranger border positions. The tactical contact teams deploy along the Rio Grande in small, concealed positions and are able to quickly respond to intelligence from APS platforms, DPS and National Guard surveillance helicopters, as well as calls to UCs from local police or citizens. DPS Dive Teams conduct SONAR scans of the Rio Grande and assist in recovery of vehicles and contraband in splashdown areas. "Spiking" teams from the Border Patrol add their manpower and sophisticated surveillance equipment to assist in containing and apprehending traffickers. Texas military forces install ASP cameras on trafficking routes, provide aerial support for surveillance and support communications to all team participants

The Rangers have engaged all of the internal Texas law enforcement organizations. DPS SWAT teams provide snipers for clandestine overwatch. The DPS Aviation Section allied with aircraft from the Texas National Guard, provides a standby means for air insertion that is able to respond very quickly to requests from U.S. Border Patrol. These aircraft identify and call out threats, and provide early warnings of approaching threats from Mexico. Aerial surveillance cameras provide a vital service by recording team engagements for later exploitation by BSOC intelligence. The Border Patrol provides tow trucks and wreckers to assist the teams in extracting submerged vehicles that smugglers use to transport drugs to Rio Grande crossing points.

Clearly the mission is greater than the available resources. For that reason, the Ranger leadership has been forced to prioritize deployment of its reconnaissance teams to the most serious tactical threats. The teams have focused their attention on a series of successful tactical operations in the lower Rio Grande Valley beginning in June 2010. These missions began with ground and air reconnaissance patrols identifying filtration routes through the valley. Hidden in small groups and working mainly at night, RRTs identified and apprehended cartel "scouts" or spotters and recovered illicit narcotics, currency, contraband and vehicles from splashdowns in the Rio Grande.

The resource issue remains the greatest impediment to the continued success of the Rangers' border war against the cartels. Budget cuts for DHS, FEMA, U.S. CBP, ICE,

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Coast Guard have severely constrained the ability of Texas to rely on federal partners and their resources to expand border operations. Border protection agencies have suffered restrictions on overtime pay and severe limitations on fuel.

X: THE CONDUCT OF MILITARY-STYLE OPERATIONS: OPERATION BORDER STAR

Operation BORDER STAR is essentially the state's "concept plan" for joint defense of southwestern border counties and constitutes the state's operational border security framework. The importance of this effort has grown exponentially with the escalation of cartel-related border crime. The operational plan integrates the cooperative participation by ICE, DHS' Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement (OCE), CBP, DEA, ATF and the FBI as well as all Texas, local and tribal partners.

A: Purpose

Beginning in January 2008, and extended in 2009, Operation BORDER STAR has served as the focus of enhanced patrolling, surveillance and actions to deter, disrupt and disorganize cartel criminal enterprises operating throughout Texas and in the six operational border sectors. In crafting and executing Operation BORDER STAR, the state has been careful to ensure complete compliance with and support for both the Texas Homeland Strategic Security Plan (2010-2015) and the U.S. DHS's agenda for addressing potential threats from across the border.

The operational intent is for all local law enforcement and first responders to remain responsible for the initial detection of cross-border activity or violence. This policy ensures that neither state nor federal authorities will usurp local authorities in dealing with lawlessness within the southwestern border counties. In addition, the strategy for UC responses to cross-border violence was to be driven by intelligence obtained from multi-agency sources brought together by JOICs.

B: An Instructive Anecdote

A good example of the value of tactical unified border operations occurred during Operation Comanche Moon. The Texas Rangers were conducting a ranger reconnaissance operation south of the Mexican border along Falcon Lake. The Rangers had some early activity with the Zetas cartel and had made some pickups of traffickers and drugs. RRTs and

Texas Game Wardens had made several arrests and the operation was gaining momentum when to the total surprise of those on the U S side, an operation conducted by the Mexican Navy, Marines and Army started up just across the border from the Rangers' operation. This "accidental" joint and international operation had a remarkable impact on drug trafficking on both sides of the border. In short, the accidental combined operation resulted in an immediate stop to all trafficking in that region for the duration of Comanche Moon.

The success of this accidental "joint" operation is instructive and begs the question: how much more effective would border security operations be if data and intelligence could be better shared between U.S. and Mexican border forces? Even more decisive, of course, would be a "coalition"-style military operation that would bring together the combined U.S.-Mexican military and law enforcement forces in a well-designed, coordinated and synchronized joint security effort. Senior military leaders who witnessed Operation Comanche Moon surmised that a sustained coalition campaign would probably secure the border from drug trafficking and other illegal activities in nine to 12 months.

C: Operation Blue Heron: Ranger Reconnaissance Teams in Action

Operation Blue Heron, conducted in October 2010 was an effort by the Rangers that demonstrates how complex and inclusive these RRT operations have become. The Rangers planned Blue Heron as a response to narco-terrorists' efforts to establish a sophisticated supply chain operation linked through Texas border counties. The Rangers focused on Hidalgo County, an area of growing narcotics trafficking and local corruption. Many natural shallow arroyos, creeks and wooded cuts along this sector of the Texas-Mexican border make it ideal for smuggling.

The concept for the operation centered on the insertion of about 20 small, five to six man "joint" observation teams into the border area, principally along the banks of the Rio Grande with the stated mission of conducting a zone reconnaissance in sector to identify and conduct surveillance of illegal infiltration routes. These teams were truly "joint" in that each was built around small teams headed by a Ranger and joined by Border Patrol, Fish and Wildlife and, on some occasions, the Texas National Guard, with the provision that Guard members could not become involved in arrest and apprehension.

The leadership added defense in-depth by enlisting the THP to "work the flanks" along all roads radiating northward from traditional border crossing sites. THP teams stationed themselves strategically in order to prevent the smugglers from reaching major Texas highways and engaging in dangerous high-speed chases. Border Patrol Riverine units

patrolled the river both to spot crossers and if possible “herd” them toward RRTs waiting along the riverbanks. Standing by on alert were rapid reaction teams mounted aboard DPS Aviation positioned strategically north of the border to react to calls for assistance from the RRTs.

The Rangers knew that enemy “scouts” lined both sides of the border waiting to identify and pass on RRT locations to the crossers. Success depended on secrecy and stealth in order to avoid detection. RRTs and their support moved clandestinely into position at night trying to avoid known enemy scout positions. Supporting units, helicopters, patrol cruisers and boats were kept ready in locations away from scout observation posts.

The first action of the smugglers was to flee when detected by RRTs. Smugglers and scouts reported on the presence of RRTs using radios and cellphones. To protect smugglers, scouts often acted as ad hoc counter-assault teams to distract or occasionally shoot at officers. To counter this threat, RRTs and helicopter crews were heavily armed with automatic weapons against an enemy increasingly prone to react with violence when detected.

The operation went down much as planned. Immediately after dark, smugglers began to cross by small rubber boats floating deep in the water under the burden of a ton or more of plastic wrapped marijuana bundles. When possible, Rangers and their colleagues “jumped” the smugglers and took them into custody on the spot. Many more smugglers fled when confronted, abandoning their loads and rushing northward into the protection of waiting scouts. RRTs passed on the smugglers’ routes to Border Patrol and THP personnel with the hope that smugglers would be apprehended before disappearing into hide houses and safe areas occupied by the scouts. Those smugglers who succeeded in eluding RRTs were often spotted by FLIR-equipped helicopters orbiting above. When detected by air, the smugglers attempted to set fire to their drug-laden vehicles using gasoline bombs.

Four days of intensive operations yielded over two tons of narcotics along with the apprehension of over 100 illegal aliens, including 10 Indians who began their journey to the border from New Delhi through Bangkok, Vietnam, Moscow, Cuba, Guatemala, Costa Rica onward to Mexico and ultimately Texas. The RRTs learned a great deal about the increasingly adaptive and creative cartel operations. The cartel’s usual smuggling method involved a lightning quick meeting between rubber boats carrying the narcotics across the river and a stolen SUV or pickup on the U. S. side. The Rangers discovered that the enemy increased his probability of escaping the THP by scattering “caltrops,” essentially small, sharp-edged devices intended to flatten the tires of pursuers. The enemy employed an increasingly sophisticated scout effort that included the use of “dry runs” and deception

operations to confuse RRTs. The scouts even constructed sophisticated “lay up” positions equipped with comfortable chairs, tree climbing ropes to gain better visibility and very expensive and effective handheld radios for maintaining contact with smugglers.

Blue Heron was just one of many such operations conducted in 2010-2011. After each mission, all players participated in after action reviews (AARs) to learn and pass on lessons to the next set of operators. The main lesson learned by the Texas DPS from these operations is that they face an elusive, creative, ruthless, well-armed and superbly financed enemy who is trying to learn and adapt at a faster pace than their American enemy.

XI: TEXAS AS A LABORATORY FOR A NATIONAL EFFORT

Five years of state operations have yielded valuable lessons and insights that can improve the border security operations of states and U.S. federal agencies. Below are insights shared by senior leaders within the Texas DPS who consider their operations in the war against narco-terrorism to be a model for how this war might be prosecuted in a wider, multi-state and national campaign.

They accede to the fact that much of their effort was derived from experience in recent campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Adaptation of a military-style effort is driven by an appreciation of the ability of the military to achieve a common approach to confronting the enemy in spite of differences between coalition partners and host governments. Without question, the military brings to the table decades of successful operations against adaptive enemies who seek to win against a shaky coalition that often is crippled by differences in operational method and procedural techniques.

A: Strategic

The Texas campaign against the cartels has proven the value of a control scheme that involves local, state and federal partnerships without sacrificing the sovereignty of any agency. The success of RRTs and Operation BORDER STAR demonstrates that a joint effort between organizations is greater than the sum of its parts. By their own admission, federal agencies willingly participate in these efforts because they recognize their value. As with any military-style effort, strategic success is dependent on shared intent. Beginning in 2006, Governor Perry and his Texas homeland security team took the time to develop a coherent border security strategy. Working closely with border sheriffs, the team stressed the importance of cooperative engagement. No strategic program can succeed unless all participants -- tactical, operational and strategic -- are knit together by a common doctrine and shared communications.

The state patiently “shopped” the strategy by engaging all participants through the Border Security Council that worked in a sense as both a sounding board to highlight issues to the federal government and a vehicle for creating a sense of commitment from every state and federal agency. The Unified Command structure created by the state in 2006 is the glue that holds this alliance together. By building the structure from the bottom up rather than the top down, Texas created a willing alliance between the most threatened regions in the state.

The state then connected each of the six UC regions together using the Joint Operations and Intelligence Center (JOIC) network. UC/JOICs in effect replicate the military system of joint command and control that has proven so successful in Iraq and Afghanistan. The difference (and the genius of the system) is that Texas successfully substituted “cooperation” for “command” without substantially forfeiting any of the effectiveness lost by sacrificing unity of command. Certainly, the system is imperfect. The structure would surely fail should trust be lost or the sense of comity forsaken by one level seeking undue credit over another. So far this has not happened due in large part to the commitment by all to prevent the intrusion of the cartels into American territory.

B: Operational

The Border Security Operations Center complex in Austin is the operational headquarters that effectively ties local law enforcement to state and federal resources, and ensures a unity of effort. The BSOC achieves this goal by bringing together all operational level-state entities such as the Rangers, Texas military forces and THP under a single joint and interagency system of management and control.

One lesson from past failures was the imperative need to close the gap between tactical defense along the border and operational depth throughout the state. The idea that a single point defense could interdict persons crossing the border violates a tenet of war: narrow, single point defenses are both porous and brittle, and can easily be defeated by an intruder that manages to “break through” by piercing a single defensive line and moving very quickly into the undefended areas deeper in the state and beyond.

Texas DPS uses a layered “defense in depth” at the tactical and operational levels. This approach seeks to extend interdiction beginning with a low-cost interconnected set of sensors that extends from the banks of the Rio Grande inward through the entire depth of the southwestern border counties. Such a system is made possible using off-the-shelf

sensors, some as unsophisticated as store-bought deer detectors, linked to a regional command and control facility with GPS and cell phones.

The key to the success of this effort is proliferation and tactical depth at the sacrifice of sophistication. Some of these sensor-detectors cost as little as a few hundred dollars. State border authorities are careful to hide these devices to prevent detection, but their low cost and density along the river makes their loss to the narco-terrorists affordable.

C: Tactical

The first principle of Texas border security operations is to empower local law enforcement. Soldiers often say that a bad strategy can never be salvaged by bad tactics, but good tactics can often salvage bad strategy. This saying simply reinforces the truism that no national strategy that seeks to defeat narco-terrorism can be adequately confronted unless the tactic units such as local police and federal border security stations are properly staffed, resourced, competent, and well-led.

The Texas DPS focuses most of its effort on the border counties. The BSOC in Austin understands that border sheriffs are overwhelmed by the threat of narco-terrorism. To use a military analogy, sheriffs are the close combat forces of the narco-war and it becomes a matter of first-priority that sheriffs have all they need to achieve success. The JOIC is structured to put information gathering from local law enforcement first in priority. The Rangers work closely with local enforcement officers to ensure they are never overpowered by the firepower and technical sophistication of the cartels.

RRT operations have developed firsthand a creative and imaginative set of tactical, close combat skills. The timely military adage that “the enemy has a vote” continues to drive innovation and change in the Ranger’s tactical method. Narco-terrorists have the patience, commitment and money to threaten the security of the state in many complex and changing ways. Tactical teams have learned to counter by deploying in smaller units, operating principally at night and linking with assets such as the THP that offer defense-in-depth. Most troubling is realization that the cartels are becoming more violent. Lately the Rangers have been involved in shootouts with well-armed narco-terrorists willing to kill to protect their illicit cargoes.

Texas has sought to implement the most cost-effective and reliable strategy for achieving technological dominance at critical border crossing points. While narco-terrorists are a national strategic threat, they are motivated by money not religion or ideology. Thus at the tactical level they will seek the most effective means for crossing using the cheapest human

capital. They will avoid crossing where agents, cameras or anti-intrusion technologies are present. Key to cartel success is not to “lose a load.”

The aborted federal border fence initiative led Texas DPS officials to employ a simple and inexpensive network of cameras, cell phones and locating devices using off the shelf technologies. They compensate for a lack of complexity by deploying in layers and adding an active human surveillance and immediate interdiction plan that puts teams and helicopters over the target immediately after detection. The greatest drawback to the tactical surveillance system is its lack of persistent surveillance. The border is too long and the cartel’s activities are too intrusive to allow anything more than sporadic observation without a larger coordinated effort.

Years of collective effort by Texas law enforcement have yielded a remarkably flexible and efficient system of border protection that involves all levels of command from federal to local. This system is under threat not only by an increasingly ruthless and adaptive enemy, but also by an increasingly diminished budget.

Without question, the future success of this effort will depend on the ability of the state of Texas, local and federal agencies to work together to expand their war against intrusion by cartels. The bottom line, however, is that while today Texas is the front line in this escalating war, the potential consequences of success or failure will affect our entire nation. Thus, it is up to the nation to support Texas in its efforts to defeat this transnational criminal enterprise.

Texas Border Security Study: A Strategic Military Assessment

The following bibliography underscores the complexities, challenges and critical importance of cooperation and coordination at the strategic, operational and tactical levels between Federal-Texas law enforcement agencies and enhancement of respective intelligence and information sharing capabilities and processes associated with southwest border security initiatives.

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ATTACHMENT 1

*Fearful and Deeply Concerned Voices
from the Southwest Border*

Source: Texas Department of Agriculture

ATTACHMENT I – Texas Border Security: A Strategic Military Assessment

Fearful and Deeply Concerned Voices from the Southwest Border

Source: Texas Department of Agriculture

Arthur Barrera – Texas Ranger

“On a day-to-day basis you see the cartels coming across. And by cartels I mean the cronies and the crooks that work for the cartels. They’ll have scouts on this side scouting looking for law enforcement. They report that information back to Mexico so they don’t move or smuggle aliens or drugs across at a certain time. So they’re very crafty.”

“A lot of these ranchers are clearing brush along the river so they can see what’s going on. Well their tractor operators are being accosted by these guys telling them to get off the tractor. Quit doing what you are doing.”

“They fear for their lives. They have family.”

“These people have a right to be free in their own home. Their home is their castle. They need to be able to relax in their front property without having to be chasing off people.”

“We are in a war. We are in a war and I’m not going to sugar coat it by any means. We are in a war and it is what it is.”

Texas Farm Manager – Identity Protected for Safety Reasons

“I’ve been here about 25 years and things have definitely changed. We’re scared to go on our farms. We don’t irrigate at night along the river. We actually have people that aren’t supposed to be there quite a bit at different times of the day. There’s actual drug running in the middle of the day, high-speed chases on our farms, vehicles being burned. You name it.”

“People come out of our sugar cane in fatigues and telling the sugar mill harvesters they need to leave our farms. They’ve changed the locks on our gates in the middle of the daytime. Locked us in basically. They’ve tried to take some of our irrigator’s cars while they are in them. We’re definitely scared someone is going to get hurt.”

“A couple of weeks ago they followed a suspicious looking federal express truck, one of them big trucks, and finally ended up in a high-speed chase, ended up on one of our farms. The people jumped into the river. Inside the truck was over a ton of dope. We are sitting there watching from the farm edges and it’s scary.”

“We have had several instances where the guys, the bad guys take bolt cutters and just cut our locks off and do whatever they want. Come in the farm. We’ve had instances of them turning off our major irrigation pumps in the middle of the night. We think so they can hear anybody approaching or anything like that. We actually see them moving dope on our farms in the daytime.”

“I think they need to acknowledge number one we have a problem. I’m tired of hearing this is safer than ever. You can make statistics tell you anything you want to hear. Maybe statistically there are less murders of border patrol agents and this and that but I’ve personally talked to several border patrol agents and they feel like they’re at risk more than they ever have been.”

Dale Murden – Rio Farms Inc.

“It’s becoming more and more of a concern this year, absolutely for the first time. We used to never feel threatened in our own country and now all of a sudden things are changing.”

“I am afraid it’s going to get worse before it gets better. I go to DC a lot and I don’t feel like they really understand that we have a problem down here and until I think there’s that awareness by the folks in power up there the problem will get worse before it gets better. It just seems they don’t really get it yet.”

“Safety is a big concern. Food security is a big concern. Terrorism is a big concern. We talk about these being drug cartels and what not but the fact of the matter is that it’s terrorism. It’s plain and simple to us it’s terrorism.”

“They use to say this was the backdoor. Well the truth is it’s the front door and the front door right now is wide open. So I hope somebody pays attention because anything and anybody can come up here and we don’t want that to happen.”

“If it’s along the border when will it be 200 miles inland or when will it be 500 miles inland and when does it stop. You’ve got to draw the line somewhere and most of us feel like the line is the river.”

Joe Aguilar – farmer who sold operation because of danger

“There’s a lot of drug problems. It’s getting very, very dangerous, even away from the river, not necessarily along the river line.”

“Either you’re going to join them or adjust to something different, and I chose not to join any of that so I adjusted to where I decided to quit and move on.”

“After so many years it’s upsetting, but either you move on or you know it’s dangerous for your family so I didn’t want to put them through that, and we just we just moved on from farming.”

“It’s not a good feeling, when you’ve been doing something all of your life and then you have to change from there to now I’m behind a desk, my hands are so slick that uh I’m not used to that. It’s something very different. I’m used to getting on the tractor, harvesting and you know getting all greased up. It’s just a different feelings most definitely.”

“They are controlling the farmers in the area and it’s really getting very sad. Sometimes we feel the federal is not doing enough, the state is not doing enough, but the ones that are really getting hurt is us down here on the end.”

Roland Garcia – Special Ranger with TSCRA, covers 5 counties – 200 miles of border

“Being on US soil, you’re supposed to feel safe. And the consensus with the ranching community and the people who live along the border that is not the fact. They live in fear and constant terror, so as far as being safe, no.”

“For the most part, you’ve heard of the terror in Mexico that has spilled into the US, that in itself has put an effect on the ranching communities’ minds. They know it exists. Either they’ve had a family member directly involved, or somebody they know has been directly involved, so that fear factor has been set for them.”

“It’s lawless on the other side. It’s semi-lawless I’ve always said on this side, only because we do not have enough boots on the ground.”

“Let’s not wait to see if our border is going to hold like what happened with Katrina when their levies didn’t hold. Let’s not wait for that day.”

Susan Durham – South Texans Property Rights Assoc.

“It is totally unstable. Totally unsafe and we want immediate action. The federal govt has turned a blind eye to it. They have been ineffective, and we are very disappointed with our homeland security director who has made statements like there is not an issue on the US side.”

“In the US of America we should have the use of our lands, and we’re not. We’re being held hostage now.”

“We just feel like we are forgotten here along the border.”

Troy Allen – Delta Lake Irrigation District General Manager

“Three men approached one of our excavator operators and asked him what he was doing. He said well I’m doing my job, and they said well we need you to cease excavating, stop clearing the trees and please move off. They said ok, and they said, we’ll be back in about four hours and you need to stop and be gone. And if you’re not gone then we’ll deal with you then.”

“It’s a big concern for me because I’ve got three employees who work down there and I’m worried about the employees. I don’t want them to get hurt, injured or even killed.”

“We really don’t know where to go from here.”

Texas Farmer – Identity Protected for Safety Reasons

“We see a lot of things but we keep our mouths shut about it. We just don’t want to be on anybody’s hit list.”

“I keep to myself. The people that are doing what they’re doing they keep to themselves. If I see something I ignore it. I look the other way but there is a problem. It’s really bad.”

“Here on the river you see a lot of stuff and you don’t pay attention to it. You walk away. You try to stay in an area where they see you so if somebody gets caught they don’t say well they called somebody. You know just try to blend in and not create any waves.”

“I’m afraid that I’ll be down here with my daughter or my wife checking on something and somebody comes out and shoots somebody. There have been incidents along the river where they have found machine guns. They’ve seen people with machine guns.”

“They need to send more people down here but you need to send them to the river to the border not two miles from the border, not seven miles from the border. You need to stop the problem right here.”

Grady Cage, Brooks Co. Rancher

“Been ranching since 1923. Most farmers and ranchers around the nation they find a dead cow, and that’s one thing, but just to find dead people, and lots of them, is really something else.”

“This is a human tragedy. I’ve lost count. Back in 2010, there were like 8 or 9. 2008, was 8 or 9, but long story short, it’s been well over 45 in the last 10 years we found on the ranch dead.”

“We’ve had equipment stolen and pick-up trucks stolen.”

“Not only have they cut fences and gone through fences, but we’ve actually put up ladders over high fence that points where we know they cross. We use these steel ladders, because if not, they pull them up and pull fence down.”

“Ranching is challenging enough without all of these other problems dealing with a criminal element.”

Texas Farmer – Identity Protected for Safety Reasons

“I’ve personally been like three feet away they just bring drugs and loads right in front of you. Just blatant.”

“I’m not going to confront them.”

“If I’m standing there and they’re looking at me, I don’t call anybody, because I’m not getting involved. But if they don’t see me, then I call Border Patrol.”

“But the Border Patrol, I could tell you that their hands are tied about a lot of stuff. They have to call Washington, even if they are having a gun fight down at the river, they are on the phone. They have to call Washington.”

“The border patrol have boats on the river. They patrol the river. They are not allowed to pick up anybody that’s in the water unless they are dead.”

“If there’s drug guys loading drugs, all they have to do is step out and wade out in the water and Border Patrol can’t touch them. They are not allowed to go into the water. And that guy can sit there and call the Border Patrol bad names and they can’t do anything about it.”

Lavoyger Duhram, Brooks rancher – one of the first who started the South Texans Property Rights Assoc.

“These people are very well organized and it’s a form of business for people to human smugglers and so on to come over so...You’re not safe. There’s nobody out here who can tell me that they have a gut feeling that they can leave their wife at night...no. You just don’t do it.”

“These guys are more adamant and come up to your door in the middle of the night, knock and ask, “How far is Houston, Can I borrow your phone, our truck...all those kinds of things.”

“As far as these border patrol stations...you say, why are they here? One, because the border is not secure. Two, they shouldn't be here; they should be on the border. That's their job. In my opinion all they got is a red flag sticking up in the middle of the highway, sticking up, saying, “boys, dump before you get here or drive around, and we are on the drive around.”

“Maybe if something really happens down here, a mass murder here on this side, then maybe some people will start to listen. But I think that's what it's going to take.”

Linda Vickers, rancher in Brooks Co. for about 15 years

“When I get up in the morning and step out the door, I'm looking for rattlesnakes and illegals and I'm packing my gun and my cell phone. When I go down to feed my horses, I have my dog, my pistol and the cell phone. You just have to stay aware.”

“Several months ago, I walked in my tack room and my two big dogs went ballistic, and there were two illegal aliens there.”

“I get more angry than scared because you cannot be scared. You're just going to have to pull your socks up and just get after it and I've got border patrol on speed dial. WE need more BP on the ground, not sitting in offices. We need them on the ground.”

“Will Washington do something?”

“We are not secure. The borders are not secure.”

“We are porous. 75 different countries have been apprehended in this area alone. If that doesn't tell you porous borders, nothing does.”

“My husband calls it an invasion. I've looked out here and seen a group of 13 going past. I've sat on my back porch and a group of 10 go past. It does feel like an invasion.”

ATTACHMENT 2

Brooks County:

Border Issues Not Confined to Border

Source: MySA, By John MacCormack, June 8, 2011

Border Issues Not Confined to Border, MySA, By John MacCormack, June 8, 2011

http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/article/border-issues-notconfined-to-border-1410247.php

FALFURRIAS – The trophy snapshots of large pickups loaded with bales of marijuana and of exotic foreigners found wandering in the surrounding brush decorate the walls of an office at the Brooks County Sheriff's Department.

"It's been an eye-opener for me. You always heard the stories about the backpackers going through, but you never imagined a ton of dope," investigator Daniel Davila said.

With smugglers relentlessly trying to bypass the U.S. Border Patrol checkpoint just south of town through adjacent ranches, deputies here routinely deal with complex situations unknown to most rural departments.

"This is a national problem. It's not just Mexicans and Hondurans," Davila said. "We've got people from Pakistan, India and China walking through the brush, and those are the ones we know about.

"It's not our problem, but it's become our job."

Once known throughout South Texas for the excellent butter produced by local dairies, Falfurrias now finds itself at the vortex of a wrenching human and political drama caused by the illegal activity coming up U.S. 281.

Several times a week, deputies encounter loads of illegal immigrants sneaking through town, and many of the "coyotes," as the smugglers are known, hit the gas when the blue-and-red lights flash instead of pulling over.

"If they think they can outrun you, they will try it. If they roll over and kill 10 people, they don't care," Davila said.

Other, more grisly photos are kept here in thick notebooks. They depict human remains in varying stages of decay, all illegal immigrants who got lost or were abandoned by their coyotes in the brush.

"Since 2009, well over 100 bodies have been found, and I think we're coming close to 20 this year," Davila said.

On May 10, as President Barack Obama delivered a speech in El Paso on immigration reform and border security, the body of Paulo Gerardo Ferreira Gomez, a 23-year-old Mexican, partly eaten by animals, was found on the misnamed Buena Suerte Ranch.

And as usual, Brooks County bore much of the burden. A deputy, justice of peace and funeral home workers were sent to the scene. If an autopsy was required, it would cost the county \$2,500.

Fighting a war

Remote, poor and having no voice in the rancorous national debate about immigration reform and border security, Brooks County is confronted regularly with problems of national and international dimensions.

Driven by powerful global forces, people from Asia, Africa and Europe steadily funnel through here, joining the familiar legions of Mexicans and Central Americans. Some die or are caught, and the rest go north, having paid thousands of dollars or more for the illicit passage.

While apprehensions in the Rio Grande Valley have dropped markedly in recent years, the percentage of non-Mexicans caught has risen sharply and includes immigrants from improbable places like Eritrea, Ukraine and Bangladesh.

And with powerful Mexican cartels now reportedly smuggling people as well as drugs, local deputies face greater risks.

It's not by chance that the Texas Border Volunteers, which stages regular nocturnal watches in the brush to detect and report illegal activity to the Border Patrol, is based here.

"We're fighting a war down here. We're being overrun by people from all over the world," said Mike Vickers, chairman of the group.

"We understand the federal government is not going to protect us and the state government can't protect us, so we're pretty much on our own," said Vickers, a local veterinarian whose ranch is regularly crossed by smugglers.

During a recent "watch," armed volunteers wearing camouflage spent several nights hidden in the brush, using night-vision and thermal-imaging equipment. But the action was light.

"We had two of them walk up to us on the Cage Ranch. They put their hands up and said, 'No mas, no mas,'" said "Gumball" a retired Fort Worth businessman, who asked not to be identified.

"They were beat up and lost. You've got to feel sorry for these guys. If you don't, the milk of humanity does not run through your veins," he said.

Although several hundred U.S. Border Patrol agents work here, the county also must deal with people and drug smugglers. And with an annual budget of \$5.8 million and just six full-time deputies, it's ill-equipped for the task.

"The border is along the Rio Grande, but the checkpoint is here, 75 miles inland, and this is where all the activity happens," County Judge Raul Ramirez said. In one year, he said, Brooks County spent \$160,000 on autopsies and burials of dead immigrants.

Sheriff Rey Rodriguez, whose deputies are paid \$27,000 a year, has an annual budget of \$588,000 and gets little in state and federal grants.

"This is the breakpoint. We have a huge problem with no help. We're not considered a border county, so we don't get federal aid," he said.

Despite this, the department has not shied away from complex investigations. About two years ago, it began working with federal agents to target local drug smugglers.

Last month, Jose Maria Carbajal, a major trafficker who claimed the Zetas as his partners, pleaded guilty to federal smuggling charges. After one big load was seized, he plotted revenge, according to an informant.

"According to Carbajal, the owners of the 1,100 pounds of marijuana (that was seized) are members of the Zeta cartel, (they) want to get to the bottom of it," reads the criminal complaint.

"Carbajal claimed he showed these individuals where Brooks County Chief Deputy Benny Martinez and Deputy Mo Saavedra lived. Carbajal informed these individuals Benny Martinez was in charge in Brooks County and would be the one to capture in order to make him talk about who provided the information," read the complaint.

While the information prompted Carbajal's quick arrest, deputies are under few illusions.

"The guy was very strong. He had the means and the motive to do it. Could it happen? Definitely yes," Martinez said of the alleged threat.

Trail of litter

Most of the trails that meander through the dense live oak thickets on the vast Tepeguaje Ranch belong to the cattle, deer and wild hogs. But Red Bull, beer cans and other discarded items along some trails tell a different story.

"This is all smuggling. This is the Bud Light guy, and we follow his trail a lot," ranch manager Ronnie Osburn, semi-automatic rifle in hand, remarked as he followed one well-trodden path.

Osburn, 61, spends a lot of time alone on the 12,500-acre ranch just south of the checkpoint on U.S. 281, one of the nation's busiest. Since October, more than 90 tons of drugs have been seized here. On Monday alone, more than 5 tons of marijuana was found in two trucks.

Smugglers regularly cross the ranches to move their loads around the checkpoint, cutting fences, breaking water lines and sometimes stealing vehicles. Encounters with large groups or menacing strangers also occur, and Osburn always is armed.

"I go to work in the morning with a Berretta semi-automatic pistol stuck in the pickup seat, and an AR-15 with a 30-round clip in the back," he said. "At night when I'm watching TV, I have the guns with me. And when I go to bed, the first things I move are the guns. That's the way I live."

Discoveries in the brush bespeak of the brutal and often tragic business at hand.

"So far, I've found about 10 bodies, including two in one day. You also see bras and panties, spiffy underclothes like young girls wear, in the trees," Osburn said. "It means they took the young girls off to one side, away from the group, raped them, and then hung their panties in the trees."

A few months ago, one of his cowboys made another bizarre find.

"It was two passport booklets, stapled together and issued in Bangladesh. This guy had made entries in Indonesia, Hong Kong and Africa. It just went on and on. The last entry was to Mexico City, and stuck in there was a boarding pass to Reynosa. I wound up giving it to a Border Patrol supervisor," he said

While Osburn thinks bringing the Army to the border is the solution, not all ranchers share his sense of alarm.

"Right now, the traffic is down considerably from what it used to be," said Presnall Cage, whose 43,000-acre family spread is just north of the checkpoint.

"I kind of go by the numbers of dead bodies picked up on the ranch. Last year, we had only four," he said. "For the last 10 years, we'd been averaging about 10. And we've had none so far this year."

"We haven't had any encounters to speak of in a long while. And we've never had anything horrendous."

Bobby Sanders, 56, a senior U.S. Border Patrol agent at the checkpoint, said U.S. 281 was just a two-lane road and 15 agents worked at the station when he began in 1988.

About the only thing unchanged is the relentless pressure by smugglers to move contraband and immigrants northward.

"It's a constant struggle because we're dealing with issues and problems south of the border. We can no longer control the north wind than what's coming out of Mexico," said Sanders, who does not share the alarmist view of some.

I know 90 percent of the ranchers in the area, and I've yet to have one come to me and say they were threatened on their property," he said. "I believe the border is as secure now as it has ever been in our history. There are more boots on the ground, and they are more capable of handling any situation."

Exposure deaths

Deputy Mo Saavedra III, 25, played a big role in some recent high-profile drug busts, including the Carbajal case. He wears bulky "rifle plate" armor and keeps a loaded semi-automatic weapon in his patrol truck.

"It's uncomfortable as hell, but it will keep you alive," he said.

Over the past two years, Saavedra, 25, spent a lot of time stalking traffickers in the brush, and was a key player in the busts that brought down Jose Maria Carbajal.

"It took us six months in the brush and getting to know the ranchers to find the areas where the smugglers were operating. Then it became a waiting game," he said.

On a recent Friday night, he spent the first couple of hours patrolling U.S. 281 for speeders, drunks and suspicious vehicles. But when a body was found in the brush, as usual, he made the scene.

On a narrow ranch road off U.S. 281, an ambulance sat blinking while a half-dozen Border Patrol agents waited nearby. Inside was the pale body of Ramon Angel Guapo Mosqueda, a 28-year old Mexican from Nezahualcoyatl.

"He's probably been out here two or three days. After three days, they are out of their minds. It's a sucky way to die," Saavedra said.

Kelly Bernard, an emergency medical technician, waited with the body, which had been found beside one empty water jug.

"He's thoroughly dehydrated. His tongue is white and crusty," she noted.

Bernard said Guapo was already dead, despite great efforts to save him, when the ambulance arrived.

"I think the public is desensitized to what the Border Patrol does," she said. "When we got here, one of the agents was on his knees, giving mouth-to-mouth CPR. It was a noble thing to see."

Later, Justice of the Peace Luis Soliz collected information about the death.

"I'm not going to call for an autopsy," he said. "I've been here nine years. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out what he died of. Dehydration due to exposure.

"We've had four (deaths) already this week. That 16-year-old hit me hard. I've got a 16-year-old son."

Back on patrol, an hour later, Saavedra spotted a figure crossing U.S. 281 to a rest area north of the checkpoint. He parked and waited. Eventually, a tattered group came out of the restrooms. The four tired and dirty Salvadorans gave up without protest.

"My father is in Houston. We can't go back. It's very bad in our country because of the gangs," said Sandra Marlena Cortillo, 37, from San Miguel, El Salvador.

She had left a month ago with her daughter, son and sister, paying smugglers \$3,000 each to be brought to Houston, only to miss the final connection.

"We got lost in the desert. They left us without water or food," she said of the coyotes, and she began to weep, perhaps not realizing a far worse fate had been avoided.

After Border Patrol agents took the four away, Saavedra headed his big Ford pickup north. There were six hours left on his shift. Just another night on the front line in Brooks County.

ATTACHMENT 3

*University Medical Center of El Paso and Texas Tech
University Health Sciences Center, Letters to President
Obama, March 16, 2010 and April 16, 2010; and
Congressman Silvestre Reyes, Letter to President Obama,
Supporting UMC Letter, March 28, 2010*



March 16, 2010

The Honorable Barack Obama
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Obama,

We are writing in coordination with U.S. Representative Silvestre Reyes (D-TX) on behalf of the Board of Managers of University Medical Center of El Paso, Texas Tech University's Health Sciences Center in El Paso, the physicians and other healthcare professionals who work in our hospital, and the residents of El Paso County, Texas who generously support our Mission via local property taxes. We find ourselves in a unique and challenging situation that we believe merits federal assistance. We write to seek your administration's help.

El Paso, Texas is located directly on the U.S./Mexico border across the Rio Grande river from Juarez, Mexico. In January of 2008, rival drug cartels fighting for control of that country's lucrative drug trade declared war on one another. While the violence was widespread, Juarez quickly became the murder capitol of Mexico. By year's end, more than 1,600 people had been killed on its streets and hundreds of others had been wounded.


Despite the arrival of the Mexican military, which was sent north to quell the violence and reestablish the rule of law in our sister city, the gruesome attacks continued in 2009 when the number of drug-related murders recorded in Juarez exceeded 2,600. Kidnappings, extortion and bank robberies became commonplace. People on both sides of the border were forced to deal with the reality that Juarez had become the most dangerous city in the northern hemisphere and that its problems didn't stop at the Rio Grande.

That became evident on January 23, 2008 when the first of what is now nearly 150 survivors of the violence was transported across the border for medical care at the Level I Trauma Center at University Medical Center of El Paso, our city's not-for-profit, public hospital. Nowhere else along the entire U.S./Mexico border has this occurred.

To date, it has cost the hospital nearly \$3 million to care for these patients, \$2,234,677 of which has not been reimbursed. Their physicians are also rendering service with little hope of reimbursement. Only 32% of the associated physicians' fees have been paid, which means the Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center Paul L. Foster School of Medicine, UMC's partner in delivering academic medicine, has suffered a loss of \$382,000.

Mr. President, neither of our organizations can sustain such losses, yet we are required by federal law to provide life-saving treatment to patients in need of emergency care, regardless of their nationality. We write to ask that you help us identify federal resources that can offset our costs and lessen the burden on El Paso County taxpayers.

Sincerely,



James N. Valenti
President & CEO
University Medical Center of El Paso



J. Manuel de la Rosa, MD
Founding Dean
TTUHSC Paul L. Foster SOM

cc: Board of Managers, El Paso County Hospital District
El Paso County Commissioners Court
U.S. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison
U.S. Senator John Cornyn
U.S. Representative Silvestre Reyes
U.S. Representative Ciro Rodriguez
El Paso Mayor John Cook
Richard Dayoub, President & CEO, Greater El Paso Chamber of Commerce



UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER
OF EL PASO

April 16, 2010

The Honorable Barack Obama
President of the United States
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear President Obama,

In follow-up to our letter to you dated March 16, 2010, we write to again express our concerns about the on-going violence in Mexico and the impact it is having on our organizations, University Medical Center of El Paso and Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center Paul L. Foster School of Medicine


As you are well aware, the situation in Juarez, Mexico, directly across the border from El Paso, continues to worsen. Warring drug cartels have already killed nearly 700 people so far this year. Hundreds of others have been wounded. Since our earlier letter to you, we have learned that out of fear, there is now a reluctance or outright refusal by many physicians and healthcare facilities in Juarez to care for the war's survivors. As a result, the wounded continue to cross the border to seek treatment at our Level I Trauma Center. We believe this turn of events represent a new chapter in the deadly violence, one that could jeopardize the safety of our campus.

We are also concerned about how this troubling trend could limit our ability to respond to traumatic situations in our own community. For the most part, the victims that we have cared for have been severely wounded and in need of highly specialized care. Providing it requires extensive resources, human and otherwise. For example, many of these patients have required multiple surgeries and admission to our Intensive Care Unit, some for as long as 30 days. That level of round-the-clock care means the physicians, nurses and ancillary staff that cared for them were not available to other patients, nor were the facilities the patients occupied. In one particularly egregious case, a patient actually had a nearly year-long length of stay in our hospital. Generally speaking, the UMC resources being most taxed are our Level I Trauma Center and our surgical and critical care services, all of which are vital community assets.


The issue of cost also continues to be problematic. To date, University Medical Center of El Paso has spent nearly \$3 million to care for survivors of the violence. Very little of that expense has been paid, meaning local taxpayers are footing the bill for the consequences of a conflict that is occurring on foreign soil. The physicians of Texas Tech University's Health Sciences Center Paul L. Foster School of Medicine are receiving very little reimbursement for the care they have provided. The school has suffered a \$382,000 loss as a result.

We join U.S. Representative Silvestre Reyes (D-El Paso) in again asking your administration for help. Please consider directing federal resources to El Paso's academic medical center to offset our costs and preserve our ability to provide critical services to the El Paso community.

Sincerely,



James N. Valenti
President & CEO
University Medical Center of El Paso



J. Manuel de la Rosa, MD
Founding Dean
TTUHSC Paul L. Foster SOM

cc: Board of Managers, El Paso County Hospital District
El Paso County Commissioners Court
U.S. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison
U.S. Senator John Cornyn
U.S. Representative Silvestre Reyes
U.S. Representative Ciro Rodriguez
El Paso Mayor John Cook
Richard Dayoub, President & CEO, Greater El Paso Chamber of Commerce

SILVESTRE REYES
16TH DISTRICT, TEXAS

PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIR AND LAND FORCES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS



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FAX: (915) 534-7426
<http://www.house.gov/reyes>

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

March 28, 2010

President Barack Obama
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As we renew our commitment to assist Mexico in its efforts to combat drug cartels, I would ask that you consider the impact the related violence is having on border communities. Attached you will find a letter from University Medical Center, a Level I Trauma hospital along the U.S.-Mexico border which is also the only public hospital that serves my congressional district in El Paso, Texas.


Over the past two years, University Medical Center has treated over 150 victims of the violence across the border in Ciudad Juarez. To date, caring for these individuals has cost the hospital nearly \$3 million, the bulk of which has gone unreimbursed. Only 32% of the associated physicians' fees have been paid. Additionally, physicians and nurses working at the hospital have expressed strong concern for their safety as more and more of their counterparts in Ciudad Juarez have begun refusing to treat these victims due to threats and outright violence directed against them.

Our frontline health care providers cannot continue to absorb these growing emergency care costs, which are placing them at risk of limiting access for our neediest and most vulnerable community members. Over the years, Section 1011 of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-173), has been a useful reimbursement resource to University Medical Center. Though this funding source has helped cover in small part the cost of providing emergency care for foreign nationals who are medically paroled into the United State and Mexican nationals with laser visas, a significant percentage of the emergency care costs incurred since 2008 has come from caring for U.S. citizens injured in Ciudad Juarez.

University Medical Center is one of many hospitals across the United States that cannot afford to reallocate any of their Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) funds to make up for uncompensated care. Instead, University Medical Center has relied on local property tax dollars to offset these costs. This past year marked the first time that more than \$50 million in property taxes will be used to help the hospital make up for the cost of providing uncompensated care. Since 1998, approximately \$400 million in property taxes have been used to offset the cost of uncompensated care for our public hospital.

I urge you to consider their request to dedicate federal resources to compensate border region hospitals, like University Medical Center, so they can better cope with the demands put on them by this surge in violence. Please contact me should you have questions, and I thank you for your consideration of this issue.

Sincerely,


Silvestre Reyes
Member of Congress

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

Attachment 4

Office of the Governor of Texas, Rick Perry, Letter to Sec. Janet Napolitano, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, April 2, 2009, and Letter to Congressmen Rodriguez, Cuellar, Reyes, Ortiz and Hinojosa, May 17, 2010



OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

RICK PERRY
GOVERNOR

April 2, 2009

The Honorable Janet Napolitano
Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
108 Federal Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20502

Dear Secretary Napolitano:

Thank you for taking the time to speak with me by phone on March 26, 2009. I look forward to meeting with you at your earliest convenience on several important issues.

I would like to discuss my request for 1,000 National Guard troops to be deployed under Title 32 authority to the Texas-Mexico border to support Texas' border security efforts, and six air assets equipped with Forward Looking Infrared Radar to support night operations. The troops would be used only in direct support of civilian law enforcement and would receive mandatory training prior to deployment. This would provide an immediate increase in the "boots on the ground" in remote areas exploited by the Mexican organized crime cartels to smuggle drugs and humans across the Rio Grande River into Texas and the United States.

As you are aware, the National Guard has provided valuable counterdrug support to law enforcement nationwide for almost two decades, and my request should not in any way be construed as an effort to militarize the Texas-Mexico border. Texas Military Forces has developed a flexible deployment plan for the use of these resources based upon threat. These include:

- 600 personnel to be deployed with 24 Border Reconnaissance Platoons, with 25 personnel each, to cover 20 locations;
- 125 personnel to support Texas Parks and Wildlife Department (TPWD) maritime operations;
- 175 personnel to support air operations, command and control, and military personnel support functions; and
- 100 personnel to support TPWD and Texas Ranger Tracking Teams.

The Honorable Janet Napolitano
April 2, 2009
Page 2

Please find enclosed a law enforcement sensitive operational deployment plan for your situational awareness. As you can appreciate, this should not be released to the public. National Guard resources can be deployed from within Texas. Texas guardsmen have a key interest in protecting their state and an advantageous understanding of the cultural dynamics of Texas and the border region.

During our conversation, you noted that the latest uniform crime report (UCR) data demonstrated a decrease in violent crimes in the Texas border counties, and you requested additional information concerning the threat of spillover violence. Texas defines spillover violence as crimes occurring in Texas as a direct or indirect result of the criminal enterprise activities of the Mexican organized crime cartels and their associates. We are proud of the decrease in crime in our border counties reflected in the UCR data you cited, and we are also pleased that, since 2005, there has been a 52 percent reduction in the rate of illegal alien arrests along the Texas-Mexico border. This was not by accident, but rather through the hard work and sacrifice of many local and state law enforcement agencies working together to conduct high-intensity, patrol-centric operations in support of the U.S. Border Patrol.

However, much more needs to be done to secure the U.S.-Mexico border from all threats, as the Mexican cartels have seemingly unlimited resources and constantly seek ways to penetrate our nation's border to derive profit from the lucrative drug and human smuggling market. For example, as we increased our unified patrol operations, the Mexican cartels began using transnational gangs, such as Barrio Azteca, Texas Syndicate, Mexican Mafia, MS-13, Hermanos de Pistoleros Latinos and Tango Blast Houstones, to smuggle drugs and humans into Texas, and cash, weapons and stolen vehicles into Mexico. These gangs are also being used to extort, kidnap, torture and murder on both sides of the border.

Transnational gangs are also recruiting in our prisons and schools to support these violent cartel-related criminal activities on both sides of the border. The Texas border region is home to only 9 percent of the population in Texas, yet it accounts for nearly one in five of all juvenile felony drug referrals in the state. Furthermore, the border region now accounts for 18 percent of all juvenile gang referrals in Texas. Every major metropolitan area in Texas is experiencing Mexican cartel-related gang activity.

It is my recommendation that the federal government adopt a proactive, rather than reactive, approach in addressing the threat from spillover violence by immediately increasing the security along the U.S.-Mexico border with an overwhelming uniformed patrol presence on the ground, in the water and in the air, enabled and supported by technology.

The Honorable Janet Napolitano
April 2, 2009
Page 3


The U.S. Border Patrol currently has approximately 18,000 U.S. Border Patrol agents to secure the 2,000 miles of U.S.-Mexico border and 4,000 miles of U.S.-Canada border, which is woefully insufficient. Similarly, the Office of Field Operations lacks the necessary personnel and technology to secure the international bridges from north- and south-bound smuggling. Until U.S. Customs and Border Protection receives sufficient staffing and resources, it is imperative that the federal government explore alternatives to immediately increase the security of our nation's border.

In my February 26, 2009, letter requesting National Guard resources, I also recommended the establishment of a Border Region Security Initiative to invest in local law enforcement as a cost-effective way to quickly increase patrol capacity along the U.S.-Mexico border. I was encouraged by your recent announcement that \$59 million in Operation Stonegarden funds would be provided to the four southwest border states. I ask that you allow these funds to be used by local law enforcement agencies to hire patrol personnel without a federal requirement that these positions be retained after the funding has been exhausted. Otherwise, many of the local law enforcement agencies will not be able to accept these funds.

Securing our nation's borders is critical to securing the homeland and is the best way to address the threat of spillover violence. However, we have a motto in Texas: "Plan for the worst and pray for the best." We have developed integrated, multi-agency contingency plans for spillover violence for each of the five border security sectors in Texas, which I will forward to you separately. Please do not hesitate to contact me regarding this or any other issues we have discussed.

I greatly appreciate your consideration of my request. No effort can be of greater importance than the public safety and homeland security of Texas and the nation.

Sincerely,



Rick Perry
Governor

RP:gep

Enclosure



OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

RICK PERRY
GOVERNOR

May 17, 2010

The Honorable Ciro D. Rodriguez
U.S. Representative, District 23
U.S. House of Representatives
2351 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-4323

The Honorable Henry Cuellar
U.S. Representative, District 28
U.S. House of Representatives
336 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-4328

The Honorable Silvestre Reyes
U.S. Representative, District 16
U.S. House of Representatives
2433 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-4316

The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz
U.S. Representative, District 27
U.S. House of Representatives
2110 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-4327

The Honorable Rubén Hinojosa
U.S. Representative, District 15
U.S. House of Representatives
2463 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-4315

Dear Congressmen Rodriguez, Cuellar, Reyes, Ortiz and Hinojosa:

Thank you for your April 8, 2010, letter and for recognizing there can be no national security without a secure Texas-Mexico border. The federal government has failed to effectively secure our border and, in recent years, violence in Northern Mexico has skyrocketed.

As you know, I have asked the Obama administration to authorize 3,000 federal Customs and Border Protection personnel, 1,000 Title 32 National Guard personnel and the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) along the Texas-Mexico border. Improving border security should not be a partisan issue, especially in Texas. I greatly appreciate the support of the Texas congressional delegation, from both sides of the aisle, to request additional federal resources for the Texas border region.

However, until the federal government dedicates sufficient resources to secure the border, it is important that state and local law enforcement work closely with their U.S. Border Patrol partners to protect Texans.

This is a growing challenge. Mexican cartels have steadily used terror tactics and prison gang affiliations to evolve into powerful and ruthless organizations operating on both sides of the border, including in many of our communities.

The Honorable Ciro D. Rodriguez
The Honorable Henry Cuellar
The Honorable Silvestre Reyes
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz
The Honorable Rubén Hinojosa
May 17, 2010
Page 2

Byrne Grant funds have been a valuable tool in our fight against these forces. Beginning in 2006, my office has allocated \$78 million in Byrne Grant funds to the border region, helping provide much-needed overtime wages, equipment and other resources to local law enforcement. The border region has received 39 percent of all state-directed Byrne Grant funds distributed in Texas. These grants are invaluable, since they provide more flexibility to allow local law enforcement agencies — who best know their own needs — to determine how this money can best serve their communities.

When it comes to funding for border communities, the 3 percent calculation you cited in your letter for Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) funds is incorrect. Between 2005 and 2009, 17 percent of the state's HSGP funding has been dedicated to the border region.

As you know, FEMA administers the HSGP, which is used to both address terrorism prevention and support response and recovery efforts to all hazards throughout the state. Dedicating all of these grant funds to the border region would violate U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grant criteria, which require the state to address the federal government's 37 target capabilities.

Since 2005, my office has directed \$105 million out of a total of \$624 million in HSGP funding to the border region, constituting 17 percent of the state's HSGP allocation from 2005-2009. U.S. Border Patrol can confirm that there are 45 counties that fully participate in coordinated border security operations. A list of these jurisdictions is enclosed.

The border region is a priority of mine in the allocation of federal grant funds, as well as in state spending meant to supplement insufficient federal resources. Since 2007, the State of Texas has provided more than \$200 million in state funds to these efforts, enhancing border security by increasing the number of law enforcement officers and helicopters in the area, funding overtime needs and adding equipment in support of coordinated patrol operations throughout the border region.

I fully support your efforts to allocate Operation Stonegarden funds to the border region. As you are aware, DHS changed the grant guidance in 2008, enabling the agency to retain authority to determine which entities receive funding. Regarding the \$60 million you referenced in your letter, Texas — a state that includes 64 percent of the U.S.-Mexico border — was allocated only 27 percent of that total. Texas deserves more from DHS, especially considering most of the recent cartel-fueled violence is occurring in Mexican states bordering Texas. Anything you can do to help Texas gain a more appropriate amount of Operation Stonegarden funding would be invaluable in protecting our border communities and our state as a whole.

Lastly, it would be very helpful if border-area law enforcement agencies were freed to use the Stonegarden funds to hire officers with no federal strings attached. In my April 2009 letter to Secretary Napolitano, I requested that DHS remove a federal requirement that any local law

The Honorable Ciro D. Rodriguez
The Honorable Henry Cuellar
The Honorable Silvestre Reyes
The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz
The Honorable Rubén Hinojosa
May 17, 2010
Page 3

enforcement positions created must be retained after funding has been exhausted. This requirement has hindered the ability of agencies to commit to adding the boots on the ground they so desperately need. I can assure you that your support of this request would be greatly appreciated by the chiefs of police and sheriffs along the Texas-Mexico border.

Thank you for your vocal support for greater law enforcement resources in the border region. With your continued efforts and support of the aforementioned issues, the State of Texas will remain the model for homeland security preparedness. I look forward to working with each of you to secure as much funding as possible to confront and eradicate this threat to our citizens.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Rick Perry". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

Rick Perry
Governor

RP:jhp

Enclosure

COASTAL BEND	RGV	LAREDO	DEL RIO	MARFA	EL PASO
Aransas Co SO	Cameron Co SO	Duval Co SO	Dimmit Co SO	Brewster Co SO	El Paso Co SO
Bee Co SO	Hidalgo Co SO	Frio Co SO	Kinney Co SO	Culberson Co SO	
Brooks Co SO	Kenedy Co SO	Jim Hogg Co SO	Maverick Co SO	Hudspeth Co SO	
Calhoun Co SO	Willacy Co SO	La Salle Co SO	Real Co SO	Jeff Davis Co SO	
Dewitt Co SO	Starr Co SO	Webb Co SO	Val Verde Co SO	Pecos Co SO	
Goliad Co SO		Zapata Co SO	Uvalde Co SO	Presidio Co SO	
Gonzales Co SO			Zavala Co SO	Reeves Co SO	
Jackson Co SO				Terrell Co SO	
Jim Wells Co SO					
Karnes Co SO					
Kleberg Co SO					
Lavaca Co SO					
Live Oak Co SO					
McMullen Co SO					
Nueces Co SO					
Refugio Co SO					
San Patricio Co SO					
Victoria Co SO					

ATTACHMENT 5

*Letters from Members of Congress Addressed to the
White House and Other Members of Congress:*

Letter from Congressmen Rodriguez, Cuellar, Reyes,
Ortiz, Hinojosa and other Members to the Hon.
Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of
Representatives, April 15, 2010, and Letter from
Congressmen Reyes and others to Hon. Nancy Pelosi
and Hon. Steny Hoyer, Majority Leader, U.S. House
of Representatives, April 16, 2010

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

April 15, 2010

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
Speaker
U.S. House of Representatives
H-232, The Capitol
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Speaker Pelosi:

As you craft supplemental appropriations legislation to fund the operations and provide for the safe return of our service members fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, we ask you to also consider needed investments in the security of our nation's border with Mexico.

The recent murders of American citizens connected to the U.S. consulate in Ciudad Juarez and the brazen murder of an Arizona rancher on American soil highlight the growing insecurity faced by Americans living along the border with Mexico. Over the past three years, a drug war raging within a stone's throw of American territory has led to the murders of an estimated 15,000 people. Drug cartels now fight each other – and Mexican military and law enforcement – with startling ferocity and sophisticated weapons and tactics for control over narcotics distribution, including significant networks inside the United States. In order to ensure the security of Americans, we ask you to include the following items in the upcoming supplemental appropriations bill for fiscal year 2010.

\$30 million for the National Guard Counter Drug program. The National Guard Counterdrug Program conducts a full spectrum campaign that bridges the gap between Department of Defense and Non-DoD institutions in the fight against illicit drugs and transnational threats to the homeland. The program contributes military support for local, state and federal Law Enforcement Agencies. The program's goal is to provide the nation with a drug-free, mission-ready force to defend the interests of its citizens at home and abroad. The soldiers and airmen involved in the program work at all levels of government to anticipate, deter, and defeat threats along our border in order to enhance national security and protect our society. We are requesting an additional \$30 million for activities along the U.S.-Mexico Border.

\$50 million for Operation Stonegarden. Operation Stonegarden provides resources to enhance law enforcement preparedness and operational readiness along the borders of the U.S. The program is designed to promote cooperation and coordination between federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies in a joint mission to secure the U.S. borders. Since this source of funding is often the only federal resource available to local law enforcement agencies in rural areas, an increase is needed to keep up with the law enforcement demands of the border, especially in a time when we are trying to prevent the spread on violence from Mexico. We are

requesting an additional \$50 Million in FY10 for Operation Stonegarden for the U.S. Mexico border.

\$25 million for the U.S. Border Patrol. The Border Patrol's goal is to establish effective control over America's border with Mexico through the use of personnel, tactical infrastructure, and technology. With assaults against Border Patrol increased from last year's levels and violence raging across the border in Mexico, further investments are needed to equip agents with the tools they need to secure the border and ensure their own safety. Funding will go toward forward operating bases, communications equipment, surveillance equipment, officer support equipment and other resources. We are requesting an additional \$25 million for Border Patrol activities along the U.S.-Mexico border.

\$32.2 million to hire new Border Patrol agents. CBP is responsible for protecting our nation's borders, and ensuring robust levels of agents in the field is critical to achieving operational control of the border. The recent sharp increase in violence in the border region underscores the dangers faced by agents in the field, and the need for more Customs and Border Protection agents has never been more prevalent. We are requesting \$32.2 million for 207 additional Border Patrol agents.

Thank you for your consideration of this critically important request. We look forward to working with you to ensure the security of our borders.

Sincerely,

Harry Teague John Gifford Archie Kinspaugh
Chris D. Bradley Ben P. Holt
Bob Felton Mac Ann
Rubin Hinojosa Henry Cuellar
Scott R. Pat
Paul Stung Larry Kincaid

<u>John Hall</u>	<u>W. H. S.</u>
<u>B. N. Y.</u>	<u>Tim Ryan</u>
<u>Harry E. Mitchell</u>	_____
<u>Arthur P. Craig</u>	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

April 16, 2010

The Honorable Nancy Pelosi
Speaker of the House
U.S. House of Representatives
H-232 Capitol
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Steny Hoyer
Majority Leader
U.S. House of Representatives
H-107 Capitol
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Madam Speaker and Leader Hoyer:

As the Appropriations Committee drafts the fiscal year 2010 emergency supplemental spending measure, we write to urge the inclusion of funding to support efforts by the United States and Mexico to combat narcotics and organized crime. We have the privilege of representing communities along the U.S.-Mexico Border, and the violence facing Mexico is having a particular impact on our communities and our sister cities as the Mexican government clamps down on criminal organizations.

U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation

The Merida Initiative, negotiated by the previous Administration and Mexican President Felipe Calderon, was an important step in cooperative efforts to combat illegal drug trafficking and make needed improvements to the Mexican justice system. The Mexican people have shown great resolve in this battle against deeply entrenched criminal elements, and the Mexican government - at all levels - has invested substantial resources to quell lawlessness and restore order. Despite these efforts, which are starting to show some success, a recent upswing in violence demonstrates that immediate attention, in the form of additional resources and a renewed focus on the problems our two nations face, is needed.

This need for further cooperation prompted President Obama to dispatch a delegation of top U.S. officials including Secretary of State Clinton, Secretary of Defense Gates, and Secretary of Homeland Security Napolitano to Mexico City on March 23, 2010 to discuss our shared interest in addressing crime and disrupting the flow of narcotics, weapons, and money. Additionally, President Calderon will meet with President Obama during an official state visit on May 19, 2010. During this visit, the two leaders will focus on further requirements for cooperation and funding to support Mexico's ongoing efforts.

In advance of those discussions, we urge you to consider including funds to meet urgent requirements in the emergency spending bill currently under consideration. As you know, following the March 23 visit, U.S. and Mexican leaders unveiled a framework for an expanded partnership. This four pillar approach includes continuing efforts to fight organized crime and improve justice institutions and adds creating a 21st Century border and building communities better able to resist the influence of cartels. The governments of both nations are working to translate those broad policy goals into concrete programs, and we have encouraged the Obama

Administration to share their funding priorities with Congress as soon as possible so that these important programs can be included in upcoming spending measures.

In addition to providing resources to support emerging requirements for Mexico, we also urge the Appropriations Committee to consider providing funds for the following areas to support efforts along the U.S.-Mexico border to combat drug trafficking and to aid our border communities, which are directly impacted by the ongoing violence.

Supporting Border Infrastructure and Personnel to Enhance Security and Commerce

Inadequate staffing and outdated infrastructure at our nation's land ports of entry threaten our national security and hinder the flow of trade which is critical to our national economy. The Government Services Administration (GSA) has identified over \$5 billion in needed upgrades to our border infrastructure. While building and expanding ports of entry would greatly improve border operations, it is also critical that these inspection lanes are appropriately staffed. To that end, there is a requirement to increase Customs and Border Protection (CBP) personnel by 30 percent nationwide which would augment the force by 5,000 officers, and an additional 350 support personnel and 1,200 agriculture inspection specialists are also needed. These additional positions would not only improve traffic flow at our land ports of entry but would allow for the expansion of CBP efforts to check southbound vehicles as well, a critical component of cooperative security efforts to disrupt the flow of weapons and money to Mexico in support of the drug trade. These proposals are included in the PORTS Act (HR 1655), which Congressman Silvestre Reyes crafted based on his experience as a U.S. Border Patrol Chief and working with border security experts. As you are considering opportunities to enhance our border security and trade, we hope that you and your staff will examine the PORTS Act as a blueprint for modernizing our nation's ports of entry, and we urge the Committee to include funding for much needed border infrastructure modernization and critical personnel in the supplemental spending bill. At a minimum, we request **\$70 million** to hire 500 CBP Officers to alleviate the immediate stress at our understaffed ports.

As you know, CBP depends on user fees to cover 30% of officers' salaries. In FY10, CBP has seen a decline in user-fee revenues and by the end of the year estimates a \$100 million user-fee revenue shortfall. This drop affects CBP's ability to pay immigration, cargo, and agriculture inspectors, all of whom are critical to our already under-staffed and under-resourced ports of entry. To make up for the shortfall, CBP is drawing from other sources within its budget, draining the budget of vital resources already marked for other purposes. Given the threats facing the nation and our stated goals of protecting our borders and facilitating commerce and trade, we urge you to provide **\$100 million** to CBP through the FY10 Supplemental Appropriations Act for approximately 300 CBP officer salaries. This will offset the decrease in user fees and will ensure that CBP officers are compensated for their work without having to siphon from other areas of the agency budget.

Additionally, Operation Stonegarden has provided resources to enhance law enforcement preparedness and operational readiness along the borders of the U.S. This program is designed to promote cooperation and coordination among federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies in a joint mission to secure U.S. borders. Because this source of funding is often the only federal resource available to local law enforcement agencies in rural areas, an increase is needed to

keep up with the law enforcement demands of the border, especially at a time when we are trying to prevent the spread of violence from Mexico. We request an additional **\$50 million** in FY10 for Operation Stonegarden for the U.S. Mexico border.

Increasing Funding to hire Border Patrol Agents and Combat Corruption

Ensuring robust levels of field agents is critical to achieving operational control of the border. We urge you to provide **\$32.2 million** for 207 additional Border Patrol Agents to help the agency meet its commitments to secure our borders without straining their existing human resources or having to deplete assets from other areas.

Moreover, at a Senate hearing on March 11, 2010, James Tomscheck, assistant commissioner with U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Office of Internal Affairs, testified that members of Drug Trafficking Organizations have attempted to join the Customs and Border Patrol to corrupt the organization. CBP has the goal of screening all applicants through polygraph testing. However, inadequate staffing hinders the ability of CBP to screen all new employees and conduct re-investigations of existing employees using these tests. Further funding to increase the number of polygraph examiners would enable the agency to reach its goal of requiring all applicants to take a polygraph test before they are hired and allow CBP to conduct re-investigations of current employees. We urge you to provide **\$39.6 million** for background investigations, including periodic re-investigations and polygraph capabilities.

Developing the Law Enforcement Communications Capability in Remote Areas Along the Border

Enhancing the communication capabilities of both law enforcement and civilians in remote areas along the border is also a critical need. CBP has an antiquated communications system in certain border sectors, and remote areas along the border do not have communications infrastructure in place. Improvements are needed to foster and enable better communication networks, and we ask that you provide **\$200 million** to support communications capabilities in remote areas along the border.

Reimbursing Border Communities for Uncompensated Health Care Costs and Developing Trauma Capability in Ciudad Juarez

As Members representing border districts, we have seen first hand the impact the violence has on communities on both sides of the border. One consequence of the violence in Mexico has been the steady flow of individuals shot or otherwise wounded by drug cartels across the border to U.S. hospitals in search of medical care. Health care providers have been forced to absorb emergency care costs, which continue to rise, leaving local taxpayers to cover the cost. We urge the Committee on Appropriations to provide **\$10 million** to compensate border region health care providers as they respond to the effects of ongoing cartel violence in Mexico and to develop trauma capability in Ciudad Juarez.

We greatly appreciate your past support for the Merida Initiative and other cooperative efforts to address drug trafficking and organized crime. We are also grateful for your past support to border

communities so that they can cope with the many challenges they face as they deal with the increasing problems wrought by criminal organizations. Your consideration of these requests is important to further both the Merida Initiative and to address the urgent needs detailed in this letter. The will of governments and communities in the U.S. and Mexico to combat criminal elements is strong and United States Congress must continue to honor that resolve with needed funding to aid those serving on the front lines at this critical juncture.

Sincerely,




Ruben Hinojosa

Harry Teague

Cristobal Colon

J. Giffords



Bob Filner

Henry Alvar

Susan A. Davis

cc: Congressman David Obey
Congresswoman Nita Lowey
Congressman Jose Serrano
Congressman David Price

ATTACHMENT 6

Testimony By Steven C. McCraw, Director,
Texas Department of Public Safety, May 11, 2011, “On the
Border and in the Line of Fire: U.S. Law Enforcement,
Homeland Security and Drug Cartel Violence”

Testimony By Steven C. McCraw, Director, Texas Department of Public
Safety , May 11, 2011 , “On the Border and in the Line of Fire: U.S. Law
Enforcement, Homeland Security and Drug Cartel Violence”

Chairman McCaul and Committee members, on behalf of the men and women of the Texas Department of Public Safety, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss a vitally important public safety and national security issue, our unsecure border with Mexico.

Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations have exploited weaknesses in our border defenses for many years in an effort to exert their dominance over the highly lucrative U.S. drug and human smuggling market and they have evolved into powerful and vicious organized crime cartels that now threaten the domestic security of Mexico. They battle each other and the Government of Mexico to maintain and/or increase their share of the multi-billions of dollars derived from the smuggling of drugs and humans into the U.S., and bulk cash, high value merchandise, stolen vehicles and weapons into Mexico.

They use military and terrorist tactics and weaponry killing over 36,000 people since 2006 and there is no limit to their depravity. They employ horrific tactics to intimidate their adversaries and the public such as decapitations, acid baths, skinning people alive, torture and Improvised Explosive Devices and they have expanded their criminal operations to profit from kidnappings, robberies, human trafficking, extortions and theft. During the past several months we have seen reports of mass graves and self-censorship of the Mexican press. The Mexican Cartels work closely with Texas based and transnational gangs to support their criminal operations on both sides of the border. We continually see multi-ton drug loads seized throughout Texas.

The Mexican Cartels use a mature decision-making process that incorporates reconnaissance networks, techniques and capabilities normally associated with military organizations such as communication intercepts, interrogations, trend analysis, secure communications, coordinated military-style tactical operations, GPS, thermal imagery and military armaments including fully automatic weapons, rocket propelled grenades and hand grenades. They are very adept at corrupting government officials and entire institutions to support their criminal operations undermining the ability of Mexico to address this threat. Recent reports reveal that Mexico has only a 2% criminal conviction rate.

The 2011 GAO Report confirmed what we already knew in Texas, there are insufficient federal resources to secure the Texas/Mexico border with as much as 70% to 90% of the 1,250 miles of border in Texas is only being monitored as opposed to managed or operationally controlled. It is important to note that the men and women of the

Customs and Border Protection Service are dedicated professionals and do an exceptional job with the limited resources they possess. However, there has been a substantial underinvestment in border security for several decades to the benefit of the Mexican Cartels and the detriment of public safety and homeland security.

Texas is a law and order state and there is a high expectation by our citizens that Sheriffs, Chiefs of Police and the Texas Department of Public Safety will work closely together with our federal partners to proactively protect Texas from all criminal and terrorist threats regardless of their origin. When Texas landowners are overwhelmed by drug and human smugglers trespassing and vandalizing their property, they expect a timely law enforcement response and do not want to hear from Sheriffs and the State of Texas that it is not their job.

The State of Texas has already invested over \$250 million to enhance border security efforts recognizing long ago its importance to the safety of all Texans. The State adopted a unified command structure to centralize local, state and federal border related intelligence across 53 Texas border Counties and over a hundred local, state and federal agencies to support unified patrol operations on the ground, in the air and on the water. Combining efforts is a force multiplier and provides a more accurate understanding of the current and future border-related threats.

It has also been necessary to increase the state's tactical capability on the border. The Cartels have become increasingly confrontational using blocking and chase cars, caltrops to disable patrol cars during high speed pursuits and Cartel boat teams that confront U.S. law enforcement on the U.S. side of the Rio Grande River while they retrieve the drugs from vehicles that have been driven into the Rio Grande River to avoid capture.

In ONE instance, Cartel members threw a Molotov cocktail at Texas Rangers in an attempt to avoid capture and on at least two occasions, Border Patrol Agents were fired upon from Mexico while patrolling the Rio Grande River.

The State of Texas established Texas Ranger Recon Teams augmented with DPS SWAT resources, Texas Military Forces personnel, DPS Aviation and Trooper Strike Teams who work closely with local law enforcement and the Border Patrol to confront the Cartels in high threat areas.

The Committee requested that I provide an assessment of the impact of Cartel-related crime in the Texas border region. To accurately assess the overall criminal impact of an unsecure border on Texas requires the syntheses of several different variables within and outside the border region. For example, if we were to use only Index Crimes as reported through the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system, it would not include essential variables such as extortions, kidnappings, smuggling incidents, corruption, smuggling-related trespassing and vandalism, arrests of aliens from countries with strong terrorist networks, seizures of Cartel drugs, weapons and bulk cash on the 10 major smuggling corridors throughout Texas, Cartel command and control networks operating in Texas, increases in Cartel-related gang activity, death squad members living in Texas, Cartel-related killings of U.S. citizens in Mexico, Cartel-related violence along the border directed at U.S. law enforcement and the recruitment of Texas children in our border region to support Cartel operations on both sides of the border. These indicators reflect what the Texas Department of Public Safety refers to as "spill over crime" and are discussed below:

Over the last 18 months, six of the seven Mexican Cartels have established command and control networks in Texas cities. This is a three-fold increase.

Within the last year the number of Texas prison gangs who work directly with the Mexican Cartels have increased from four to twelve. This is significant because 62% of prison gang members are incarcerated for violent crimes in Texas and as much as 60% of the criminal activity in some Texas communities is carried out by gangs.

Since January 2010, DPS has identified in Texas 22 murders, 24 assaults, 15 shootings and five kidnappings directly related to the Mexican Cartels.

The Mexican Cartels are recruiting Texas school age children to support Cartel operations. The border region constitutes 9.4% of the state's population and now has over 18.9% of the juvenile felony drug and gang referrals.

The Mexican Cartels are actively recruiting U.S. law enforcement officers to support their smuggling operations. Two South Texas Sheriffs were convicted for Cartel-related corruption and over 70 CBP Agents have been arrested for corruption along the southwest border.

The Mexican Cartels and Texas gangs who support them smuggle and traffic in humans. There have been 480 human trafficking victims over the last four years, 77% were children. Approximately 10% of the calls to the National Human Trafficking Hotline come from Texas, more than any other state.

The FBI in San Antonio reported that there have been 266 kidnappings since 2004, 14 reported in 2004, and 58 in 2009. Kidnappings include Americans kidnapped in Mexico, victims abducted in Texas and taken to Mexico and victims kidnapped in Texas by subjects from Mexico.

Virtual kidnappings and extortions are increasing in Texas. There were 23 reports of attempted extortion in El Paso between August 2009 and September 2010.

The amount of drug and human smuggling and trafficking that occurs in Texas is an essential indicator of the crime impact on the state. A senior DHS official has reported that only 6.5% of the drugs and humans smuggled into the U.S. from Mexico are interdicted. The Department of Public Safety is not in a position to confirm the percentage cited but it does track interdictions within the border region and seizures beyond the check points.

The 2009 UCR data for the El Paso Police Department shows a reduction in murders; however, the 2011 data from the El Paso Police Department currently shows a 1,200% increase in murders from 2010 to 2011. The Department of Public Safety considers UCR data as only one indicator because of the delay in reporting and the limited incidents it captures.

CBP Agents and Officers continue to arrest illegal aliens along the U.S./Mexico border from countries with a known terrorism presence and 74% of those arrests have occurred in Texas.

A recent federal investigation in Texas underscores the seriousness of this homeland security threat. Between 2006-2008, Dhakane smuggled 300 Somali illegal aliens, moving them through Brazil-Guatemala-Mexico-Texas and California. Dhakane eventually admitted that not only had he worked for many years for the designated terrorist groups AL-ITTIHAD-AL-ISLAMI (AIAI, or Islamic Union Courts/closely affiliated

with al-Shabaab) and the AL-BARRAKAT, he moved at least seven committed Jihadists, most of them over the U.S. southwestern border.

Total amount of Operation Border Star seizures from 2006 to present have an estimated street value of \$7,939,824,739.23 (see Exhibit 1).

The Texas Department of Public Safety has seen an increase in Cartel related seizures occurring beyond the check points and along the ten major corridors in Texas.

Cocaine 28% increase

Marijuana 124% increase

Heroin 2,493% increase

Methamphetamine 135% increase

Bulk Cash 168% increase

Weapons 155% increase

When the U.S./Mexico border is finally secured the Mexican Cartels will no longer have access to the billions of dollars they use to undermine the domestic security of Mexico and the safety and security of the citizens of Texas and the nation. Border security can be accomplished with the sufficient will and resources of the federal government working as a team with local and state law enforcement agencies.

<http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony%20McCraw.pdf>

ATTACHMENT 7

President Obama, MEMORANDUM FOR THE
SECRETARY OF STATE
SUBJECT: Presidential Determination on Major
Illicit Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing
Countries for Fiscal Year 2012

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release September 15, 2011

September 15, 2011

Presidential Determination

No. 2011-16

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Presidential Determination on Major Illicit Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2012

Pursuant to section 706(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-228)(FRAA), I hereby identify the following countries as major drug transit or major illicit drug producing countries: Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.

A country's presence on the Majors List is not necessarily an adverse reflection of its government's counternarcotics efforts or level of cooperation with the United States. Consistent with the statutory definition of a major drug transit or drug producing country set forth in section 481(e)(2) and (5) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), one of the reasons that major drug transit or illicit drug producing countries are placed on the list is the combination of geographic, commercial, and economic factors that allow drugs to transit or be produced despite the concerned government's most assiduous narcotics control law enforcement measures.

Pursuant to section 706(2)(A) of the FRAA, I hereby designate Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela as countries that have failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to make substantial efforts to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and take the measures set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the FAA. Accompanying this report are justifications for the determinations on Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela, as required by section 706(2)(B).

I have also determined, in accordance with provisions of section 706(3)(A) of the FRAA, that support for programs to aid Bolivia and Venezuela are vital to the national interests of the United States.

Afghanistan remains the world's largest producer of opium poppy and a major source of heroin. Primary trafficking routes from Afghanistan, where poppy cultivation is still mostly confined to the southern and western provinces, are through Iran to Turkey and Western Europe; through Pakistan to Africa, Asia, and the Middle East; and through Central Asia to the Russian Federation.

Helmand Province remains the largest grower of opium poppy in Afghanistan, but the Provincial Government's innovative Food Zone program, which provides farmers with wheat seed and fertilizer in exchange for a pledge not to grow poppy, coupled with

credible law enforcement, has reduced Helmand's poppy cultivation by a third, to 69,883 hectares in 2009 and even further to 65,043 hectares in 2010. The U.S.-funded Governor Led Eradication (GLE) program has demonstrated progress in Helmand with 2,111 hectares eradicated by the end of May 2011. To date during 2011, a total of 3,827 hectares of GLE has been verified in 17 provinces throughout the country, an increase of more than 45 percent in eradication over the same time last year.

Although the amount of opium poppy cultivated in Pakistan is much less than Afghanistan, the country continues to qualify as a major drug producing country, with an estimated 1,700 hectares of opium poppy under cultivation. The country also remains a major transit country for opiates and hashish for markets around the world and is a transit country for precursor chemicals illegally smuggled to Afghanistan, where they are used to process heroin. Bilateral cooperation between Pakistan and the United States continues to support Pakistan's goal of returning to poppy-free status. United States Government support focuses especially on upgrading the institutional capacity of Pakistan's law enforcement agencies.

A number of indicators qualify the addition of El Salvador and Belize to the Majors List along with the remainder of Central American countries on the isthmus connecting South America to North America.

El Salvador, located between Guatemala and Nicaragua along the Pacific coastline and sharing an eastern border with Honduras, is subject to a number of factors making it vulnerable to the drug trade flowing to the United States from South America. The International Narcotics Control Board describes El Salvador as part of the so-called "northern triangle" with Guatemala and Honduras where "national gangs are forming alliances with international criminal syndicates." According to the most recent U.S. interagency assessment of cocaine flows, the amount of this illicit substance passing through El Salvador destined directly for the United States was estimated at 4 metric tons in 2009.

The most recent U.S. assessment for Belize estimates the flow of drugs destined for the United States through this Central American country on the Caribbean coast at about 10 metric tons. Belize's vulnerability as a south-north avenue for the illegal narcotics trade is also demonstrated by recent drug and weapons seizures in Mexico along the border it shares with Belize. United States officials also report that drug control observers in Belize are increasingly concerned about the presence of drug trafficking organizations, including Los Zetas of Mexico, in the country's border areas and in coastal ports.

Considering the Central American region as a whole, the United States Government estimates that as much as 90 percent of some 700 metric tons of cocaine shipped annually from Colombia and other producing nations intended for the U.S. markets passes through the countries of Central America. This situation is an important element prompting the Central American Citizen Security Partnership, which I announced in March 2011. Through this partnership, the United States is working to refocus the impact of assistance through the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and enhance the impact of complementary United States Government non-CARSI citizen safety and rule of law programs. Countries in the region are increasing coordination through the Central

American Integration System, a combined effort to promote citizen security and economic prosperity, including programs aimed at thwarting the drug trade.

International documentation shows continued strengthening of illegal drug trafficking ties between South America and West Africa. West Africa is the closest point to South America for transatlantic purposes, and its close proximity to southern Europe provides a natural gateway to European drug markets. Porous borders, inadequate law enforcement, and corruption create a permissive environment for the illegal drug trade. West African linguistic connections among Brazil, Portugal, and Cape Verde may also contribute to narcotics trafficking. According to the U.S. assessment of cocaine movement, about a third of cocaine destined for Europe passed through West Africa in 2009. The 2011 U.N. World Drug Report also states there are reports that cocaine from Latin America is being stockpiled in some West African countries for future distribution to Europe in smaller quantities.

Despite the range of domestic challenges, including corruption, West African countries have begun to consider narcotics control as a top national security priority. For example, in 2010, Liberian law enforcement successfully uncovered and interdicted a cache of cocaine valued at \$100 million. A number of U.S. projects in West Africa are aimed at improving drug interdiction and investigation capabilities. The assistance provided by international donors and organizations to West African governments to improve their counternarcotics capability is increasingly urgent. The United States welcomes fresh impetus in 2010 and 2011 from the international community, especially the United Nations and the European Union, to make Africa a priority for drug-control assistance, to promote and protect the stability and positive growth of countries in Africa.

The stealth with which both marijuana and synthetic drugs such as MDMA (ecstasy) and methamphetamine are produced in Canada and trafficked to the United States makes it difficult to measure the overall impact of this smuggling. However, a special report prepared in May 2011 by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration states that "the threat posed by MDMA trafficking from Canada to and within the United States is significant." For example, in April 2011, a seizure of 20 pounds of MDMA from a Canada-based trafficking group was made by U.S. law enforcement in

4

Plattsburg, New York. The United States pledges a more robust engagement and dialogue with Canada to reduce the shared problem of illegal drug trafficking. The results of this bilateral redoubling of drug-control cooperation will be considered in the framework of next year's Presidential Determination.

You are hereby authorized and directed to submit this determination under section 706 of the FRAA, transmit it to the Congress, and publish it in the Federal Register.

BARACK OBAMA

ATTACHMENT 8

Summary, North Texas High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area Drug Market Analysis, U.S. DOJ,
National Drug Intelligence Center, June 2010

North Texas High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA)

Based on material from the U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, North Texas High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Drug Market Analysis 2010.

The North Texas High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) region is a major regional- and national-level transportation and distribution area for cocaine, methamphetamine, marijuana, and heroin supplied to U.S. drug markets primarily in the Midwest, Northeast, and Southeast. Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), which pose the greatest organizational threat to the region, use the Dallas/Fort Worth area as well as the Oklahoma City area to store and distribute illicit drugs destined for drug markets throughout the United States and to consolidate bulk cash drug proceeds smuggled into Mexico.

The following are significant strategic drug threat developments in the North Texas HIDTA:

- Mexican DTOs are expanding their illicit operations into rural areas within and adjacent to the HIDTA region, where law enforcement resources are limited. Consequently, these areas are expected to experience an increase in drug-related criminal activity involving these DTOs.
- Seizures of portable one-pot, or shake-and-bake, methamphetamine laboratories nearly tripled in 2009 from 2008 in the Oklahoma counties of the North Texas HIDTA region, primarily Tulsa County, indicating increased local production of methamphetamine. This trend is expected to increase in the near term.
- Controlled prescription drugs (CPDs) accounted for more than 80 percent of drug-related deaths in the Oklahoma counties in the North Texas HIDTA in 2009, posing a growing threat to the HIDTA region.
- Cannabis cultivation at indoor and outdoor sites is increasing in the North Texas HIDTA region, and outdoor grow operations in the region's rural locations are expanding in size and number.
- Seizures of hydroponic marijuana in the North Texas HIDTA region more than doubled from 2008 to 2009, indicating increased availability of the drug. This trend is expected to continue as demand for high-potency marijuana increases in the region.

The North Texas HIDTA region encompasses 15 northern Texas counties (most of which are located in the Dallas/Fort Worth area, the largest metropolitan area in size and

population in Texas) and 6 Oklahoma counties (including Oklahoma and Tulsa Counties, where the state's two largest cities by population are located).

Approximately 7 million residents, or 28 percent of the Texas population, reside in the Texas portion of the North Texas HIDTA region, and more than 1.7 million residents, or 48 percent of the Oklahoma population, reside in the Oklahoma portion. This large population base is ethnically diverse, particularly in the Dallas/Fort Worth metropolitan area, where more than a million residents are foreign-born and nearly 29 percent of the population is Hispanic. The diverse population of the North Texas HIDTA region enables members of ethnic-based DTOs, criminal groups, and gangs to easily assimilate within communities and divert attention from their drug trafficking activities.

The North Texas HIDTA region's extensive transportation infrastructure and strategic proximity to Mexico contribute to making the region an attractive area for DTOs to conduct their criminal activities. Drug traffickers exploit the region's intricate network of highway systems for the northbound flow of illicit drugs from the Southwest Border to U.S. drug markets and the southbound flow of bulk cash and monetary instruments to drug source areas primarily in Mexico.

Interstates 20, 30, 35, 40, and 44 are main corridors that intersect the HIDTA region and link its primary drug markets (Dallas/Fort Worth and Oklahoma City) to the Southwest Border and to major U.S. markets in the Midwest, Northeast, and Southeast. Air transportation in the North Texas HIDTA region offers additional potential for exploitation by drug traffickers. The Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) provides nonstop service to 140 domestic and 40 international destinations. It is the third-busiest airport in the world in terms of aircraft movement and the eighth-busiest in terms of passenger traffic. The HIDTA region also has numerous private airports, buses, trains, and package delivery services that traffickers could exploit to transport contraband.

Although a significant portion of illicit drug shipments transported to the North Texas HIDTA region is intended for local distribution, many drug shipments are stored at stash houses in the area and transshipped to other U.S. drug markets. National Seizure System (NSS) data for 2009 indicate that illicit drugs originating from locations in the HIDTA region were destined for drug markets in states such as Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee.

The attractiveness of the North Texas HIDTA region to DTOs is further enhanced by the region's financial infrastructure, diverse businesses, major industries, and multinational corporations. In 2009, the Dallas/Fort Worth metropolitan area was home to 24 Fortune 500 companies and was the third-highest metropolitan area in the nation based on the number of large corporate headquarters. The presence of these major companies in the metropolitan area contributes greatly to the economic viability of the region. Drug

traffickers seeking opportunities to launder illicit drug proceeds are particularly drawn to the Dallas/Fort Worth area because of its status as a principal banking and financial center in the Southwest.

Dallas and Tarrant Counties also have one of the largest concentrations of licensed firearms dealers in the state. Drug traffickers and other criminal groups take advantage of the many firearms businesses and gun shows in the HIDTA region to purchase firearms for their criminal operations or for smuggling to Mexico on behalf of Mexican DTOs.

The trafficking and abuse of methamphetamine, primarily ice methamphetamine, pose the most significant drug threat to the North Texas HIDTA region. According to the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) National Drug Threat Survey (NDTS) 2010, 49 of the 91 federal, state, and local law enforcement respondents in the North Texas HIDTA region identify either ice methamphetamine (35) or powder methamphetamine (14) as the greatest drug threat to their jurisdictions. Fifteen respondents identify cocaine, predominantly crack cocaine (11), as the greatest drug threat, followed by marijuana, CPDs, and heroin. Most respondents also indicate that each of these drugs, with the exception of heroin, is readily available at moderate to high levels in their jurisdictions. Marijuana, CPDs, and ice methamphetamine are the most widely available and abused drugs in the HIDTA region.

The threat posed by the distribution and abuse of methamphetamine in the region is enhanced by the drug's strong association with property crime and violent crime. Of the 91 law enforcement agencies responding to the NDTS 2010, more than half attribute property and violent crime in their jurisdictions to the distribution and abuse of methamphetamine.

Mexican ice methamphetamine is the dominant form of the drug available in the North Texas HIDTA region, and its availability remains high in most areas, despite a reduction in the quantity of methamphetamine seized in the region in 2009. This reduction in methamphetamine seizure amounts in 2009 from the 2008 total is attributed to the seizure of large amounts of the drug resulting from Project Reckoning in September 2008. Apart from the high seizure total recorded by the HIDTA initiative in 2008, methamphetamine seizure amounts in the region are trending upward overall since 2007. NSS data indicate that seizure amounts of liquid methamphetamine in 2009 totaled 20,817.5 milliliters after none was seized in 2008. Also, locally produced powder methamphetamine is increasingly available in the Oklahoma area of the HIDTA region.

The distribution and abuse of cocaine, both powder and crack, are contributing factors to property crime and violent crime in the region, according to state and local law enforcement respondents to the NDTS 2010. Cocaine is readily available in the region, with a moderate upswing in the demand for powder cocaine noted during the last 6

months of 2009. Crack cocaine conversion, distribution, and abuse are most problematic in low-income urban areas of Dallas, Fort Worth, Lawton, Oklahoma City, and Tulsa.

Marijuana availability has increased in the region, resulting in increased treatment admissions for the drug, primarily in the Oklahoma counties. For example, mentions of marijuana in Tulsa County increased from 310 treatment admissions in 2008 to 531 admissions in 2009. The demand for hydroponically grown marijuana is increasing in the region, particularly in North Texas. North Texas HIDTA task force initiatives seized more hydroponic marijuana in 2009 than in the previous 4 years combined. Additionally, a variety of marijuana called popcorn is available in the Dallas/Fort Worth area. This type of marijuana, which is grown in Chihuahua, Mexico, consists primarily of the buds of the cannabis plant and is slightly greasy or oily to the touch because it is grown under pine trees.

Heroin, primarily Mexican black tar, is widely available, and the demand for the drug remains stable. Heroin-related treatment admissions in the region increased marginally in 2009. In Texas counties, heroin-related treatment admissions increased from 2,697 in 2008 to 2,850 in 2009, and in Oklahoma counties, admissions increased from 148 to 174 during the same period.

The abuse of diverted CPDs--notably hydrocodone, oxycodone, and alprazolam products--poses a serious and growing threat to the entire HIDTA region, but especially to Oklahoma and Tulsa Counties. CPDs are readily available, abused at high levels, and associated with more than 80 percent of the drug overdose deaths (248) in the HIDTA region's Oklahoma counties.

Other drugs such as MDMA (3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine, also known as ecstasy), PCP (phencyclidine), and khat pose low threats to the North Texas HIDTA region. However, the availability and abuse of MDMA present a growing concern, specifically in the Dallas/Fort Worth area as well as in Oklahoma City and Tulsa. In addition, seizures of a counterfeit MDMA in both North Texas and Oklahoma have caused further concern. Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) Crime Laboratory data indicate that in 2009 approximately 30 percent of all evidentiary drug submissions represented as MDMA were BZP (N-benzylpiperazine) and TFMPP (1-(3-trifluoromethylphenyl)piperazine). The counterfeit MDMA was marked, embossed, and tinted to simulate MDMA and was distributed as that drug. Increased seizure amounts of PCP in 2009 indicate growing availability of the drug. Law enforcement authorities in Nacogdoches and Angelina Counties in Texas (located near Smith County in the North Texas HIDTA region) report increased demand for PCP in their jurisdictions. Khat seizures totaled more than 89 kilograms in 2009 after none was seized in 2008. Khat use in the Dallas/Fort Worth area is prevalent among immigrants from African countries such as Somalia and Ethiopia.

NDTS data for 2010 cited in this report are as of March 3, 2010. NDTS data cited are raw, unweighted responses from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies solicited through either NDIC or the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) HIDTA program. Data cited may include responses from agencies that are part of the NDTS 2010 national sample and/or agencies that are part of HIDTA solicitation lists.

Project Reckoning was a 15-month multiagency investigation that targeted the Gulf Cartel and its smuggling operations. As part of Project Reckoning, federal, state, and local law enforcement officers (in the jurisdiction of the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Texas) conducted Operation Dos Equis and Operation Vertigo, both of which focused on Gulf Cartel members who operated cocaine and methamphetamine trafficking cells in the North Texas area. The two operations resulted in the arrests of more than 30 drug traffickers and the seizure of more than \$1 million in cash, 300 kilograms of cocaine, 360 pounds of ice methamphetamine, numerous weapons, and an explosive device. A second phase of Project Reckoning led to the arrests of more than 40 drug traffickers with links to the Gulf Cartel in several states, including Texas and Oklahoma.

BZP is a stimulant that produces euphoria and cardiovascular effects and is approximately 10 to 20 times less potent than amphetamine in producing these effects. BZP tablets, especially those that contain the hallucinogen TFMPP, are often sold as MDMA or promoted as an alternative to MDMA.

Gangs in the North Texas HIDTA region are involved at varying levels in drug trafficking and related criminal activities, such as assaults, home invasions, burglaries, and weapons trafficking. Many of the most active gangs in the HIDTA region are Hispanic street and prison gangs. Some of these gangs are transnational and have foreign-born members who engage in criminal activity on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border. Transnational gang members generally maintain criminal connections in their native countries and may have some of their criminal activities planned, directed, and controlled by gang leaders in those countries. Members of certain gangs, including outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs), engage in weapons smuggling. For example, law enforcement officers in the Dallas area report that members of Bandidos OMG move guns from Dallas into Mexico.

North Texas: A Major Focus in Project Coronado Operation

In October 2009, a law enforcement effort led by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) resulted in the arrests of more than 300 individuals in 19 states as part of Project Coronado, a multijurisdictional investigation that targeted methamphetamine and cocaine trafficking cells associated with La Familia Michoacana (La Familia). La Familia is a significant Mexican DTO operating in the North Texas HIDTA region, notably the Dallas/Fort Worth area. La Familia's organizational components in and around the Dallas/Fort Worth area are highly structured, well-organized, and primarily responsible

for the majority of ice methamphetamine and significant amounts of marijuana trafficked in the North Texas area. Some cell members who work for the DTO use members of the Tango Blast prison clique and the Mexican Mafia prison gang for enforcement, protection, and the transportation of illicit drugs. Arrests in conjunction with Project Coronado in the North Texas HIDTA region occurred in the Dallas/Fort Worth (84) and Tulsa (8) areas. The Dallas/Fort Worth area served as a critical distribution hub for La Familia and a transshipment point for drug shipments to other U.S. cities in states such as Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Minnesota, and Mississippi. Cell members received drug shipments, used stash houses to store the drugs and cash proceeds, and acted as intermediaries and brokers to negotiate the acquisition, price, delivery, and payment for the drugs. They used vehicles to transport the bulk currency to supply sources in Michoacán, Mexico, secreting the funds in false compartments, gas tanks, or other containers in vehicles. Project Coronado also resulted in the arrests of individuals engaged in firearms smuggling for La Familia.

Table 4. Active Hispanic Gangs in the Major Drug Markets of the North Texas HIDTA Region, 2009

City	Gang	Type
Dallas	Eastside Homeboys	Street
	Latin Kings	Street
	Mexicles	Prison
	Mexikanemi	Prison
	Tango Blast	Prison clique/Street
	Texas Syndicate	Prison
	Varrío North Side (VNS)	Street
	West Side Gator Boys	Street
Fort Worth	28th Street	Street
	Fantasmas	Street
	Sur-13	Street
Oklahoma City	Eastside Vatos Sureños (EVS)	Street
	Grande Barrio Centrale (GBC)	Street

City	Gang	Type
	Juaritos (or Grande Barrio Loco (GBL))	Street
	South Side Locos (SSL)	Street
Tulsa	East Side Longos	Street
	Latin Kings	Street
	Ñeta	Prison/Street
	Norteños	Street
	Sureños	Street

Transnational Gang Members Arrested in Dallas/Fort Worth Area

In June 2009, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents and other law enforcement officers arrested 81 transnational gang members, their associates, and immigration status violators during a 6-day Operation Community Shield² action in the Dallas/Fort Worth area. The operation targeted foreign-born, violent gang members and associates in the North Texas cities of Arlington, Dallas, Carrollton, Fort Worth, Irving, Lewisville, and Plano. Gang members arrested were from Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, and Laos and belonged to the following street gangs: 15th Street, 18th Street, 28th Street, 68th Street (Nuevo Laredo, Mexico), Aryan Brotherhood, Butter Bean Boys, Crips, East Side Homeboys, Easy Riders (Los Angeles), Five Deuce Crip, How High Crew, Mara Salvatrucha (MS 13), Northside Locos, Laotian Oriental Killer Boyz, Mexican Clan Locos, Norteños, Southside, Sureños, Tango Blast, True Bud Smokers, Trueman Street Blood, Varrio Diamond Hill, and Varrio Northside. Fifty-two of those arrested were active gang members and 14 were gang associates. Individuals associated with the Los Zetas criminal organization were also arrested during this operation. Many of those arrested had previous criminal convictions that included weapons charges, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against a peace officer, engaging in organized criminal activity, burglary of a vehicle, and robbery.

Texas DPS authorities indicate that during 2009, Mexican traffickers transported liquid methamphetamine to the Dallas/Fort Worth area; however, no seizures of this form of the drug have been recorded since late 2009. Texas DPS officers note that quantities of acetone have been discovered in some methamphetamine stash houses in the

Dallas/Fort Worth area. Traffickers convert or "recrystallize" the liquid compound to high-purity (98%) ice methamphetamine crystals or shards using an acetone-wash process. Although no liquid methamphetamine has been seized in the HIDTA region since the last quarter of 2009, there is still reporting that acetone is being stored in stash houses in the area, leading to an intelligence gap regarding the purpose of this chemical.

Law enforcement officials in the region report an increase in the number of indoor cannabis grow operations, particularly those producing hydroponic marijuana. The majority of indoor hydroponic grows in the HIDTA region are found in rental units or homes in residential areas, primarily in the Dallas/Fort Worth area. Grow operators are employing techniques such as using stolen electric meters during the production process to avoid detection of excessive electricity use. In the first quarter of 2010, law enforcement officers in Lubbock County, Texas, reported a noticeable increase in the cultivation of hydroponic cannabis in dorm rooms and apartments.

Law enforcement officials also report an increase in the number of outdoor grow operations in the North Texas HIDTA region, particularly in the heavily wooded rural areas of the region. In July 2009, law enforcement officers discovered several large cannabis grow operations in Ellis and Navarro Counties, resulting in the seizure of more than 16,000 plants. Officers in Oklahoma discovered other large grow operations in a remote section of the Kiamichi Mountains situated in southeastern Oklahoma across the border from Texas. Evidence at many of the grow sites in the region indicates that the principal growers are Mexicans, usually illegal nationals.

Transportation

Mexican traffickers smuggle multikilogram to multiton quantities of illicit drugs--primarily cocaine, ice methamphetamine, heroin, and marijuana--to the North Texas HIDTA region, either directly from Mexico through major ports of entry (POEs) along the U.S.-Mexico border (such as Laredo, El Paso, McAllen, or Brownsville) or other, smaller Southwest Border towns, or through California and Arizona. Traffickers continually adjust their smuggling routes through the region to avoid interdiction on the major highways in the North Texas HIDTA region. For example, law enforcement in Terry County (which is directly southwest of Lubbock County) reports that traffickers are avoiding concentrated law enforcement interdiction efforts along Interstates 10, 20, 27, and 40 and shifting to less traveled highways such as U.S. Highways 62, 380, and 385 to transport drug shipments from western states to the North Texas area.

Drug shipments that arrive in the HIDTA region are often repackaged for distribution to drug markets in the region and throughout the United States. NSS data indicate that seized drug shipments originating in the North Texas HIDTA region in 2009 were destined primarily for drug markets in southeastern and midwestern states, including

Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.

Aviation smuggling is increasing in the Dallas/Fort Worth area. ICE agents indicate that traffickers are transporting cocaine and marijuana as well as illegal aliens by air from the Dallas/Fort Worth area to other transshipment locations, such as Atlanta. Much of this activity occurs at private airports through the use of private pilots referred to as mercenary pilots.

Distribution

Dallas/Fort Worth

Mexican DTOs are the principal wholesale distributors of methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, and marijuana in the Dallas/Fort Worth area of the HIDTA region, while Asian DTOs, primarily Vietnamese, are the main distributors of MDMA and hydroponic marijuana. Local independent distributors and members of street, prison, and outlaw motorcycle gangs are the primary midlevel and retail-level drug distributors operating in the Dallas/Fort Worth area. African American and Hispanic street gangs are principal retail-level distributors of illicit drugs in the North Texas HIDTA region. African American drug traffickers in the Dallas/Fort Worth area are increasingly distributing MDMA.

Oklahoma City

Mexican DTOs and criminal groups are significant suppliers of wholesale quantities of illicit drugs in Oklahoma City. Some members of African American and Hispanic street gangs, particularly South Side Locos and Juaritos, work with Mexican DTOs to distribute methamphetamine, marijuana, and cocaine in Oklahoma City at the retail level. African American street gangs also distribute MDMA and codeine-laced cough syrup to young abusers.

Drug-Related Crime

Methamphetamine is the drug that most contributes to property crime and violent crime in the HIDTA region. According to NDTs 2010 data, 56 of the 91 state and local law enforcement respondents in the North Texas HIDTA region identify methamphetamine as the drug most associated with property crime, and 48 respondents identify methamphetamine as the drug most associated with violent crime.

Abusers of methamphetamine and other drugs commit crimes to obtain money to support their drug addictions, including stealing property, committing identity theft and credit card fraud, and other criminal activity. Some gangs in the HIDTA region have a propensity for violence, such as Tango Blast in Dallas and South Side Locos in Oklahoma

City, and some gangs also commit auto theft, burglary, illegal immigrant smuggling, home invasion robbery, kidnapping, and murder.

Gang members (such as members of the East Side Homeboys street gang in Dallas) arrested on drug trafficking violations in the HIDTA region are frequently in possession of firearms, which they typically carry to protect their drug supplies or defend their distribution territories. They also use the firearms for intimidation or retaliation purposes and, at times, against law enforcement. Many gang and criminal group members obtain firearms by burglarizing area businesses, private homes and vehicles, or through straw purchasers.

Mexican criminals and trusted members of some gangs in the North Texas HIDTA region smuggle stolen and illegally purchased guns, particularly assault rifles, to Mexico for use by DTO enforcers. For example, in October 2009, gun smugglers in the Dallas/Fort Worth area were arrested in conjunction with Project Coronado. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) participated in the Project Coronado effort, targeting firearms smugglers working on behalf of La Familia. Six of the arrests occurred in Fort Worth, where a weapons trafficking ring had recruited and paid individuals to act as straw purchasers to buy firearms. After acquiring a sufficient number of firearms, the traffickers transported them to a ranch in Cleburne, Texas, where the guns were stored prior to shipment to the Southwest Border area and eventually to Mexico.

Illicit Finance

Millions of dollars in illicit drug proceeds are smuggled in bulk to Mexico from the HIDTA region for eventual laundering or repatriation. Drug traffickers routinely use the region, particularly the Dallas/Fort Worth area, as a staging location for bulk cash and monetary instruments that they generate through their illicit activities. Internal Revenue Service authorities indicate that some drug traffickers have used color coding to mark packages in bulk currency shipments to identify from where the proceeds have come or to which criminal groups the proceeds should be delivered.

Traffickers in the Dallas and Oklahoma City areas are also being seen in possession of stored value cards, such as gift cards. Traffickers are transporting the stored value cards to Brownsville or other Southwest Border locations. There the transporter withdraws the money from the cards and wires the funds to a recipient in Mexico or another foreign location.

Stored Value Cards

Stored value cards are prepaid debit cards that use magnetic stripe technology to store information about funds that have been prepaid to the card. Payroll cards, government benefit cards, gift cards, and telephone cards are examples of stored value cards. These virtual money cards can be accessed through the Internet and often allow holders to

transfer money values anonymously without being subject to the same controls required of institutions that deal with credit and debit cards. Legitimate and criminal users of these virtual money cards store funds on the cards in amounts not exceeding the dollar limit set by the issuing authority; however, a complicit issuing authority can waive the dollar limit, making these cards attractive to money launderers. In addition, the owner of a stored value card can authorize another individual to withdraw funds without requiring any type of identification at the time of the transaction.

Money launderers also use wire transfer services to move illicit drug proceeds from the Dallas/Fort Worth area to banks and other financial transaction points in Mexico. Money launderers are facilitating wire transfers by using "straw men" to conceal the identity of the transferring party. Also in the Dallas/Fort Worth area, members of Mexican drug trafficking cells are buying properties, renovating them, and then selling them legitimately and sending the profits to Mexico.

NDIC CONCLUSIONS

NDIC analysts expect that Mexican DTOs will continue to dominate wholesale drug distribution in and from the North Texas HIDTA region and further exploit the Dallas/Fort Worth area as a major staging area for their drug trafficking and bulk currency consolidation operations. No other trafficking group appears to have the sources of supply or organizational structure to challenge them.

Methamphetamine, primarily Mexican ice methamphetamine, will remain the most significant drug threat in the HIDTA region as distributors and abusers continue to commit violent crimes and property crimes. Although Mexican methamphetamine will remain the most available type of the drug, it is expected that the production and availability of one-pot, or shake-and-bake, methamphetamine will increase in the Oklahoma areas of the HIDTA region and expand to some areas of North Texas.

The increasing abuse of CPDs in the North Texas HIDTA, particularly in the HIDTA's Oklahoma counties, will result in more drug-related deaths. NDIC analysts expect indoor and outdoor cannabis grow operations to increase in number throughout the HIDTA region. DTOs will exploit the region's rural wooded areas to situate larger and more sophisticated outdoor cannabis grow sites and, thereby, avoid the risk of having their marijuana shipments interdicted along the Southwest Border. It is expected that Mexican traffickers will exploit the rising demand for hydroponic or high-potency marijuana and the high profit margins associated with the drug to develop indoor grow operations in the North Texas HIDTA region.

Attachment 9

MAPS Depicting Hemispheric, U.S. and Texas Drug Trafficking Patterns & Trends

U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Threat Assessment 2011

A. Cities Reporting Drug Trafficking Organizations Cartel Territory and Drug Routes – Rand 2011

B. Drug Routes - Mexico to U.S. Border Composite – COLGEN 2011

C. Flow of Transnational Crime and Violence - Composite – COLGEN 2011

D. US Dept. of Justice, National Drug Threat Assessment:


U.S. Internal Cocaine Movement, FY2008–FY2010


U.S. Internal Heroin Movement, FY2008–FY2010

U.S. Internal Marijuana Movement, FY2008–FY2010


U.S. Internal MDMA Movement, FY2008–FY2010

U.S. Internal Methamphetamine Movement, FY2008–FY2010





Colgen Composite 2011



Colgen Composite 2011

Figure 2. Internal Cocaine Movement, FY2008–FY2010



Cocaine

Southern California and South Texas are the primary entry points for cocaine, much of which is transported toward heavily populated cities in the eastern United States. Atlanta, in particular, has emerged over the past several years as a key wholesale cocaine distribution hub. Significant quantities of cocaine smuggled into California transit the Pacific Region for Canada. Colombian and Dominican TCOs still use maritime and commercial air conveyances to smuggle cocaine into New York City and Miami for distribution in some East Coast locales, but cocaine smuggled across the Southwest Border is increasingly being distributed in these markets.

Figure 3. Internal Heroin Movement, FY2008–FY2010



Heroin

Mexican heroin enters the country primarily at crossing points in southern California, South Texas and, increasingly, Arizona. It is largely destined for western states, where it is preferred, but it is simultaneously being moved to eastern markets on a smaller but increasing scale. An increasing amount of South American heroin available in the United States is smuggled across the Southwest Border and subsequently shipped to East Coast markets, where it is sold along with South American heroin smuggled into Chicago, New York City, Miami, and other East Coast metropolitan areas by Colombian and Dominican TCOs.

Figure 4. Internal Marijuana Movement, FY2008–FY2010



Marijuana

Mexico-produced marijuana enters the country primarily in Arizona, California, and South Texas, while high-potency Canadian marijuana is usually smuggled through and between POEs in Washington, Michigan, New York, and Vermont. Both forms of marijuana are distributed nationally. Similarly, domestically produced marijuana is transported from grow sites to markets nationwide.

Figure 5. Internal MDMA Movement, FY2008–FY2010



MDMA

MDMA is generally transported from POEs in Washington, Michigan, New York, and Vermont to markets throughout the United States.

Figure 6. Internal Methamphetamine Movement, FY2008–FY2010



Methamphetamine

Mexican traffickers supply drug markets in the western United States and, on a smaller but increasing scale, eastern drug markets with methamphetamine smuggled over the Southwest Border and with methamphetamine produced in California superlabs.ⁿ Methamphetamine crossing the Southwest Border is primarily smuggled through California and South Texas POEs. Methamphetamine produced in small domestic laboratory operations is usually consumed locally.

n. Superlabs are laboratories capable of producing 10 or more pounds of methamphetamine in a single production cycle.

ATTACHMENT 10

Fact Sheet:

Cartel-Related Crime, Texas Department of Public Safety,
July 15, 2011

Fact Sheet: Cartel-Related Crime

Updated July 15, 2011


Texas Department of Public Safety

This fact sheet contains information regarding criminal activity in Texas and in Mexico related to cartels and cartel associates. It also contains data regarding crimes that may be associated with cartels but for which a cartel connection is not explicit. **Significant quantitative information is highlighted in bold.** Endnotes provide additional source information.

Violence in Mexico

(U) Between December 2006 and December 2010, **there were 34,612 organized crime-related homicides in Mexico**, according to official data released publicly by the government of Mexico; we are aware of no official data released publicly since January 2011. Since June 2011, unofficial news media accounts and peace advocates have stated that **approximately 40,000 people have died** since December 2006.¹ An unofficial tally of cartel-related homicides maintained online by an independent website **has surpassed 45,000**;² this tally appears to be based on multiple sources, including uncorroborated news media reports, and the time period for this tally is unclear.

(U) Much of the violence in Mexico has been increasingly concentrated in close proximity to Texas. The graph below shows the number of homicides in Mexico, in the four Mexican states bordering Texas, and in Ciudad Juarez, based on an analysis of information contained in the Government of Mexico's publicly accessible database of organized crime-related homicides. **The percentage of organized crime-related homicides that occurred in the states bordering Texas was 17 percent in 2007, 35 percent in 2008, 39 percent in 2009, and 43 percent in 2010.** (Government of Mexico)



(U) While the violence in Ciudad Juarez has represented a significant portion of the violence along the Texas border since 2008, the ongoing conflict between the Gulf cartel and Los Zetas appears to have prompted a significant and sudden increase in violence in Tamaulipas state in 2010; while **the number of homicides in Tamaulipas was 80 in 2007, 96 in 2008, and 90 in 2009, the number grew to more than 1,200 in 2010**, according to information contained in the Government of Mexico's publicly accessible database of organized crime-related homicides.

(U) A review of information from multiple sources shows that **224 decapitations have been reported in Mexico** since January 2009, according to a compilation and analysis of information conducted by the JOICs. These include 8 reported in 2009, 152 reported in 2010, and 64 reported from January to June 2011. **(BSOC and JOICs)**

(U) The body of **one victim who was kidnapped from his home in Horizon City, Texas, in 2009 was found in Ciudad Juarez with his hands cut off**; the kidnappers transported him to Mexico, killed him and mutilated his body in retaliation for the loss of a marijuana load seized at the Sierra Blanca checkpoint, according to a DEA press release announcing the suspects' indictment.³ **(DEA)**

(U) At least **8 VBIED incidents have been reported in Mexico** since July 2010, according to a review of information from multiple sources. These include all reports of IEDs in vehicles, including seven detonations and one device that was discovered before it detonated. **(ICT)**

Violence against Americans in Mexico

(U) The U.S. State Department reports that **341 American citizen deaths in Mexico were classified as homicide (310), drug-related (15), or execution (16)** between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2010, the most recent date for which information is available. Of these, **47 deaths occurred in 2006, 38 in 2007, 62 in 2008, 81 in 2009, and 113 in 2010**, according to information contained in the State Department's publicly accessible database of American citizen deaths abroad. **(U.S. State Department)**

(U) Much of the violence affecting American citizens in Mexico is increasingly concentrated in the four Mexican states adjacent to Texas. **The percentage of homicides of Americans that occurred in these states was 34 percent in 2006, 18 percent in 2007, 40 percent in 2008, 41 percent in 2009, and 44 percent in 2010**, according to information contained in the State Department's publicly accessible database of American citizen deaths abroad. **(U.S. State Department)**

(U) A July 2010 survey of U.S. companies operating in Mexico conducted by the U.S. State Department's Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) found that **45 percent of the 220 organizations that responded had been impacted by violent crime**, including kidnappings, armed robbery, truck hijacking, and other violent crimes. The survey also found that 74 percent of the respondents have implemented travel restrictions, while 15 percent have deferred near-term investment and/or expansion initiatives in Mexico due to cartel violence. **(OSAC, Mexico Security Benchmarking Survey Results)**

(U) Mexican government statistics released to the press show that deaths of innocent bystanders from drug-related violence nearly tripled in 2010 compared to 2009. The Mexican Attorney General's Office (PGR) reported in January 2011 that **166 innocent bystanders died from drug-related violence in 2010, compared to only 61 in 2009.**

(U) The U.S. Consulate in Monterrey became a partially unaccompanied post in September 2010, where no minor dependents of U.S. government employees are permitted to remain in the city. The decision was based on the August 2010 shooting near the American Foundation School and the high kidnapping rate in the area.⁴ The State Department urges Americans to defer unnecessary travel to multiple places in Mexico, including the entire state of Tamaulipas and parts of Chihuahua and Coahuila states; these states border Texas. U.S. Government employees are prohibited from entering parts of Nuevo Laredo.⁵

Homicides in Texas

(U) The BSOC and ICT have received reports of **28 homicides, involving 30 victims, in Texas** that are connected to Mexican cartels or Texas-based gangs connected to Mexican cartels since 2009.

Shootings from Mexico to Texas

(U) The BSOC and ICT have received reports of **8 incidents in which bullets were fired from Mexico and crossed into Texas** since 2009. This does not include incidents in which shots were fired at law enforcement in Texas.

Assaults on Law Enforcement

Note: CBP provided the following information with the request that DPS notify CBP of any use or reference of the information by DPS.

Caltrop Incidents

(U) Since 2008, the BSOC has received reports of 72 caltrop incidents. **(BSOC)**

Caltrops	Incidents
<i>Calendar Year</i>	<i>Number (#)</i>
2008	1
2009	18
2010	37
2011 (Jan 1-Jun 30)	16
Total	72

Law Enforcement Pursuits

(U) Nearly one fourth of all Texas Highway Patrol pursuits occur in the 14 counties along the border with Mexico. From January 2006 to May 2011, **THP has conducted 4,810 pursuits in Texas, including 1,159 pursuits in the counties that border Mexico.** These counties represent approximately 9.7 percent of the population in Texas, but the **pursuits in these border counties accounted for 24.1 percent of all pursuits** conducted by THP during this time period. Of the 1,159 pursuits in border counties, 684 (59 percent) occurred in Hidalgo county. **(THP)**

Year	THP Pursuits in All Counties	THP Pursuits in Border Counties	Percent
2006	889	188	21.15
2007	906	216	23.84
2008	985	266	27.01
2009	896	209	23.32
2010	833	207	24.85
2011 (YTD)	301	73	24.25
Total	4,810	1,159	24.1

(U) In a June 9, 2011, decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held in *Sykes v. United States* that felony vehicle flight, as proscribed by Indiana law, is a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. §924(e).⁶ **(U.S. Supreme Court)**

Splashdowns

(U) Since October 2009, the BSOC has received reports of 58 splashdown incidents. **(BSOC)**

Kidnapping

Note: The FBI will provide updated kidnapping data on Monday, July 18, along with permission to publicly release some of the summary numbers. As of July 15, the FBI has not provided updated information or permission to publicly release the data.

Extortion

Note: The FBI will provide updated extortion data on Monday, July 18, along with permission to publicly release some of the summary numbers. As of July 15, the FBI has not provided updated information or permission to publicly release the data.

(U) A July 2010 survey of U.S. companies operating in Mexico conducted by the U.S. State Department's Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) found that **29 percent of the 220 organizations that responded had experienced acts of extortion** in Mexico. (OSAC, Mexico Security Benchmarking Survey Results)

Human Trafficking and Human Smuggling

(U) Mexico's National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) documented **214 kidnapping incidents involving 11,333 victims that occurred in Mexico during the six-month period from April to September 2010**, according to a February 2011 report published by CNDH on migrant kidnappings in Mexico.⁷ The report was based on victim descriptions of the incidents and other sources. Most of the victims were Central American migrants transiting Mexico en route to the United States. A previous CNDH report stated that ransom payments for kidnapped migrants averaged \$2,500 per victim, and it calculated that **the kidnapping of migrants could generate \$25 million in a six month period**. Federal security spokesman Alejandro Poire has stated that CNDH data on kidnappings is inconsistent with the Mexican government's data. (CNDH)

(U) The National Human Trafficking Hotline (NHTH) receives between 5,500 and 7,500 calls each year; approximately **10 to 12 percent of the calls originate in Texas**, making Texas the number one state in the number of NHTH calls received, according to the Texas Human Trafficking Prevention Task Force (THTPTF) report published in January 2011.⁸ **(Texas Human Trafficking Prevention Task Force 2011 report)**

(U) Between January 1, 2007, and January 13, 2011, HTRS data and the data collected by the Innocence Lost task forces show that **369 children have been identified as victims who were trafficked in Texas**. **(Texas Human Trafficking Prevention Task Force 2011 report)**

Victims younger than 18 years of age	January 1, 2007 – January 13, 2011
International – Labor	2
Domestic – Labor	1
International – Sex	26
Domestic – Sex	188
Unknown Origin – Sex	34
Foreign – Labor and Sex	8
Domestic – Labor and Sex	0
Unknown – Labor and Sex	1
Innocence Lost – Sex (International and Domestic) ¹⁶	109
TOTAL	369

(U) Based on information entered into Human Trafficking Reporting System (HTRS) by the four Texas-based federally-funded task forces, **since January 1, 2007, 554 human trafficking investigations led to the arrest of 132 suspects**. Ultimately, 113 of those suspects were indicted. Of those, 22 suspects were charged with violations of federal law, and 72 with state law violations. Of the 72 suspects charged with violating state law, 15 were charged with human trafficking, 24 were charged with prostitution-related charges, 15 were charged with rape, 7 were charged with kidnapping, 8 were charged with assault, and the remaining 3 were charged with pandering. In total, 29 suspects were convicted of a human trafficking-related crime. **(Texas Human Trafficking Prevention Task Force 2011 report)**

(U) Since 2007, HTRS data indicates that **480 human trafficking victims have been reported in Texas**. Of those reported Texas victims, HTRS indicates that 189 were not United States citizens, while 220 victims were Americans who were trafficked domestically. The remaining 71 victims' country of origin is unknown. **(Texas Human Trafficking Prevention Task Force 2011 report)**

(U) **Sex trafficking in the five most populous counties in Texas could generate over \$60 million every year**, according to the THTPTF 2011 report. This estimate was based on calculation of a formula included in a 2008 report by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago,⁹ which was produced with funding by the U.S. DOJ. **(Texas Human Trafficking Prevention Task Force 2011 report)**

Criminal Aliens in Texas

(U) Texas registered **89,810 Alien IDENT Matches through Secure Communities** between October 27, 2008, and May 31, 2011; these include Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 offenses. These matches account for **15.8 percent of all matches nationwide** during this time period. Texas also registered **28,601 removals and returns, which represents 24.8 percent of all removals and returns nationwide** during this time period. **(ICE, Secure Communities)**

Interoperability Statistics: U.S. States (From October 27, 2008 through May 31, 2011)															
State	Activation Date	Submissions	Alien IDENT Matches*			Administratively Arrested or Booked into ICE Custody**					Removals and Returns**				
			LESC L1	LESC L2/3	Total	L1	L2	L3	Non-Criminal Immigration Violator	Total	L1	L2	L3	Non-Criminal Immigration Violator	Total
TX	10/27/08	1,307,399	15,877	73,933	89,810	12,125	7,376	13,845	12,606	45,952	7,110	4,822	10,808	5,861	28,601
Total	10/27/08	8,462,221	94,309	473,070	567,379	80,424	34,974	61,924	85,735	263,057	29,856	16,907	35,702	32,931	115,396

(U) Of the 155,940 inmates incarcerated in TDCJ on May 31, 2011, the **number of inmates documented by TDCJ as illegal aliens was 6,928, accounting for 4.44 percent of the total TDCJ population**. **(TDCJ)**

Illegal Alien Offense of Record	May 31, 2011	Percent of Total
Offense	Number (#)	Percent (%)
Robbery	980	14.15%
Sexual Assault Against a Child	958	13.83%
Homicide	946	13.65%
Assault/Terroristic Threat	932	13.45%
Drug Possession	549	7.92%
DWI	482	6.96%
Drug Delivery	482	6.96%
Burglary	374	5.40%
Sexual Assault	355	5.12%
Sexual Offense Against a Child	329	4.75%
Kidnapping	103	1.49%
Other	438	6.32%
Total	6,928	100.00%

(U) Of the 6,928 illegal aliens in TDCJ, 912 have been documented as confirmed or suspected members of a Security Threat Group, accounting for **13.2 percent of all illegal aliens incarcerated**. By contrast, **only approximately 7.5 percent of the total TDCJ population are confirmed or suspected STG members.** (TDCJ)

Illegal Alien STG Affiliation	<i>May 31, 2011</i>	<i>Percent of Total</i>
<i>STG</i>	<i>Number (#)</i>	<i>Percent (%)</i>
Partido Revolucionario Mexicanos	313	34.32%
Mexicles	117	12.83%
Tango Houston	78	8.55%
Mexican Mafia	69	7.57%
Texas Syndicate	49	5.37%
Barrio Azteca	38	4.17%
Tango Dallas	35	3.84%
Tango Valluco	24	2.63%
Hermanos De Pistoleros Latino	22	2.41%
Mara Salvatrucha	20	2.19%
Other STG	76	8.33%
Unknown STG	71	7.79%
Total	912	100.00%

Enterprise Investigations

(U) DPS CID reports **12 gang enterprise investigations** (7 Tier 1 and 5 Tier 2; 10 open and 2 closed), and **26 DTO enterprise investigations** (14 open and 12 closed). Most of these investigations are joint/multi-agency investigations; however, the cases listed are those in which CID is the lead or a major contributor. This information is since January 2010, which is when CID began specifically tracking these types of cases. Closed cases are those in which a significant majority of the targets (80-100%) have been indicted or arrested, and the criminal enterprise has been rendered ineffective in its current form. (CID)

Region 1 - Dallas

Gang Investigations

Tier 1 Gangs – 0

Tier 2 Gangs – 2 – (ABT, Bandidos)

Cartel Related DTO Investigations

Open – 4

Closed – 3

Region 2 - Houston

Gang Investigations

Tier 1 Gangs – 2 (Tango, Mexican Mafia)

Tier 2 Gangs – 2 – (MS-13, ABT)

Cartel Related DTO Investigations

Open – 2

Closed – 2

Region 3 - McAllen

Gang Investigations

Tier 1 Gangs – 2 (Texas Syndicate, Mexican Mafia)

Cartel Related DTO Investigations

Open – 2

Closed – 2

Region 4 – El Paso

Gang Investigations

Tier 1 Gangs – 1 (Barrio Azteca)

Cartel Related DTO Investigations

Open – 1

Closed – 2

Region 5 – Lubbock

Gang Investigations

Tier 1 Gangs – 0

Tier 2 Gangs – (ABT – closed)

Cartel Related DTO Investigations

Open – 2

Region 6 – San Antonio

Gang Investigations

Tier 1 Gang – 1 (Mexican Mafia) (open)

Tier 1 Gang – 1 (Texas Syndicate) (Closed)

Cartel Related DTO Investigations

Open – 3

Closed - 3

Juvenile Recruitment by Cartels and Gangs

(U) The 14 Texas counties along the Mexico border represent approximately 9.7 percent of the Texas population, though since 2008 **these counties have accounted for 19.2 percent of juvenile felony drug referrals in Texas, 21.8 percent of juvenile felony gang referrals, and 14.3 percent of other juvenile gang referrals**, according to an analysis of information provided by the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission. The numbers listed below represent the number of referrals since 2008. **(Texas Juvenile Probation Commission)**

Juvenile Felony Drug Referrals	7,991
Juvenile Felony Drug Referrals (Border)	1,535
Juvenile Gang Referrals	25,421
Juvenile Gang Referrals (Border)	3,627
Juvenile Felony Gang Referrals	7,409
Juvenile Felony Gang Referrals (Border)	1,613


(U) One Laredo teenager, Rosalio Reta, claimed he participated in **at least 30 homicides in Mexico, while he was convicted of involvement in two murders in Texas**, according to open source reporting.

Public Corruption

(U) CBP Commissioner Alan Bersin testified to a June 9, 2011, hearing of the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, ad hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs, that **since October 1, 2004, 127 CBP employees have been arrested or indicted for acts of corruption** including drug smuggling, alien smuggling, money laundering, and conspiracy; of those arrests, 95 percent are considered mission-compromising acts of corruption. **(CBP statement to U.S. Senate)**

(U) DHS Acting Inspector General Charles Edwards testified at the same hearing that "according to government reports, Los Zetas are becoming involved increasingly in systematic corruption to further alien and drug smuggling, including smuggling of aliens from designated special interest countries likely to export terrorism." **(DHS statement to U.S. Senate)**

(U) In FY2010, the DHS Office of Inspector General opened more than **770 corruption investigations of CBP employees and more than 220 investigations of ICE employees**, according to an article published September 12, 2010, by the Washington Post,¹⁰ citing the DHS OIG. A graphic created by the Washington Post **projected that the number of investigations would be 775 for CBP and 228 for ICE** by the end of FY2010.



Graphic: The Washington Post

(U) **Less than 15 percent of CBP job applicants in 2009 were administered polygraph examinations, of which approximately 60 percent were found unsuitable for employment**, according to statements made March 11, 2010, by James Tomscheck, Assistant Commissioner of CBP's Office of Internal Affairs, in a hearing of the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, ad hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs.

(U) The DHS Office of Inspector General opened **576 allegations involving CBP employees regarding corruption on the border in FY2009**, according to written testimony presented March 11, 2010, by Thomas Frost, Assistant Inspector General for Investigations in DHS's Office of Inspector General, to the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, ad hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs.

(U) **More than 400 public corruption cases have originated from the U.S. Southwest Border region over an unspecified time period**, as well as more than **100 arrests and more than 130 state and federal cases prosecuted in FY2009**, according to written testimony presented March 11, 2010, by Kevin Perkins, Assistant Director of the FBI's Criminal Investigative Division, to the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, ad hoc Subcommittee on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs.

Illegal Alien Apprehensions

(U) From FY2006 to FY2010, the U.S. Border Patrol has reported **1,034,724 illegal alien apprehensions** in the sectors of RGV, Laredo, Del Rio, Marfa, and El Paso.

Total USBP Illegal Alien Apprehensions by Sector						
	FY2006	FY2007	FY2008	FY2009	FY2010	Total
Del Rio	42,636	22,920	20,761	17,082	14,694	118,093
El Paso	122,256	75,464	30,312	14,999	12,251	255,282
Laredo	74,840	56,714	43,658	40,569	35,287	251,068
Marfa	7,520	5,536	5,391	6,360	5,288	30,095
RGV	110,528	73,430	75,473	60,989	59,766	380,186
Total	357,780	234,064	175,595	139,999	127,286	1,034,724

(U) Since 2006, the BSOC reports that **54,039 illegal alien referrals have occurred**.

IA Referrals	Referrals
Calendar Year	Number (#)
OBS Start (March 2006) - 2008	35,969
2009	6,557
2010	9,333
2011 (Jan 1-Jun 30)	2,708
Total	54,567

Medical Treatment in Texas of Victims of Cartel Violence in Mexico

(U) In a March 16, 2010, letter to President Barack Obama, the President & CEO of University Medical Center El Paso wrote that since January 23, 2008, **the hospital's Level 1 Trauma Center had treated nearly 150 survivors of violence in Mexico**. The cost of this treatment was nearly \$3 million, \$2,234,677 of which had not been repaid. (**University Medical Center El Paso**)

Seizure Information

BSOC Seizure Data (April, 2006 to June 30, 2011) (Meth seizure data represents January 2007 to June 30, 2011. Weapon seizure data represents January 2009 to June 30, 2011.)

Marijuana-	6,560,454.67 lbs
Estimated value-	\$3,615,728,987.37
Cocaine-	70,858.25 lbs
Estimated value-	\$2,086,497,815.94
Heroin-	1,641.38 lbs
Estimated value-	\$67,006,621.72
Methamphetamine-	5,699.86 lbs
Estimated value-	\$216,528,447.59
Currency-	\$157,191,710.52
Weapons-	2,785

DPS Seizure Data (January 1, 2006 to June 30, 2011) (PSAT DIP Database did not capture all of CID's seizures until 2011.)

Marijuana-	1,058,694.33 lbs
Estimated value-	\$583,488,793.04
Cocaine-	29,998.48 lbs
Estimated value-	\$883,337,641.96
Heroin-	245.77 lbs
Estimated value-	\$10,033,144.90
Methamphetamine-	2,387.42 lbs
Estimated value-	\$90,694,170.43
Currency-	\$116,177,713.53
Weapons-	919

DPS Seizure Data Excluding Border Star Counties (January 1, 2006 to June 30, 2011)
(PSAT DIP Database did not capture all of CID's seizures until 2011.)

Marijuana-	320,350.88 lbs
Estimated value-	\$176,558,184.00

Cocaine- 11,495.16 lbs
Estimated value- \$338,487,439.07

Heroin- 194.05 lbs
Estimated value-\$7,921,859.99

Methamphetamine- 1,853.65 lbs
Estimated value- \$70,416,970.01

Currency- \$70,527,531.66

Weapons-720

Endnotes

¹ <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/laplaza/2011/06/mexico-war-dead-update-figures-40000.html>

² <https://sites.google.com/site/policereform/leap-mexico/narco-killings>

³ <http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/states/newsrel/2010/elpaso031810.html>

⁴ http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_4755.html

⁵ http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/tw/tw_5440.html

⁶ <http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-11311.pdf>

⁷ http://www.cndh.org.mx/InfEspecialSecuestroMigrantes_8.pdf

⁸ https://www.oag.state.tx.us/AG_Publications/pdfs/human_trafficking.pdf

⁹ <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/224393.pdf>

¹⁰ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2010/09/12/ST2010091200425.html?sid=ST2010091200425%3Cbr%20/%3E>

ATTACHMENT 11

Arrest Charges

*Illegal Aliens Incarcerated in Texas Prisons, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice, Sept. 2011*

ARREST CHARGES - ILLEGAL ALIENS INCARCERATED IN TEXAS PRISONS

6,508 Illegal Aliens in Texas Prisons have accounted for 27,880 Texas arrest charges. The 27,880 offenses are enumerated below:

Offenses and Number of Occurrences

Traffic Offense / DWI.....	5,150
Dangerous Drugs.....	3,818
Assault.....	3,261
Obstruct Police.....	2,380
Burglary.....	2,250
Sex Assault.....	1,866
Robbery.....	1,567
Larceny.....	1,441
Homicide.....	1,032
Weapon Offense.....	951
Vehicle Theft.....	628
Sex Offense	588
Public Order Crimes.....	406
Invade Privacy	350
Damage Property.....	339
Arrest Data Not Clear.....	272
Kidnapping.....	227
Fraud.....	165
Public Peace.....	151
Family Offense	150
Forgery.....	140
Escape.....	115
Terroristic Threat.....	111
Obstruct / Contempt / Perjury.....	93
Crimes Against Person.....	68
Liquor.....	67
Arson.....	59
Drunkenness	59
Illegal Entry.....	46
Commercial Sex.....	45
Class C Misdemeanor.....	23
Stolen Property.....	17
Morals / Decency Crime.....	17
Tax Revenue	7
Federal Offense.....	4
Smuggling.....	4
Property Crimes.....	3
Conservation.....	3
Obscene Material.....	3

Bribery..... 2

ATTACHMENT 12

U.S. State Department Travel Warning, April 22, 2011 &
DPS Travel Warning 2011

TRAVEL WARNINGS

Since March 2010 the Texas Department of Public Safety has issued a number of Mexico travel warnings to Texas citizens and visitors. DPS has taken this extraordinary action out of an abundance of caution and concern for the safety and welfare of our citizens and because it cannot guarantee the safety or security of its citizens if they travel to Mexico. In spite of much rhetoric relative to a "secure border," the facts reflect significantly to the contrary. Mexican cartels work closely with Texas-based and transnational gangs to support their criminal operations on both sides of the border. Since December 2006, reports indicate that between 38,000 – 40,000 people have lost their lives in Mexico as a result of the cartel wars between each other and the Government of Mexico (GOM).

As reported in the L.A. Times on May 7, 2011, Mexican President Felipe Calderon is touting 2011 as the year of tourism, and the Mexican Tourism Board is spending millions of dollars plastering billboards with images of the Great Pyramid of Cholula and underwater trees. At the same time the U. S. government has widened its travel warnings, which has thrown a wrench into Mexico's effort to attract foreign visitors. The State Department now urges U. S. travelers to steer clear of all or parts of 10 Mexican states, including most of the border region and popular vacation sites such as Acapulco and Monterrey.

The Department of Public Safety constantly monitors the travel warnings issued by the U. S. State Department and the activities of the cartels and the response by the GOM. The Department of Public Safety also considers a number of other important factors when issuing its travel warnings which are addressed in this document. The latest U. S. Department of State Travel Warning is as follows:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Bureau of Consular Affairs

Mexico

April 22, 2011

The Department of State has issued this Travel Warning to inform U.S. citizens traveling to and living in Mexico about the security situation in Mexico. This Travel Warning supersedes the Travel Warning for Mexico dated September 10, 2010 to consolidate and update information about the security situation and to advise the public of additional restrictions on the travel of U.S. government personnel.

Millions of U.S. citizens safely visit Mexico each year, including more than 150,000 who cross the border every day for study, tourism or business and at least one million U.S. citizens who live in Mexico. The Mexican government makes a considerable

effort to protect U.S. citizens and other visitors to major tourist destinations. Resort areas and tourist destinations in Mexico generally do not see the levels of drug-related violence and crime reported in the border region and in areas along major trafficking routes. Nevertheless, crime and violence are serious problems and can occur anywhere. While most victims of violence are Mexican citizens associated with criminal activity, the security situation poses serious risks for U.S. citizens as well.

It is imperative that you understand the risks involved in travel to Mexico and how best to avoid dangerous situations. Common-sense precautions such as visiting only legitimate business and tourist areas during daylight hours, and avoiding areas where criminal activity might occur, can help ensure that travel to Mexico is safe and enjoyable.

General Conditions

Since 2006, the Mexican government has engaged in an extensive effort to combat transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). The TCOs, meanwhile, have been engaged in a vicious struggle to control drug trafficking routes and other criminal activity. According to Government of Mexico figures, 34,612 people have been killed in narcotics-related violence in Mexico since December 2006. More than 15,000 narcotics-related homicides occurred in 2010, an increase of almost two-thirds compared to 2009. Most of those killed in narcotics-related violence since 2006 have been members of TCOs. However, innocent persons have also been killed as have Mexican law enforcement and military personnel.

There is no evidence that U.S. tourists have been targeted by criminal elements due to their citizenship. Nonetheless, while in Mexico you should be aware of your surroundings at all times and exercise particular caution in unfamiliar areas. Bystanders, including U.S. citizens, have been injured or killed in violent incidents in various parts of the country, especially, but not exclusively in the northern border region, demonstrating the heightened risk of violence throughout Mexico. TCOs, meanwhile, engage in a wide-range of criminal activities that can directly impact U.S. citizens, including kidnapping, armed car-jacking, and extortion that can directly impact U.S. citizens. The number of U.S. citizens reported to the Department of State as murdered in Mexico increased from 35 in 2007 to 111 in 2010.

The Mexican government has deployed federal police and military personnel throughout the country as part of its efforts to combat the TCOs. U.S. citizens traveling on Mexican roads and highways may encounter government checkpoints, which are often staffed by military personnel. You are advised to cooperate with personnel at government checkpoints and mobile military patrols. TCOs have erected their own unauthorized checkpoints, and killed or abducted motorists who have failed to stop at them.

Violence along Mexican roads and highways is a particular concern in the northern border region. As a result, effective July 15, 2010, the U.S. Mission in Mexico imposed restrictions on U.S. government employees' travel. U.S. government employees and their families are not permitted to drive from the U.S.-Mexico border to or from the interior of Mexico or Central America. Travel by vehicle is permitted between Hermosillo and Nogales.

While violent incidents have occurred at all hours of the day and night on both modern toll ("cuotas") highways and on secondary roads, they have occurred most frequently at night and on isolated roads. To reduce risk, you are strongly urged to

travel only during daylight hours throughout Mexico, to avoid isolated roads, and to use toll roads whenever possible. For more information on road safety and crime along Mexico's roadways, see the Department of State's Country Specific Information.

Due to ongoing violence and persistent security concerns, you are urged to defer non-essential travel to the states of Tamaulipas and Michoacán, and to parts of the states of Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Sinaloa, Durango, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí and Jalisco. Details on these locations, and other areas in which travelers should exercise caution, are below.

Violence along the U.S. - Mexico Border

You should be especially aware of safety and security concerns when visiting the northern border states of Northern Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas. Much of the country's narcotics-related violence has occurred in the border region. More than a third of all U.S. citizens killed in Mexico in 2010 whose deaths were reported to the U.S. government were killed in the border cities of Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana. Narcotics-related homicide rates in the border states of Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas have increased dramatically in the past two years.

Carjacking and highway robbery are serious problems in many parts of the border region and U.S. citizens have been murdered in such incidents. Most victims who complied with carjackers at these checkpoints have reported that they were not physically harmed. Incidents have occurred during the day and at night, and carjackers have used a variety of techniques, including bumping moving vehicles to force them to stop and running vehicles off the road at high speed. There are some indications that criminals have particularly targeted newer and larger vehicles with U.S. license plates, especially dark-colored SUVs. However, victims' vehicles have included those with both Mexican and American registration and vary in type from late model SUVs and pick-up trucks to old sedans.

If you make frequent visits to border cities, you should vary your route and park in well-lighted, guarded and paid parking lots. Exercise caution when entering or exiting vehicles.

Large firefights between rival TCOs or TCOs and Mexican authorities have taken place in towns and cities in many parts of Mexico, especially in the border region. Firefights have occurred in broad daylight on streets and in other public venues, such as restaurants and clubs. During some of these incidents, U.S. citizens have been trapped and temporarily prevented from leaving the area. The location and timing of future armed engagements cannot be predicted. You are urged to defer travel to those areas mentioned in this Travel Warning and to exercise extreme caution when traveling throughout the northern border region.

Northern Baja California: Targeted TCO assassinations continue to take place in Northern Baja California, including the city of Tijuana. You should exercise caution in this area, particularly at night. In late 2010, turf battles between criminal groups proliferated and resulted in numerous assassinations in areas of Tijuana frequented by U.S. citizens. Shooting incidents, in which innocent bystanders have been injured, have occurred during daylight hours throughout the city. In one such incident, an American citizen was shot and seriously wounded.

Nogales and Northern Sonora: You are advised to exercise caution in the city of Nogales. Northern Sonora is a key region in the international drug and human trafficking trades, and can be extremely dangerous for travelers. The U.S. Consulate requires that armored vehicles are used for official travel in the consular district of Nogales, including certain areas within the city of Nogales. The region west of Nogales, east of Sonoyta, and from Caborca north, including the towns of Saric, Tubutama and Altar, and the

eastern edge of Sonora bordering Chihuahua, are known centers of illegal activity. You should defer non-essential travel to these areas.

You are advised to exercise caution when visiting the coastal town of Puerto Peñasco. In the past year there have been multiple incidents of TCO-related violence, including the shooting of the city's police chief. U.S. citizens visiting Puerto Peñasco are urged to cross the border at Lukeville, AZ, to limit driving through Mexico and to limit travel to main roads during daylight hours.

Ciudad Juarez and Chihuahua: The situation in the state of Chihuahua, specifically Ciudad Juarez, is of special concern. Ciudad Juarez has the highest murder rate in Mexico. Mexican authorities report that more than 3,100 people were killed in Ciudad Juarez in 2010. Three persons associated with the Consulate General were murdered in March, 2010. You should defer non-essential travel to Ciudad Juarez and to the Guadalupe Bravo area southeast of Ciudad Juarez. U.S. citizens should also defer non-essential travel to the northwest quarter of the state of Chihuahua. From the United States, these areas are often reached through the Columbus, NM, and Fabens and Fort Hancock, TX, ports-of-entry. In both areas, U.S. citizens have been victims of narcotics-related violence. There have been incidents of narcotics-related violence in the vicinity of the Copper Canyon in Chihuahua.

Durango, Coahuila and Zacatecas: Between 2006 and 2010, the number of narcotics-related murders in the State of Durango increased dramatically. Several areas in the state have seen sharp increases in violence and remain volatile and unpredictable. U.S. government employees are restricted from traveling to the cities of Durango and Gomez Palacio. You should defer non-essential travel to these cities.

The State of Coahuila has also experienced an increase in violent crimes and narcotics-related murders. U.S. government employees are restricted from traveling to the area known as "La Laguna", including the city of Torreon, and the city of Saltillo within the state. You should defer non-essential travel to this area, as well as to the cities of Piedras Negras and Ciudad Acuña due to frequent incidents of TCO-related violence.

The northwestern portion of the state of Zacatecas has become notably dangerous and insecure. Robberies and carjackings are occurring with increased frequency and both local authorities and residents have reported a surge in observed TCO activity. This area is remote, and local authorities are unable to regularly patrol it or quickly respond to incidents that occur there. The Consulate General in Monterrey restricts travel for U.S. government employees to the city of Fresnillo and the area extending northwest from Fresnillo along Highway 45 (Fresnillo-Sombrete) between Highways 44 and 49. In addition, highway 49 northwards from Fresnillo through Durango and in to Chihuahua is isolated and should be considered dangerous. You should defer non-essential travel to these areas.

Monterrey and Nuevo Leon: The level of violence and insecurity in Monterrey remains elevated. Local police and private patrols do not have the capacity to deter criminal elements or respond effectively to security incidents. As a result of a Department of State assessment of the overall security situation, on September 10, 2010, the Consulate General in Monterrey became a partially unaccompanied post with no minor dependents of U.S. government employees permitted.

TCOs continue to use stolen cars and trucks to create roadblocks or "blockades" on major thoroughfares, preventing the military or police from responding to criminal activity in Monterrey and the surrounding areas. Travelers on the highways between Monterrey and the United States (notably through Nuevo Laredo and Matamoros/Reynosa) have been targeted for robbery that has resulted in violence. They have also been caught in incidents of gunfire between criminals and Mexican law

enforcement. In 2010, TCOs kidnapped guests out of reputable hotels in the downtown Monterrey area, blocking off adjoining streets to prevent law enforcement response. TCOs have also regularly attacked local government facilities, prisons and police stations, and engaged in public shootouts with the military and between themselves. Pedestrians and innocent bystanders have been killed in these incidents.

The number of kidnappings and disappearances in Monterrey, and increasingly throughout Monterrey's consular district, is of particular concern. Both the local and expatriate communities have been victimized and local law enforcement has provided little to no response. In addition, police have been implicated in some of these incidents. Travelers and residents are strongly advised to lower their profile and avoid displaying any evidence of wealth that might draw attention.

Tamaulipas: You should defer non-essential travel to the state of Tamaulipas. In an effort to prevent the military or police from responding to criminal activity, TCOs have set up roadblocks or "blockades" in various parts of Nuevo Laredo in which armed gunmen carjack and rob unsuspecting drivers. These blockades occur without warning and at all times, day and night. The Consulate General prohibits employees from entering the entertainment zone in Nuevo Laredo known as "Boys Town" because of concerns about violent crime in that area. U.S. government employees are currently restricted from travelling on the highway between Nuevo Laredo and Monterrey, as well as on Mexican Highway 2 towards Reynosa or Ciudad Acuña due to security concerns.

Be aware of the risks posed by armed robbery and carjacking on state highways throughout Tamaulipas. In January 2011, a U.S. citizen was murdered in what appears to have been a failed carjacking attempt. While no highway routes through Tamaulipas are considered safe, many of the crimes reported to the U.S. Consulate General in Matamoros took place along the Matamoros-Tampico highway, particularly around San Fernando and the area north of Tampico.

Crime and Violence in Other Parts of Mexico

While security concerns are particularly acute in the northern border region, you should be aware of situations that could affect your safety in other parts of Mexico.

Sinaloa and Southern Sonora: One of Mexico's most powerful TCOs is based in the state of Sinaloa. Since 2006, more homicides have occurred in the state's capital city of Culiacan than in any other city in Mexico, with the exception of Ciudad Juarez. You should defer non-essential travel to Culiacan and exercise extreme caution when visiting the rest of the state. Travel off the toll roads in remote areas of Sinaloa is especially dangerous and should be avoided.

In the last year, the city of Mazatlan has experienced a level of violence, primarily confrontations between TCOs, not seen before. In 2010 there were over 300 narcotics-related murders within the city, compared to fewer than 100 in 2009. You are encouraged to visit Mazatlan during daylight hours and limit the time you spend outside tourist centers. Exercise caution during late night and early morning hours when most violent crimes occur.

Highway robbery and carjacking are ongoing security concerns for travelers on the Mexican toll road Highway 15 in Sonora and on Maxipista Benito Juarez in Sinaloa. These highways are known to be particularly dangerous at night when roadside robberies occur. When traveling in Sinaloa, U.S. government employees are required to use armored vehicles and may only travel in daylight hours.

San Luis Potosi: In February 2011, one U.S. government employee was killed and another wounded when they were attacked in their U.S. government vehicle on Highway 57 near Santa Maria del Rio. The incident remains under investigation. Cartel violence and highway lawlessness have increased throughout the state and are a continuing security concern. All official U.S. government employees and their families have been advised to defer travel on the entire stretch of highway 57D in San Luis Potosi as well as travel in the state east of highway 57D towards Tamaulipas. You should defer non-essential travel in these areas.

Nayarit and Jalisco: Official U.S. government employees are prohibited from traveling to Colotlan, Jalisco, and Yahualica, Jalisco, both near the Zacatecas border, because of an increasingly volatile security situation. Concerns include roadblocks placed by individuals posing as police or military personnel and recent gun battles between rival TCOs involving automatic weapons. You should defer non-essential travel to these cities. In addition, the border areas between Jalisco state and the states of Zacatecas and Michoacán, as well as southern Nayarit state including the city of Tepic, have been sites of violence and crime involving TCOs. You should exercise extreme caution when traveling in these areas. Due to recent TCO-mounted road blockades between the Guadalajara airport and the Guadalajara metropolitan areas, U.S. government employees are only authorized to travel between Guadalajara and the Guadalajara Airport during daylight hours.

Michoacán: You should defer non-essential travel to the State of Michoacán, which is home to another of Mexico's most dangerous TCOs, "La Familia". Attacks on government officials and law enforcement and military personnel, and other incidents of TCO-related violence, have occurred throughout Michoacan, including in and around the capital of Morelia and in the vicinity of the world famous butterfly sanctuaries in the eastern part of the State.

Guerrero and Morelos: You should exercise extreme caution when traveling in the northwestern part of the state of Guerrero, which has a strong TCO presence. Do not take the dangerous, isolated road through Ciudad Altamirano to the beach resorts of Ixtapa and Zihuatanejo and exercise caution traveling on the coastal road between Acapulco and Ixtapa due to the risk of roadblocks and carjackings. Numerous incidents of narcotics-related violence have occurred in the city of Cuernavaca, in the State of Morelos, a popular destination for American language students.

Downtown Acapulco and surrounding areas have seen a significant increase in narcotics-related violence in the last year. Incidents have included daylight gunfights and murders of law enforcement personnel and some have resulted in the deaths of innocent bystanders. Due to the unpredictable nature of this violence, you should exercise extreme caution when visiting downtown Acapulco. To reduce risks, tourists should not visit the downtown area at night and should remain in clearly identifiable tourist areas. In general, the popular tourist area of Diamante just south of the city has not been affected by the increasing violence.

In addition to the above latest State Department travel warning the United States Consulates General in a number of the northern Mexican states has issued warnings to American citizens and U. S. law enforcement against travel of any type in Mexico following the discovery of several mass graves in and around the Nuevo Laredo area and other parts of Mexico.

In February 2011, suspected members of Los Zetas operating an illegal highway checkpoint in San Luis Potosi opened fire on two ICE Special Agents travelling in a vehicle with diplomatic license plates, killing one and wounding the other.

In April 2010, an explosive device detonated inside the U. S. Consulate compound in Nuevo Laredo, MX after the device was thrown over the wall of the compound.

In September 2010, the U. S. Consulate in Monterrey became a partially unaccompanied post where no minor dependents of U. S. government employees are permitted to remain in the city. The decision was based on the August 2010 shooting near the American Embassy Foundation School and the high kidnapping rate in the area.

The Mexican Attorney General's Office (PGR) reported in January 2011 that 166 innocent bystanders died from drug-related violence in 2010, compared to only 61 in 2009.

Other Security Factors Considered by DPS

- **Extreme Violence (photos available upon request)**

- Murders
- Assassinations
- Beheadings
- Dismemberments
- Skinning Alive
- Acid Baths
- Torture
- Kidnappings

- 2010 saw a significant increase in kidnappings and extortions, particularly in northern states. Kidnappings reported for the January – July 2010 period were up 14.7% from the same period last year, and 78.8% from that same period in 2008. (Drug Violence in Mexico, Trans-Border Institute, February 2011)
- Study: 2010 Record Year for Kidnappings in Mexico. Kidnappings in Mexico are at a record high and are more than twice as likely to end with the death of a hostage, according to the Citizen's Council for Public Security and Penal Justice. CCSP-JP Director Jose Ortega Sanchez said the Mexico's kidnapping rate now stands at 195 cases for every million inhabitants, the second highest in the hemisphere after Venezuela. Ortega added that kidnapping data from municipal governments is often "falsified" or underreported, for example, in Tamaulipas, the municipal government only reported 25 kidnap cases, when the military reported rescuing 173 people.

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Tab

- Rapes
 - In April 2010, Amnesty International reported that as many as six out of every 10 Central American women and girls are raped as they pass through Mexico hoping to cross illegally into the United States.
- Human Trafficking
 - "Mexico has long been a trampoline for migrants from around the world trying to bounce over the Rio Grande into the United States. Now Mexico's drug gangs have become increasingly involved in the human trafficking business while the nation's prisons and police are under increased pressure from the crime wave." "Everyone round the world knows that Mexico is the back door into the United States. That causes a lot of problems here and now we are seeing those problems come to a head," said a high ranking official at Mexico's National Immigration Institute, who asked his name not be used in case of repercussion from superiors. Immigration officials estimate that more than 300,000 undocumented foreigners pour through Mexico each year to try to sneak over the southern U. S. border. This generates an enormous human trafficking business, estimated to be worth more than \$2 billion each year to Mexican gangs. In April 2010, police arrested dozens of officials from the National Immigration Institute for working with human traffickers. "The immigration institute is so corrupt it is like a rotting corpse," said migrant activist and Roman Catholic priest Alejandro Solalinde. Mexican President Felipe Calderon said he was taking bold action to punish corrupt officials and protect migrants by signing a new immigration bill into law last week. "We know of hundreds of hundreds of heartbreaking stories of migrants who have been victims of corrupt (Mexican) authorities," Calderon said as he signed the bill.
- Extortions
 - Phone Extortion in Mexico Rising: According to the Citizen's Council for Public Safety (Consejo Ciudadano de Seguridad Publica-CCSP), a government body that monitors crime rates, in 2010 a total of 119,007 threatening calls were reported
- Carjackings

- **High Profile Murders/Intimidation**
 - **Mayors (2004-2010, 27 Mayors killed)**
 - **Executive Law Enforcement Officials**
 - Cancun, in February 2009, retired Brigadier General Mauro Tello Quinones arrived in Cancun to weed out corruption in the city's police force and to take the streets back from the criminal gangs. He lasted three days. On 3 February, together with his bodyguard and driver, he was abducted. The three men were tortured and then driven to a remote jungle location where they were killed with a bullet to the head.
 - Praxedis G. Guerrero, in October 2011, 20-year-old female criminology student accepted the job of police chief in Praxedis G. Guerrero. In March she fled with her family to El Paso seeking asylum after numerous death threats against her and her family.
 - **Police Officers**
 - Thousands have been kidnapped, assassinated, murdered, beheaded, dismembered and tortured since 2006.
 - **Military**
 - Mexico City, in May 2011, just recently retired senior Army General Jorge Juarez Loera, who was the number three in the Mexican Army, was shot dead. General Loera had previously headed the Joint Operation Chihuahua which targeted drug trafficking in the northern states of Chihuahua, Coahuila and Durango.
 - **Prosecutors**
 - In April 2011, the body of federal prosecutor, Claudia Avila Yanez, was discovered in Villa Juarez, a community near the City of Lerdo. The prosecutor was shot several times in the abdomen and extremities. Earlier, the head of the Attorney General's Durango Bureau, Gustavo Armando Garcia Silve, was also murdered.
 - **Government Candidates**
 - 13 candidates killed during the 2010 elections including the PRI-Candidate for Governor of Tamaulipas, Rodolfo Torre Cantu.
 - **Journalists**
 - At least 38 journalists have been killed between 2006 – 2010 and many more threatened into silence.
 - **Medical Doctors**
 - In December 2010, Dr. Jose Alberto Betancourt Rosales was kidnapped from the parking garage at Centro Medico in Juarez. His kidnappers

asked for \$1 million in ransom money. His body was found a few days later.

- According to the Citizen's Medical Committee of Ciudad Juarez, at least 9 doctors have been killed and 21 others kidnapped in the past two years and almost 70% of private practices in the city have closed down since 2008.

- **United States Citizens Killed in Mexico**

- The U. S. State Department reports that 341 American citizen deaths in Mexico were classified as homicides, drug-related, or executions between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2010. Of these, 47 deaths occurred in 2006, 38 in 2007, 62 in 2008, 81 in 2009, and 113 in 2010.
- Much of the violence affecting American citizens in Mexico is increasingly concentrated in the four Mexican states adjacent to Texas.
- In March 2010, an employee of the U. S. Consulate in Ciudad Juarez and her husband (El Paso County Deputy Sheriff) were murdered while leaving a birthday party. The spouse of another Consulate employee died in a separate attack.
- In September 2010, a U. S. citizen was murdered on Falcon Lake Reservoir on the Tamaulipas-Texas border. The Mexican investigator looking into the murder was later found murdered.
- In October 2010, a 19-year-old U. S. student at the Brownsville campus of the University of Texas was murdered when suspected drug traffickers hijacked a bus in southern Tamaulipas in which he was a passenger.
- In November 2010, two U. S. citizens from the University of Texas at El Paso were murdered in Ciudad Juarez. Both were students at the University's College of Business Administration.
- In January 2011, a U. S. Citizen and female missionary was shot in the head by suspected traffickers on a Mexican highway as they were returning to Texas. The missionary was pronounced dead at a Texas hospital.
- In January 2011, a Canadian traveler was shot and wounded during a firefight between rival drug traffickers in Mazatlan.
- In February 2011, two U. S. teen students from Cathedral High School and Radford School in El Paso and a Mexican national were murdered at a used car dealership in Juarez.
- In April 2011, two U. S. citizens were killed by gunmen who opened fire while they waited in line to reach a Tijuana border crossing.

- **Mass Graves/Massacres**

- In August 2010, 72 migrants from Central and South America were kidnapped and murdered in San Fernando.
- In April 2011, Mexican security forces searching for abducted bus passengers in a violent northern state bordering Texas stumbled on a collection of pits holding a total of 59 bodies.
- In April 2011, another site was discovered in San Fernando where at least 219 bodies have been recovered.
- Officials in Tamaulipas say they have found 34 grave sites scattered in a wide arc around San Fernando.

- **Orphans & Child Victims**

- Mexico's Human Rights Commission reports that at least 12,000 children have lost one or both of their parents as a result of the cartel wars.
- In March 2011, a Chihuahua state police commander was attacked as she carried her 5-year-old daughter to school. Both died of multiple gunshot wounds.
- In February 2011, assassins went hunting for a Ciudad Juarez man, but the intended target wasn't home, so they killed his three daughters instead, ages 12, 14, and 15.
- In March 2011, a young woman was bound and gagged, shot and left in a car in Acapulco. Her 4-year-old daughter lay slumped beside her with a single bullet to the chest.
- Media reports reflect that children as young as 10 have been employed by crime gangs to watch over street corners or sell drugs, and in some cases kill.
- In December 2010, Mexican authorities arrested a 14-year-old who allegedly confessed that he worked as an assassin for \$250 a week.

- **Internally/Externally Displaced Persons**

- The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre reports that about 230,000 people have been displaced in Mexico because of drug violence.
- Mexican government census figures released in March 2011 support the idea of an exodus, at least in some areas. The census, carried out in mid-2010, listed as uninhabited 61% of the 3,616 homes in Praxedis G. Guerrero, a

striking 111,103 of the 448,785 homes in violence-wracked Ciudad Juarez were abandoned, or about 23%, and almost 33% of the 160,171 houses in Reynosa were unoccupied.

- **Press Censorship**
 - Spanish journalist Judith Torrea harshly criticized a recent pact on news coverage of the drug-related mayhem signed by 50 Mexican media groups, saying it was an agreement to “not report” on drug trafficking and violence “because they say organized crime should not get any publicity.”

- **Government Corruption (Trans-Border Institute Report, February 2011)**
 - Government corruption remains a pervasive problem in 2010.
 - In May 2010, Quintana Roo’s gubernatorial candidate and the former mayor of Cancun, Gregorio Sanchez, was detained on drug charges and accused of having ties to the Beltran Leyva and Zeta drug trafficking organizations.
 - Former governor, Mario Villanueva of Quintana Roo (Cancun) was extradited to the U. S. on drug charges.
 - In October 2010, the Chihuahua state Attorney General, Patricia Gonzalez Rodriguez, was accused by her own brother of having ties to the Juarez cartel.
 - Former congressmen, Julio Cesar Godoy, was formally impeached and is now under investigation for allegedly accepting \$2 million in bribes based on his recorded telephone conversations with drug traffickers.
 - In July 2010, prison officials granted inmates an unofficial furlough in order to murder a group of 17 people.
 - Corruption is pervasive at all levels and is not limited to any particular political party.
 - Competition has emboldened cartels to expose the corruption networks of their rivals, either through public accusations or as informants for the government upon arrest.
 - AP (Mark Stevenson) 10 May 2010, The reported discovery in cartel hands of a sheaf of police documents containing agents’ names and contact numbers, along with apparent references to shared U. S. intelligence data, has renewed fears of high-level corruption in Mexico’s war on drugs. Coming less than two years after a widespread corruption probe known as “Operation Clean House,” toppled Mexico’s former anti-drug czar, Noe Ramirez, and other top officials for allegedly collaborating with a drug cartel. “Operation Clean House was a

warning that something wasn't working, and this confirms that it still isn't working," said Jore Chabat, a Mexican expert on drug cartels. "What I see clearly here...is that the process of infiltration continues" among Mexican police, said Samuel Gonzalez, the country's former top anti-drug prosecutor. "When you're dealing with systemic corruption, you sort of have to presume innocence with caution. You know there are people out there who are not innocent, but you have to work with somebody, as best you can. You take whatever countermeasures you can," said David Shirk, director of the University of San Diego's Trans-border Institute.

- **Criminal Conviction Rate**

- Only 15% of drug suspects detained between December 2006 – September 2009 have been convicted or acquitted.
- A Monterrey Institute of Technology study reported that 98.5% of the crimes committed in Mexico go unpunished.
- Of the 7.48 million crimes – both federal and common – committed in Mexico this year (2010), the conviction rate has only been about 1%.
- The study also cited that about 15% of reported crimes are investigated, but only about 4% of the cases are completed due to the "slowness in the majority of the proceedings and failure to comply with the law."
- The study also cited that only about 1.75% of suspects ever get convicted.
- The Mexican Attorney General's Office (PGR) released a report in April saying that authorities were able to bring to trial only 28% of federal arrests in 2010. The rest of the more than 160,000 people detained went free.

- **Youth Criminals**

- An increasing disturbing factor in the vicious violence plaguing Mexico is the youthfulness of the individuals involved, whether as assassins or victims.
- According to Luis Astorga, an expert on drug trafficking in Mexico, "The labor force willing to enter into the criminal world is more than enough, and there is a "reserve army" of young people without options, from both rural and urban areas.
- Astorga also stated that there are large numbers of young people in rural areas who are involved in growing marijuana and opium poppies, in packaging drugs, and they are also the hired assassins in those parts of the country.
- Organized crime analyst, Jose Luis Pineyro, who teaches at Mexico City's Metropolitan Autonomous University, stated that, "The most obvious change I

- see is that those being recruited as hit men or hired assassins are young people – very young people- who are unemployed and poor or drug addicts. They're not professional assassins, and they don't have particular knowledge of how to use weapons. They're disposable, they're recyclable. They're hired for an average of US \$500 to \$650 a month to kill an unlimited number of people or to carry out other acts of violence. Ten years ago, a hired assassin charged US \$12,000 to \$13,000 to kill just one person. So you could say that hiring assassins has become cheaper for drug traffickers."
- In December 2010, Mexico was shocked when a 14-year-old nicknamed "El Ponchis" was arrested in Cuernavaca, Morelos, trying to take a flight to San Diego after appearing in a gruesome video on YouTube. He is believed to have been recruited by the Beltran Leyva Cartel and told reporters he had participated in four beheadings. When asked how and why he could do such a thing, he said he was drugged and threatened with death if he did not participate.
 - **Increased Drug Addiction Among Mexican Population**
 - According to Lesly Narvaez Castanon of the Ixtapa-Zihuatanejo Youth Integration Center (CIJ), on average, local youth begin using marijuana at ten years of age and then quickly transition to other drugs. "We give them an average of four to six months before they move on to other substances."
 - Recent CIJ studies reveal that while marijuana was Zihuatanejo's drug of choice in 2009, cocaine was the favorite in 2010.
 - Narvaez warns that the local drug abuse problem is moving from the orange zone to the red zone, but is quick to add that Zihuatanejo and Guerrero still lag behind the level of illegal drug consumption in places like Mexico's northern border states.
 - **Availability of Heavy Weapons/Explosives/Improvised Explosive Devices**
 - Machine Guns
 - .50 cal sniper rifles
 - Fragmentation grenades
 - 40mm grenades
 - Rocket Propelled grenades (RPGs)
 - Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
 - Vehicle Borne IEDs

- Cartel Expansion
 - Mexican drug cartels are not confined to Mexico. They have established an effective presence north of the border, and have even expanded to Europe and Africa. Expanding their operations into Central America gives them more opportunity to hide out from Mexican authorities and expand their range of operations. The bottom line is the Mexican cartels are wreaking havoc in these societies. In Guatemala, drug money has permeated the country as cartels build airstrips in the jungle. Guatemalan President Alvaro Colom calls the cartel invasion the biggest threat to his country and the region. Guatemala has also proven to be a fertile recruiting ground for the Zetas, who have been able to enlist former members of the feared Guatemalan army unit called the Kaibiles.
 - El Salvador has become a center for money laundering for the cartels because in 2001, El Salvador adopted the U. S. dollar as its currency which makes money laundering quite easy.
 - Honduras is convenient for unloading boatloads of cocaine.
 - Hezbollah is using the same southern narcotics routes that Mexican drug kingpins do to smuggle drugs and people into the United States, reaping money to finance its operations and threatening U. S. national security. According to Michael Braun, who recently retired as assistant administrator and chief of operations for the U. S. Drug Enforcement Administration, "Hezbollah relies on the same criminal weapons smugglers, document traffickers and transportation experts as the drug cartels." Hezbollah shifted its trade routes along with the drug cartels, using Lebanese Shi'ite expatriates to negotiate contracts with Mexican crime bosses, Mr. Braun said.
 - Hezbollah. Admiral James G. Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, testified that the nexus between illicit drug trafficking – including routed, profits, and corruptive influence and Islamic radical terrorism is a growing threat to the U. S.
 - State Department Country Reports – 2008. "Over the past five years, smuggling rings have been detected moving people from East Africa, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia to Honduras or through its territory. In 2008, there was an increase in the number of boats arriving on the North coast, ferrying people from all over the world seeking to enter the United States illegally via Guatemala and Mexico.
 - Farida Goolam Ahmed was captured at the McAllen airport in 2004. Ahmed was on the terrorist watch list and was part of a team planning attacks in New York city.

- Ahmed Muhammad Dhakane asked for asylum at one of the international bridges in Brownsville. Dhakane admitted to FBI agents that he smuggled at least seven Al Qaeda terrorists into the country.
 - Mahmoud Khalil and Ziad Saleh, two Hama operatives were arrested in January 2005.
 - Mahmoud Kourani was put under surveillance after the owner of Cafe La Libanesa in Tijuana, Mexico, Salim Boughader Mucharrafilie, was arrested in 2002 by US agents on charges of smuggling people. Mahmoud Youssef Kourani, a former Hizbullah fighter, was born in 1971 in Lebanon. He entered USA in 2001, after he bribed the Mexican consul in Lebanon, through the Mexican border and settled in Detroit. As he came to USA Mahmoud Kourani shaved his beard, avoided local mosques and blended in. His brother, Haydar Kourani, was Hizbullah's chief of military security for South Lebanon and his operator in the US.
 - Salim Boughader was arrested in 2002 and used to work for Hezbollah TV.
- Tourist Resort Areas – Recent Open Source Headlines
 - Acapulco is listed in the top five most violent cities in Mexico in 2010 (Trans-Border Institute, February 2011)
 - 5/30/11 Shootout in Acapulco: Five killed, including two policemen. "Violence in the famous port continues to increase, there were a total of 16 executions on Sunday alone in separate incidents."
 - 5/28/11 Armed Group conducts attack on dance hall in Acapulco injuring four
 - 5/23/11 Decapitation in Acapulco (Narco-message left on body, "Mr. Governor, you are responsible for these deaths because you support your cousin, Victor Aguirre.") {NOTE: Victor Aguirre is reportedly identified as a leader within the Independent Cartel of Acapulco}
 - 5/3/11 Teen of 14 and another man gunned down in Acapulco
 - 5/3/11 Person executed, two vehicles burned, corpse found in trunk in Acapulco
 - 5/1/11 Three men and a woman found tortured and executed in Acapulco
 - 4/29/11 Three male murder victims with slit throats in Acapulco
 - 4/27/11 Acapulco-Zihuatanejo Hwy Decapitations, the bodies of four decapitation victims were left at a bus stop along the A-Z Hwy, seven narco-messages left
 - 4/25/11 Acapulco Hwy kidnapping, businessman Javier Dimas Moharro, 43, was kidnapped by a group of gunmen near the 20 de Noviembre neighborhood

- 4/24/11 Five women beheaded in Acapulco, including 14 year old
- 4/18/11 Dismembered male body found with message recovered in Acapulco
- 4/6/11 EFE - Acapulco dealing with worst image crisis ever, "Crime is the main reason that tourists are staying away from Acapulco, but "worn out" infrastructure and a bad public transit system are also problems, the tourism development secretary said. Acapulco has been the scene of several drug-related killings in the past few days linked to a broader war for control of the area being waged by several drug cartels. The Cartel Independiente de Acapulco, the Pacifico Sur cartel and the Gulf cartel have been fighting for control of the resort city. In January (2011), 22 people were massacred in Acapulco by suspected members of the Cartel Independiente de Acapulco. Of the 22 victims, 15 were beheaded. The war between the rival cartels left 370 people dead last year in Acapulco alone.
- 4/5/11 Acapulco Cartel sets fire to Market, engages military
- 3/31/11 Area man executed in Acapulco, the man showed signs of torture
- 3/27/11 Deputy police commander kidnapped, tortured, executed in Acapulco
- 3/27/11 Shootout near Acapulco beach, yacht club and tourist restaurant filled with tourist, 3 federal police, 2 civilians wounded
- 3/27/11 Three Acapulco highway patrol officers kidnapped, 1 other officer, civilian wounded
- 3/25/11 Five are butchered in Acapulco with narco messages signed by El Chapo Guzman
- 3/23/11 Soldiers arrest three alleged kidnapers and rescue a kidnapping victim in Puerto Vallarta
- 3/19/11 Ten people killed as masked men open fire in bar in Mexican resort city of Acapulco
- 3/18/11 Three decapitation victims recovered in Lake Chapala in Jalisco
- 3/17/11 4 year old girl shot in Acapulco, 5th child victim this week. At least five young people have died in drug violence in Acapulco since Sunday, including a 2-year-old boy and a 6-year-old boy killed with an elderly woman who tried to shield them when gunmen opened fire at their home.
- 3/17/11 Violence continues in Acapulco. Violence Continues in Acapulco, Guerrero – On 17 March 2011, multiple murders were reported in Acapulco [16.8500 -99.9167], Guerrero. Some of these incidents were reported as follows:
 - **Incident one:** multiple murder victims were recovered during the early hours of the day. No additional details regarding these incidents were provided.

- **Incident two:** the body of a male murder victim was recovered from the trunk of a vehicle that was abandoned in an area known as La Cima along the Mexico-Acapulco federal highway. The victim in question had been visibly tortured before being shot multiple times.
 - **Incident three:** the body of taxi driver Epifanio Rodriguez Salazar, 41, was recovered from the interior of a Tsuru vehicle that was left parked in front of a car shop.
 - **Incident four:** the body of Gonzalo Rojas Fernandez, 31, was recovered from the back seat of a blue Sentra. This vehicle was abandoned near Las Cruces intersection, and reportedly had at least 20 bullet holes on its exterior.
 - **Incident five:** at approximately 1600 hours, police officer Jose Raul Mendoza Marquez, 42, was attacked by a group of hitmen along the Escenica Highway. After the attack, he was taken to the hospital where he died later as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained.
- **3/16/11 Mexico Gunmen kill six, including two children in Acapulco**
 - **3/16/11 One suspected cartel gunman killed and one police officer injured in firefight in Cancun**
 - **3/15/11 Cancun murders, police discovered four burned bodies in Cancun. The victims were blindfolded with their hands bound and had wounds to their necks**
 - **3/15/11 Cancun: Six people found without heart. All the bodies had an incision on the left side through which criminals removed the heart.**
 - **3/15/11 In the Pacific coast city of Acapulco, a teenager was killed outside the junior high school he attended**
 - **3/15/11 Eight more killed in Acapulco. Eight people in 3 different areas of the city have been killed by cartel gunmen. These included a 70 year old grandmother protecting her grandchildren, 6 and 2 years old, that were killed anyway. Two other children were wounded, including a 20 day old infant.**
 - **3/15/11 Police in the resort city of Cancun found four bodies that had been set on fire**
 - **3/13/11 Authorities reported that nine people were shot dead Sunday in the resort city of Acapulco. The victims included a woman and her two children and a retired Navy Captain.**
 - **3/9/11 Nine bodies found near Acapulco Mexico resort. Mexican authorities said they unearthed nine bodies near the beach resort of Acapulco.**

- 2/9/11 **Cancun** cancellations follow violence. First Mazatlan, then Acapulco, and now Cancun is paying the tourist price for increasing gang violence sweeping many parts of Mexico.
- 1/11/11 Man beheaded, another shot in **Cancun**
- Jan 2011 Acapulco - Police found 15 decapitated bodies, believed to have been victims of the fighting waged by the La Familia, Los Zetas and Beltran Leyva gangs over control of the key point of entry for drugs heading north to the United States.
- 8/31/10 Deadly **Cancun** Bombing: Will Drug Cartel Squeeze Life Out of Tourist Destination? The deadly bombing of the Castillo del Mar bar in Cancun left 8 people dead.
- 6/19/10 Mexican police say they have found 12 mutilated corpses in hidden graves on the outskirts of **Cancun**, the latest sign drug-related violence is spreading to the popular tourist destination. In May, Mexican police arrested Cancun's mayor Gregorio Sanchez on suspicion of offering information and protection to the Zetas as well as the Beltran Leyva catels.
- 2/1/09 On 1 February, retired Brigadier General Mauro Tello Quinones arrived in **Cancun**. Gen. Tello's task was to weed out corruption in the city's police force; to take the streets back from the criminals. He lasted less than three days at work. On 3 February, together with his bodyguard and driver, he was abducted. The three men were tortured and then driven to a remote jungle location where they were killed with a bullet to the head.

TRAVEL WARNINGS

Since March 2010 the Texas Department of Public Safety has issued a number of Mexico travel warnings to Texas citizens and visitors. DPS has taken this extraordinary action out of an abundance of caution and concern for the safety and welfare of our citizens and because it cannot guarantee the safety or security of its citizens if they travel to Mexico. In spite of much rhetoric relative to a "secure border," the facts reflect significantly to the contrary. Mexican cartels work closely with Texas-based and transnational gangs to support their criminal operations on both sides of the border. Since December 2006, reports indicate that between 38,000 – 40,000 people have lost their lives in Mexico as a result of the cartel wars between each other and the Government of Mexico (GOM).

As reported in the L.A. Times on May 7, 2011, Mexican President Felipe Calderon is touting 2011 as the year of tourism, and the Mexican Tourism Board is spending millions of dollars plastering billboards with images of the Great Pyramid of Cholula and underwater trees. At the same time the U. S. government has widened its travel warnings, which has thrown a wrench into Mexico's effort to attract foreign visitors. The State Department now urges U. S. travelers to steer clear of all or parts of 10 Mexican states, including most of the border region and popular vacation sites such as Acapulco and Monterrey.

The Department of Public Safety constantly monitors the travel warnings issued by the U. S. State Department and the activities of the cartels and the response by the GOM. The Department of Public Safety also considers a number of other important factors when issuing its travel warnings which are addressed in this document. The latest U. S. Department of State Travel Warning is as follows:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Bureau of Consular Affairs

Mexico

April 22, 2011

The Department of State has issued this Travel Warning to inform U.S. citizens traveling to and living in Mexico about the security situation in Mexico. This Travel Warning supersedes the Travel Warning for Mexico dated September 10, 2010 to consolidate and update information about the security situation and to advise the public of additional restrictions on the travel of U.S. government personnel.

Millions of U.S. citizens safely visit Mexico each year, including more than 150,000 who cross the border every day for study, tourism or business and at least one million U.S. citizens who live in Mexico. The Mexican government makes a considerable

effort to protect U.S. citizens and other visitors to major tourist destinations. Resort areas and tourist destinations in Mexico generally do not see the levels of drug-related violence and crime reported in the border region and in areas along major trafficking routes. Nevertheless, crime and violence are serious problems and can occur anywhere. While most victims of violence are Mexican citizens associated with criminal activity, the security situation poses serious risks for U.S. citizens as well.

It is imperative that you understand the risks involved in travel to Mexico and how best to avoid dangerous situations. Common-sense precautions such as visiting only legitimate business and tourist areas during daylight hours, and avoiding areas where criminal activity might occur, can help ensure that travel to Mexico is safe and enjoyable.

General Conditions

Since 2006, the Mexican government has engaged in an extensive effort to combat transnational criminal organizations (TCOs). The TCOs, meanwhile, have been engaged in a vicious struggle to control drug trafficking routes and other criminal activity. According to Government of Mexico figures, 34,612 people have been killed in narcotics-related violence in Mexico since December 2006. More than 15,000 narcotics-related homicides occurred in 2010, an increase of almost two-thirds compared to 2009. Most of those killed in narcotics-related violence since 2006 have been members of TCOs. However, innocent persons have also been killed as have Mexican law enforcement and military personnel.

There is no evidence that U.S. tourists have been targeted by criminal elements due to their citizenship. Nonetheless, while in Mexico you should be aware of your surroundings at all times and exercise particular caution in unfamiliar areas. Bystanders, including U.S. citizens, have been injured or killed in violent incidents in various parts of the country, especially, but not exclusively in the northern border region, demonstrating the heightened risk of violence throughout Mexico. TCOs, meanwhile, engage in a wide-range of criminal activities that can directly impact U.S. citizens, including kidnapping, armed car-jacking, and extortion that can directly impact U.S. citizens. The number of U.S. citizens reported to the Department of State as murdered in Mexico increased from 35 in 2007 to 111 in 2010.

The Mexican government has deployed federal police and military personnel throughout the country as part of its efforts to combat the TCOs. U.S. citizens traveling on Mexican roads and highways may encounter government checkpoints, which are often staffed by military personnel. You are advised to cooperate with personnel at government checkpoints and mobile military patrols. TCOs have erected their own unauthorized checkpoints, and killed or abducted motorists who have failed to stop at them.

Violence along Mexican roads and highways is a particular concern in the northern border region. As a result, effective July 15, 2010, the U.S. Mission in Mexico imposed restrictions on U.S. government employees' travel. U.S. government employees and their families are not permitted to drive from the U.S.-Mexico border to or from the interior of Mexico or Central America. Travel by vehicle is permitted between Hermosillo and Nogales.

While violent incidents have occurred at all hours of the day and night on both modern toll ("cuotas") highways and on secondary roads, they have occurred most frequently at night and on isolated roads. To reduce risk, you are strongly urged to

travel only during daylight hours throughout Mexico, to avoid isolated roads, and to use toll roads whenever possible. For more information on road safety and crime along Mexico's roadways, see the Department of State's Country Specific Information.

Due to ongoing violence and persistent security concerns, you are urged to defer non-essential travel to the states of Tamaulipas and Michoacán, and to parts of the states of Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Sinaloa, Durango, Zacatecas, San Luis Potosi and Jalisco. Details on these locations, and other areas in which travelers should exercise caution, are below.

Violence along the U.S. - Mexico Border

You should be especially aware of safety and security concerns when visiting the northern border states of Northern Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Nuevo Leon, and Tamaulipas. Much of the country's narcotics-related violence has occurred in the border region. More than a third of all U.S. citizens killed in Mexico in 2010 whose deaths were reported to the U.S. government were killed in the border cities of Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana. Narcotics-related homicide rates in the border states of Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas have increased dramatically in the past two years.

Carjacking and highway robbery are serious problems in many parts of the border region and U.S. citizens have been murdered in such incidents. Most victims who complied with carjackers at these checkpoints have reported that they were not physically harmed. Incidents have occurred during the day and at night, and carjackers have used a variety of techniques, including bumping moving vehicles to force them to stop and running vehicles off the road at high speed. There are some indications that criminals have particularly targeted newer and larger vehicles with U.S. license plates, especially dark-colored SUVs. However, victims' vehicles have included those with both Mexican and American registration and vary in type from late model SUVs and pick-up trucks to old sedans.

If you make frequent visits to border cities, you should vary your route and park in well-lighted, guarded and paid parking lots. Exercise caution when entering or exiting vehicles.

Large firefights between rival TCOs or TCOs and Mexican authorities have taken place in towns and cities in many parts of Mexico, especially in the border region. Firefights have occurred in broad daylight on streets and in other public venues, such as restaurants and clubs. During some of these incidents, U.S. citizens have been trapped and temporarily prevented from leaving the area. The location and timing of future armed engagements cannot be predicted. You are urged to defer travel to those areas mentioned in this Travel Warning and to exercise extreme caution when traveling throughout the northern border region.

Northern Baja California: Targeted TCO assassinations continue to take place in Northern Baja California, including the city of Tijuana. You should exercise caution in this area, particularly at night. In late 2010, turf battles between criminal groups proliferated and resulted in numerous assassinations in areas of Tijuana frequented by U.S. citizens. Shooting incidents, in which innocent bystanders have been injured, have occurred during daylight hours throughout the city. In one such incident, an American citizen was shot and seriously wounded.

Nogales and Northern Sonora: You are advised to exercise caution in the city of Nogales. Northern Sonora is a key region in the international drug and human trafficking trades, and can be extremely dangerous for travelers. The U.S. Consulate requires that armored vehicles are used for official travel in the consular district of Nogales, including certain areas within the city of Nogales. The region west of Nogales, east of Sonoyta, and from Caborca north, including the towns of Saric, Tubutama and Altar, and the

eastern edge of Sonora bordering Chihuahua, are known centers of illegal activity. You should defer non-essential travel to these areas.

You are advised to exercise caution when visiting the coastal town of Puerto Peñasco. In the past year there have been multiple incidents of TCO-related violence, including the shooting of the city's police chief. U.S. citizens visiting Puerto Peñasco are urged to cross the border at Lukeville, AZ, to limit driving through Mexico and to limit travel to main roads during daylight hours.

Ciudad Juarez and Chihuahua: The situation in the state of Chihuahua, specifically Ciudad Juarez, is of special concern. Ciudad Juarez has the highest murder rate in Mexico. Mexican authorities report that more than 3,100 people were killed in Ciudad Juarez in 2010. Three persons associated with the Consulate General were murdered in March, 2010. You should defer non-essential travel to Ciudad Juarez and to the Guadalupe Bravo area southeast of Ciudad Juarez. U.S. citizens should also defer non-essential travel to the northwest quarter of the state of Chihuahua. From the United States, these areas are often reached through the Columbus, NM, and Fabens and Fort Hancock, TX, ports-of-entry. In both areas, U.S. citizens have been victims of narcotics-related violence. There have been incidents of narcotics-related violence in the vicinity of the Copper Canyon in Chihuahua.

Durango, Coahuila and Zacatecas: Between 2006 and 2010, the number of narcotics-related murders in the State of Durango increased dramatically. Several areas in the state have seen sharp increases in violence and remain volatile and unpredictable. U.S. government employees are restricted from traveling to the cities of Durango and Gomez Palacio. You should defer non-essential travel to these cities.

The State of Coahuila has also experienced an increase in violent crimes and narcotics-related murders. U.S. government employees are restricted from traveling to the area known as "La Laguna", including the city of Torreon, and the city of Saltillo within the state. You should defer non-essential travel to this area, as well as to the cities of Piedras Negras and Ciudad Acuña due to frequent incidents of TCO-related violence.

The northwestern portion of the state of Zacatecas has become notably dangerous and insecure. Robberies and carjackings are occurring with increased frequency and both local authorities and residents have reported a surge in observed TCO activity. This area is remote, and local authorities are unable to regularly patrol it or quickly respond to incidents that occur there. The Consulate General in Monterrey restricts travel for U.S. government employees to the city of Fresnillo and the area extending northwest from Fresnillo along Highway 45 (Fresnillo-Sombrete) between Highways 44 and 49. In addition, highway 49 northwards from Fresnillo through Durango and in to Chihuahua is isolated and should be considered dangerous. You should defer non-essential travel to these areas.

Monterrey and Nuevo Leon: The level of violence and insecurity in Monterrey remains elevated. Local police and private patrols do not have the capacity to deter criminal elements or respond effectively to security incidents. As a result of a Department of State assessment of the overall security situation, on September 10, 2010, the Consulate General in Monterrey became a partially unaccompanied post with no minor dependents of U.S. government employees permitted.

TCOs continue to use stolen cars and trucks to create roadblocks or "blockades" on major thoroughfares, preventing the military or police from responding to criminal activity in Monterrey and the surrounding areas. Travelers on the highways between Monterrey and the United States (notably through Nuevo Laredo and Matamoros/Reynosa) have been targeted for robbery that has resulted in violence. They have also been caught in incidents of gunfire between criminals and Mexican law

enforcement. In 2010, TCOs kidnapped guests out of reputable hotels in the downtown Monterrey area, blocking off adjoining streets to prevent law enforcement response. TCOs have also regularly attacked local government facilities, prisons and police stations, and engaged in public shootouts with the military and between themselves. Pedestrians and innocent bystanders have been killed in these incidents.

The number of kidnappings and disappearances in Monterrey, and increasingly throughout Monterrey's consular district, is of particular concern. Both the local and expatriate communities have been victimized and local law enforcement has provided little to no response. In addition, police have been implicated in some of these incidents. Travelers and residents are strongly advised to lower their profile and avoid displaying any evidence of wealth that might draw attention.

Tamaulipas: You should defer non-essential travel to the state of Tamaulipas. In an effort to prevent the military or police from responding to criminal activity, TCOs have set up roadblocks or "blockades" in various parts of Nuevo Laredo in which armed gunmen carjack and rob unsuspecting drivers. These blockades occur without warning and at all times, day and night. The Consulate General prohibits employees from entering the entertainment zone in Nuevo Laredo known as "Boys Town" because of concerns about violent crime in that area. U.S. government employees are currently restricted from travelling on the highway between Nuevo Laredo and Monterrey, as well as on Mexican Highway 2 towards Reynosa or Ciudad Acuña due to security concerns.

Be aware of the risks posed by armed robbery and carjacking on state highways throughout Tamaulipas. In January 2011, a U.S. citizen was murdered in what appears to have been a failed carjacking attempt. While no highway routes through Tamaulipas are considered safe, many of the crimes reported to the U.S. Consulate General in Matamoros took place along the Matamoros-Tampico highway, particularly around San Fernando and the area north of Tampico.

Crime and Violence in Other Parts of Mexico

While security concerns are particularly acute in the northern border region, you should be aware of situations that could affect your safety in other parts of Mexico.

Sinaloa and Southern Sonora: One of Mexico's most powerful TCOs is based in the state of Sinaloa. Since 2006, more homicides have occurred in the state's capital city of Culiacan than in any other city in Mexico, with the exception of Ciudad Juarez. You should defer non-essential travel to Culiacan and exercise extreme caution when visiting the rest of the state. Travel off the toll roads in remote areas of Sinaloa is especially dangerous and should be avoided.

In the last year, the city of Mazatlan has experienced a level of violence, primarily confrontations between TCOs, not seen before. In 2010 there were over 300 narcotics-related murders within the city, compared to fewer than 100 in 2009. You are encouraged to visit Mazatlan during daylight hours and limit the time you spend outside tourist centers. Exercise caution during late night and early morning hours when most violent crimes occur.


Highway robbery and carjacking are ongoing security concerns for travelers on the Mexican toll road Highway 15 in Sonora and on Maxipista Benito Juarez in Sinaloa. These highways are known to be particularly dangerous at night when roadside robberies occur. When traveling in Sinaloa, U.S. government employees are required to use armored vehicles and may only travel in daylight hours.

San Luis Potosi: In February 2011, one U.S. government employee was killed and another wounded when they were attacked in their U.S. government vehicle on Highway 57 near Santa Maria del Rio. The incident remains under investigation. Cartel violence and highway lawlessness have increased throughout the state and are a continuing security concern. All official U.S. government employees and their families have been advised to defer travel on the entire stretch of highway 57D in San Luis Potosi as well as travel in the state east of highway 57D towards Tamaulipas. You should defer non-essential travel in these areas.

Nayarit and Jalisco: Official U.S. government employees are prohibited from traveling to Colotlan, Jalisco, and Yahualica, Jalisco, both near the Zacatecas border, because of an increasingly volatile security situation. Concerns include roadblocks placed by individuals posing as police or military personnel and recent gun battles between rival TCOs involving automatic weapons. You should defer non-essential travel to these cities. In addition, the border areas between Jalisco state and the states of Zacatecas and Michoacán, as well as southern Nayarit state including the city of Tepic, have been sites of violence and crime involving TCOs. You should exercise extreme caution when traveling in these areas. Due to recent TCO-mounted road blockades between the Guadalajara airport and the Guadalajara metropolitan areas, U.S. government employees are only authorized to travel between Guadalajara and the Guadalajara Airport during daylight hours.

Michoacán: You should defer non-essential travel to the State of Michoacán, which is home to another of Mexico's most dangerous TCOs, "La Familia". Attacks on government officials and law enforcement and military personnel, and other incidents of TCO-related violence, have occurred throughout Michoacan, including in and around the capital of Morelia and in the vicinity of the world famous butterfly sanctuaries in the eastern part of the State.

Guerrero and Morelos: You should exercise extreme caution when traveling in the northwestern part of the state of Guerrero, which has a strong TCO presence. Do not take the dangerous, isolated road through Ciudad Altamirano to the beach resorts of Ixtapa and Zihuatanejo and exercise caution traveling on the coastal road between Acapulco and Ixtapa due to the risk of roadblocks and carjackings. Numerous incidents of narcotics-related violence have occurred in the city of Cuernavaca, in the State of Morelos, a popular destination for American language students.

 Downtown **Acapulco** and surrounding areas have seen a significant increase in narcotics-related violence in the last year. Incidents have included daylight gunfights and murders of law enforcement personnel and some have resulted in the deaths of innocent bystanders. Due to the unpredictable nature of this violence, you should exercise extreme caution when visiting downtown Acapulco. To reduce risks, tourists should not visit the downtown area at night and should remain in clearly identifiable tourist areas. In general, the popular tourist area of Diamante just south of the city has not been affected by the increasing violence.

In addition to the above latest State Department travel warning the United States Consulates General in a number of the northern Mexican states has issued warnings to American citizens and U. S. law enforcement against travel of any type in Mexico following the discovery of several mass graves in and around the Nuevo Laredo area and other parts of Mexico.

In February 2011, suspected members of Los Zetas operating an illegal highway checkpoint in San Luis Potosi opened fire on two ICE Special Agents travelling in a vehicle with diplomatic license plates, killing one and wounding the other.

In April 2010, an explosive device detonated inside the U. S. Consulate compound in Nuevo Laredo, MX after the device was thrown over the wall of the compound.

In September 2010, the U. S. Consulate in Monterrey became a partially unaccompanied post where no minor dependents of U. S. government employees are permitted to remain in the city. The decision was based on the August 2010 shooting near the American Embassy Foundation School and the high kidnapping rate in the area.

The Mexican Attorney General's Office (PGR) reported in January 2011 that 166 innocent bystanders died from drug-related violence in 2010, compared to only 61 in 2009.

Other Security Factors Considered by DPS

- **Extreme Violence (photos available upon request)**

- Murders
- Assassinations
- Beheadings
- Dismemberments
- Skinning Alive
- Acid Baths
- Torture
- Kidnappings

- **2010 saw a significant increase in kidnappings and extortions, particularly in northern states. Kidnappings reported for the January – July 2010 period were up 14.7% from the same period last year, and 78.8% from that same period in 2008. (Drug Violence in Mexico, Trans-Border Institute, February 2011)**
- **Study: 2010 Record Year for Kidnappings in Mexico. Kidnappings in Mexico are at a record high and are more than twice as likely to end with the death of a hostage, according to the Citizen's Council for Public Security and Penal Justice. CCSP-JP Director Jose Ortega Sanchez said the Mexico's kidnapping rate now stands at 195 cases for every million inhabitants, the second highest in the hemisphere after Venezuela. Ortega added that kidnapping data from municipal governments is often "falsified" or underreported, for example, in Tamaulipas, the municipal government only reported 25 kidnap cases, when the military reported rescuing 173 people.**

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Tab

- Rapes
 - In April 2010, Amnesty International reported that as many as six out of every 10 Central American women and girls are raped as they pass through Mexico hoping to cross illegally into the United States.
- Human Trafficking
 - "Mexico has long been a trampoline for migrants from around the world trying to bounce over the Rio Grande into the United States. Now Mexico's drug gangs have become increasingly involved in the human trafficking business while the nation's prisons and police are under increased pressure from the crime wave." "Everyone round the world knows that Mexico is the back door into the United States. That causes a lot of problems here and now we are seeing those problems come to a head," said a high ranking official at Mexico's National Immigration Institute, who asked his name not be used in case of repercussion from superiors. Immigration officials estimate that more than 300,000 undocumented foreigners pour through Mexico each year to try to sneak over the southern U. S. border. This generates an enormous human trafficking business, estimated to be worth more than \$2 billion each year to Mexican gangs. In April 2010, police arrested dozens of officials from the National Immigration Institute for working with human traffickers. "The immigration institute is so corrupt it is like a rotting corpse," said migrant activist and Roman Catholic priest Alejandro Solalinde. Mexican President Felipe Calderon said he was taking bold action to punish corrupt officials and protect migrants by signing a new immigration bill into law last week. "We know of hundreds of hundreds of heartbreaking stories of migrants who have been victims of corrupt (Mexican) authorities," Calderon said as he signed the bill.
- Extortions
 - Phone Extortion in Mexico Rising: According to the Citizen's Council for Public Safety (Consejo Ciudadano de Seguridad Publica-CCSP), a government body that monitors crime rates, in 2010 a total of 119,007 threatening calls were reported
- Carjackings

- **High Profile Murders/Intimidation**
 - **Mayors (2004-2010, 27 Mayors killed)**
 - **Executive Law Enforcement Officials**
 - **Cancun, in February 2009, retired Brigadier General Mauro Tello Quinones arrived in Cancun to weed out corruption in the city's police force and to take the streets back from the criminal gangs. He lasted three days. On 3 February, together with his bodyguard and driver, he was abducted. The three men were tortured and then driven to a remote jungle location where they were killed with a bullet to the head.**
 - **Praxedis G. Guerrero, in October 2011, 20-year-old female criminology student accepted the job of police chief in Praxedis G. Guerrero. In March she fled with her family to El Paso seeking asylum after numerous death threats against her and her family.**
 - **Police Officers**
 - **Thousands have been kidnapped, assassinated, murdered, beheaded, dismembered and tortured since 2006.**
 - **Military**
 - **Mexico City, in May 2011, just recently retired senior Army General Jorge Juarez Loera, who was the number three in the Mexican Army, was shot dead. General Loera had previously headed the Joint Operation Chihuahua which targeted drug trafficking in the northern states of Chihuahua, Coahuila and Durango.**
 - **Prosecutors**
 - **In April 2011, the body of federal prosecutor, Claudia Avila Yanez, was discovered in Villa Juarez, a community near the City of Lerdo. The prosecutor was shot several times in the abdomen and extremities. Earlier, the head of the Attorney General's Durango Bureau, Gustavo Armando Garcia Silve, was also murdered.**
 - **Government Candidates**
 - **13 candidates killed during the 2010 elections including the PRI-Candidate for Governor of Tamaulipas, Rodolfo Torre Cantu.**
 - **Journalists**
 - **At least 38 journalists have been killed between 2006 – 2010 and many more threatened into silence.**
 - **Medical Doctors**
 - **In December 2010, Dr. Jose Alberto Betancourt Rosales was kidnapped from the parking garage at Centro Medico in Juarez. His kidnappers**

asked for \$1 million in ransom money. His body was found a few days later.

- According to the Citizen's Medical Committee of Ciudad Juarez, at least 9 doctors have been killed and 21 others kidnapped in the past two years and almost 70% of private practices in the city have closed down since 2008.

- **United States Citizens Killed in Mexico**

- The U. S. State Department reports that 341 American citizen deaths in Mexico were classified as homicides, drug-related, or executions between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2010. Of these, 47 deaths occurred in 2006, 38 in 2007, 62 in 2008, 81 in 2009, and 113 in 2010.
- Much of the violence affecting American citizens in Mexico is increasingly concentrated in the four Mexican states adjacent to Texas.
- In March 2010, an employee of the U. S. Consulate in Ciudad Juarez and her husband (El Paso County Deputy Sheriff) were murdered while leaving a birthday party. The spouse of another Consulate employee died in a separate attack.
- In September 2010, a U. S. citizen was murdered on Falcon Lake Reservoir on the Tamaulipas-Texas border. The Mexican investigator looking into the murder was later found murdered.
- In October 2010, a 19-year-old U. S. student at the Brownsville campus of the University of Texas was murdered when suspected drug traffickers hijacked a bus in southern Tamaulipas in which he was a passenger.
- In November 2010, two U. S. citizens from the University of Texas at El Paso were murdered in Ciudad Juarez. Both were students at the University's College of Business Administration.
- In January 2011, a U. S. Citizen and female missionary was shot in the head by suspected traffickers on a Mexican highway as they were returning to Texas. The missionary was pronounced dead at a Texas hospital.
- In January 2011, a Canadian traveler was shot and wounded during a firefight between rival drug traffickers in Mazatlan.
- In February 2011, two U. S. teen students from Cathedral High School and Radford School in El Paso and a Mexican national were murdered at a used car dealership in Juarez.
- In April 2011, two U. S. citizens were killed by gunmen who opened fire while they waited in line to reach a Tijuana border crossing.

- **Mass Graves/Massacres**

- In August 2010, 72 migrants from Central and South America were kidnapped and murdered in San Fernando.
- In April 2011, Mexican security forces searching for abducted bus passengers in a violent northern state bordering Texas stumbled on a collection of pits holding a total of 59 bodies.
- In April 2011, another site was discovered in San Fernando where at least 219 bodies have been recovered.
- Officials in Tamaulipas say they have found 34 grave sites scattered in a wide arc around San Fernando.

- **Orphans & Child Victims**

- Mexico's Human Rights Commission reports that at least 12,000 children have lost one or both of their parents as a result of the cartel wars.
- In March 2011, a Chihuahua state police commander was attacked as she carried her 5-year-old daughter to school. Both died of multiple gunshot wounds.
- In February 2011, assassins went hunting for a Ciudad Juarez man, but the intended target wasn't home, so they killed his three daughters instead, ages 12, 14, and 15.
- In March 2011, a young woman was bound and gagged, shot and left in a car in Acapulco. Her 4-year-old daughter lay slumped beside her with a single bullet to the chest.
- Media reports reflect that children as young as 10 have been employed by crime gangs to watch over street corners or sell drugs, and in some cases kill.
- In December 2010, Mexican authorities arrested a 14-year-old who allegedly confessed that he worked as an assassin for \$250 a week.

- **Internally/Externally Displaced Persons**

- The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre reports that about 230,000 people have been displaced in Mexico because of drug violence.
- Mexican government census figures released in March 2011 support the idea of an exodus, at least in some areas. The census, carried out in mid-2010, listed as uninhabited 61% of the 3,616 homes in Praxedis G. Guerrero, a

striking 111,103 of the 448,785 homes in violence-wracked Ciudad Juarez were abandoned, or about 23%, and almost 33% of the 160,171 houses in Reynosa were unoccupied.

- **Press Censorship**
 - Spanish journalist Judith Torrea harshly criticized a recent pact on news coverage of the drug-related mayhem signed by 50 Mexican media groups, saying it was an agreement to “not report” on drug trafficking and violence “because they say organized crime should not get any publicity.”

- **Government Corruption (Trans-Border Institute Report, February 2011)**
 - Government corruption remains a pervasive problem in 2010.
 - In May 2010, Quintana Roo’s gubernatorial candidate and the former mayor of Cancun, Gregorio Sanchez, was detained on drug charges and accused of having ties to the Beltran Leyva and Zeta drug trafficking organizations.
 - Former governor, Mario Villanueva of Quintana Roo (Cancun) was extradited to the U. S. on drug charges.
 - In October 2010, the Chihuahua state Attorney General, Patricia Gonzalez Rodriguez, was accused by her own brother of having ties to the Juarez cartel.
 - Former congressmen, Julio Cesar Godoy, was formally impeached and is now under investigation for allegedly accepting \$2 million in bribes based on his recorded telephone conversations with drug traffickers.
 - In July 2010, prison officials granted inmates an unofficial furlough in order to murder a group of 17 people.
 - Corruption is pervasive at all levels and is not limited to any particular political party.
 - Competition has emboldened cartels to expose the corruption networks of their rivals, either through public accusations or as informants for the government upon arrest.
 - AP (Mark Stevenson) 10 May 2010, The reported discovery in cartel hands of a sheaf of police documents containing agents’ names and contact numbers, along with apparent references to shared U. S. intelligence data, has renewed fears of high-level corruption in Mexico’s war on drugs. Coming less than two years after a widespread corruption probe known as “Operation Clean House,” toppled Mexico’s former anti-drug czar, Noe Ramirez, and other top officials for allegedly collaborating with a drug cartel. “Operation Clean House was a

warning that something wasn't working, and this confirms that it still isn't working," said Jore Chabat, a Mexican expert on drug cartels. "What I see clearly here...is that the process of infiltration continues" among Mexican police, said Samuel Gonzalez, the country's former top anti-drug prosecutor. "When you're dealing with systemic corruption, you sort of have to presume innocence with caution. You know there are people out there who are not innocent, but you have to work with somebody, as best you can. You take whatever countermeasures you can," said David Shirk, director of the University of San Diego's Trans-border Institute.

- **Criminal Conviction Rate**

- Only 15% of drug suspects detained between December 2006 – September 2009 have been convicted or acquitted.
- A Monterrey Institute of Technology study reported that 98.5% of the crimes committed in Mexico go unpunished.
- Of the 7.48 million crimes – both federal and common – committed in Mexico this year (2010), the conviction rate has only been about 1%.
- The study also cited that about 15% of reported crimes are investigated, but only about 4% of the cases are completed due to the "slowness in the majority of the proceedings and failure to comply with the law."
- The study also cited that only about 1.75% of suspects ever get convicted.
- The Mexican Attorney General's Office (PGR) released a report in April saying that authorities were able to bring to trial only 28% of federal arrests in 2010. The rest of the more than 160,000 people detained went free.

- **Youth Criminals**

- An increasing disturbing factor in the vicious violence plaguing Mexico is the youthfulness of the individuals involved, whether as assassins or victims.
- According to Luis Astorga, an expert on drug trafficking in Mexico, "The labor force willing to enter into the criminal world is more than enough, and there is a "reserve army" of young people without options, from both rural and urban areas.
- Astorga also stated that there are large numbers of young people in rural areas who are involved in growing marijuana and opium poppies, in packaging drugs, and they are also the hired assassins in those parts of the country.
- Organized crime analyst, Jose Luis Pineyro, who teaches at Mexico City's Metropolitan Autonomous University, stated that, "The most obvious change I

- see is that those being recruited as hit men or hired assassins are young people – very young people- who are unemployed and poor or drug addicts. They're not professional assassins, and they don't have particular knowledge of how to use weapons. They're disposable, they're recyclable. They're hired for an average of US \$500 to \$650 a month to kill an unlimited number of people or to carry out other acts of violence. Ten years ago, a hired assassin charged US \$12,000 to \$13,000 to kill just one person. So you could say that hiring assassins has become cheaper for drug traffickers.”
- In December 2010, Mexico was shocked when a 14-year-old nicknamed “El Ponchis” was arrested in Cuernavaca, Morelos, trying to take a flight to San Diego after appearing in a gruesome video on YouTube. He is believed to have been recruited by the Beltran Leyva Cartel and told reporters he had participated in four beheadings. When asked how and why he could do such a thing, he said he was drugged and threatened with death if he did not participate.
 - **Increased Drug Addiction Among Mexican Population**
 - According to Lesly Narvaez Castanon of the Ixtapa-Zihuatanejo Youth Integration Center (CIJ), on average, local youth begin using marijuana at ten years of age and then quickly transition to other drugs. “We give them an average of four to six months before they move on to other substances.”
 - Recent CIJ studies reveal that while marijuana was Zihuatanejo’s drug of choice in 2009, cocaine was the favorite in 2010.
 - Narvaez warns that the local drug abuse problem is moving from the orange zone to the red zone, but is quick to add that Zihuatanejo and Guerrero still lag behind the level of illegal drug consumption in places like Mexico’s northern border states.
 - **Availability of Heavy Weapons/Explosives/Improvised Explosive Devices**
 - Machine Guns
 - .50 cal sniper rifles
 - Fragmentation grenades
 - 40mm grenades
 - Rocket Propelled grenades (RPGs)
 - Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
 - Vehicle Borne IEDs

- Cartel Expansion
 - Mexican drug cartels are not confined to Mexico. They have established an effective presence north of the border, and have even expanded to Europe and Africa. Expanding their operations into Central America gives them more opportunity to hide out from Mexican authorities and expand their range of operations. The bottom line is the Mexican cartels are wreaking havoc in these societies. In Guatemala, drug money has permeated the country as cartels build airstrips in the jungle. Guatemalan President Alvaro Colom calls the cartel invasion the biggest threat to his country and the region. Guatemala has also proven to be a fertile recruiting ground for the Zetas, who have been able to enlist former members of the feared Guatemalan army unit called the Kaibiles.
 - El Salvador has become a center for money laundering for the cartels because in 2001, El Salvador adopted the U. S. dollar as its currency which makes money laundering quite easy.
 - Honduras is convenient for unloading boatloads of cocaine.
 - Hezbollah is using the same southern narcotics routes that Mexican drug kingpins do to smuggle drugs and people into the United States, reaping money to finance its operations and threatening U. S. national security. According to Michael Braun, who recently retired as assistant administrator and chief of operations for the U. S. Drug Enforcement Administration, "Hezbollah relies on the same criminal weapons smugglers, document traffickers and transportation experts as the drug cartels." Hezbollah shifted its trade routes along with the drug cartels, using Lebanese Shi'ite expatriates to negotiate contracts with Mexican crime bosses, Mr. Braun said.
 - Hezbollah. Admiral James G. Stavridis, Supreme Allied Commander-Europe, testified that the nexus between illicit drug trafficking – including routed, profits, and corruptive influence and Islamic radical terrorism is a growing threat to the U. S.
 - State Department Country Reports – 2008. "Over the past five years, smuggling rings have been detected moving people from East Africa, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia to Honduras or through its territory. In 2008, there was an increase in the number of boats arriving on the North coast, ferrying people from all over the world seeking to enter the United States illegally via Guatemala and Mexico.
 - Farida Goolam Ahmed was captured at the McAllen airport in 2004. Ahmed was on the terrorist watch list and was part of a team planning attacks in New York city.

- Ahmed Muhammad Dhakane asked for asylum at one of the international bridges in Brownsville. Dhakane admitted to FBI agents that he smuggled at least seven Al Qaeda terrorists into the country.
 - Mahmoud Khalil and Ziad Saleh, two Hama operatives were arrested in January 2005.
 - Mahmoud Kourani was put under surveillance after the owner of Cafe La Libanesa in Tijuana, Mexico, Salim Boughader Mucharrafilie, was arrested in 2002 by US agents on charges of smuggling people. Mahmoud Youssef Kourani, a former Hizbullah fighter, was born in 1971 in Lebanon. He entered USA in 2001, after he bribed the Mexican consul in Lebanon, through the Mexican border and settled in Detroit. As he came to USA Mahmoud Kourani shaved his beard, avoided local mosques and blended in. His brother, Haydar Kourani, was Hizbullah's chief of military security for South Lebanon and his operator in the US.
 - Salim Boughader was arrested in 2002 and used to work for Hezbollah TV.
- Tourist Resort Areas – Recent Open Source Headlines
 - Acapulco is listed in the top five most violent cities in Mexico in 2010 (Trans-Border Institute, February 2011)
 - 5/30/11 Shootout in Acapulco: Five killed, including two policemen. “Violence in the famous port continues to increase, there were a total of 16 executions on Sunday alone in separate incidents.”
 - 5/28/11 Armed Group conducts attack on dance hall in Acapulco injuring four
 - 5/23/11 Decapitation in Acapulco (Narco-message left on body, “Mr. Governor, you are responsible for these deaths because you support your cousin, Victor Aguirre.”) {NOTE: Victor Aguirre is reportedly identified as a leader within the Independent Cartel of Acapulco}
 - 5/3/11 Teen of 14 and another man gunned down in Acapulco
 - 5/3/11 Person executed, two vehicles burned, corpse found in trunk in Acapulco
 - 5/1/11 Three men and a woman found tortured and executed in Acapulco
 - 4/29/11 Three male murder victims with slit throats in Acapulco
 - 4/27/11 Acapulco-Zihuatanejo Hwy Decapitations, the bodies of four decapitation victims were left at a bus stop along the A-Z Hwy, seven narco-messages left
 - 4/25/11 Acapulco Hwy kidnapping, businessman Javier Dimas Moharro, 43, was kidnapped by a group of gunmen near the 20 de Noviembre neighborhood

- 4/24/11 Five women beheaded in Acapulco, including 14 year old
- 4/18/11 Dismembered male body found with message recovered in Acapulco
- 4/6/11 EFE - Acapulco dealing with worst image crisis ever, "Crime is the main reason that tourists are staying away from Acapulco, but "worn out" infrastructure and a bad public transit system are also problems, the tourism development secretary said. Acapulco has been the scene of several drug-related killings in the past few days linked to a broader war for control of the area being waged by several drug cartels. The Cartel Independiente de Acapulco, the Pacifico Sur cartel and the Gulf cartel have been fighting for control of the resort city. In January (2011), 22 people were massacred in Acapulco by suspected members of the Cartel Independiente de Acapulco. Of the 22 victims, 15 were beheaded. The war between the rival cartels left 370 people dead last year in Acapulco alone.
- 4/5/11 Acapulco Cartel sets fire to Market, engages military
- 3/31/11 Area man executed in Acapulco, the man showed signs of torture
- 3/27/11 Deputy police commander kidnapped, tortured, executed in Acapulco
- 3/27/11 Shootout near Acapulco beach, yacht club and tourist restaurant filled with tourist, 3 federal police, 2 civilians wounded
- 3/27/11 Three Acapulco highway patrol officers kidnapped, 1 other officer, civilian wounded
- 3/25/11 Five are butchered in Acapulco with narco messages signed by El Chapo Guzman
- 3/23/11 Soldiers arrest three alleged kidnapers and rescue a kidnapping victim in Puerto Vallarta
- 3/19/11 Ten people killed as masked men open fire in bar in Mexican resort city of Acapulco
- 3/18/11 Three decapitation victims recovered in Lake Chapala in Jalisco
- 3/17/11 4 year old girl shot in Acapulco, 5th child victim this week. At least five young people have died in drug violence in Acapulco since Sunday, including a 2-year-old boy and a 6-year-old boy killed with an elderly woman who tried to shield them when gunmen opened fire at their home.
- 3/17/11 Violence continues in Acapulco. Violence Continues in Acapulco, Guerrero – On 17 March 2011, multiple murders were reported in Acapulco [16.8500 -99.9167], Guerrero. Some of these incidents were reported as follows:
 - **Incident one:** multiple murder victims were recovered during the early hours of the day. No additional details regarding these incidents were provided.

- **Incident two:** the body of a male murder victim was recovered from the trunk of a vehicle that was abandoned in an area known as La Cima along the Mexico-Acapulco federal highway. The victim in question had been visibly tortured before being shot multiple times.
 - **Incident three:** the body of taxi driver Epifanio Rodriguez Salazar, 41, was recovered from the interior of a Tsuru vehicle that was left parked in front of a car shop.
 - **Incident four:** the body of Gonzalo Rojas Fernandez, 31, was recovered from the back seat of a blue Sentra. This vehicle was abandoned near Las Cruces intersection, and reportedly had at least 20 bullet holes on its exterior.
 - **Incident five:** at approximately 1600 hours, police officer Jose Raul Mendoza Marquez, 42, was attacked by a group of hitmen along the Escenica Highway. After the attack, he was taken to the hospital where he died later as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained.
- **3/16/11 Mexico Gunmen kill six, including two children in Acapulco**
 - **3/16/11 One suspected cartel gunman killed and one police officer injured in firefight in Cancun**
 - **3/15/11 Cancun murders, police discovered four burned bodies in Cancun. The victims were blindfolded with their hands bound and had wounds to their necks**
 - **3/15/11 Cancun: Six people found without heart. All the bodies had an incision on the left side through which criminals removed the heart.**
 - **3/15/11 In the Pacific coast city of Acapulco, a teenager was killed outside the junior high school he attended**
 - **3/15/11 Eight more killed in Acapulco. Eight people in 3 different areas of the city have been killed by cartel gunmen. These included a 70 year old grandmother protecting her grandchildren, 6 and 2 years old, that were killed anyway. Two other children were wounded, including a 20 day old infant.**
 - **3/15/11 Police in the resort city of Cancun found four bodies that had been set on fire**
 - **3/13/11 Authorities reported that nine people were shot dead Sunday in the resort city of Acapulco. The victims included a woman and her two children and a retired Navy Captain.**
 - **3/9/11 Nine bodies found near Acapulco Mexico resort. Mexican authorities said they unearthed nine bodies near the beach resort of Acapulco.**

- 2/9/11 **Cancun** cancellations follow violence. First Mazatlan, then Acapulco, and now Cancun is paying the tourist price for increasing gang violence sweeping many parts of Mexico.
- 1/11/11 Man beheaded, another shot in **Cancun**
- Jan 2011 Acapulco - Police found 15 decapitated bodies, believed to have been victims of the fighting waged by the La Familia, Los Zetas and Beltran Leyva gangs over control of the key point of entry for drugs heading north to the United States.
- 8/31/10 Deadly **Cancun** Bombing: Will Drug Cartel Squeeze Life Out of Tourist Destination? The deadly bombing of the Castillo del Mar bar in Cancun left 8 people dead.
- 6/19/10 Mexican police say they have found 12 mutilated corpses in hidden graves on the outskirts of **Cancun**, the latest sign drug-related violence is spreading to the popular tourist destination. In May, Mexican police arrested Cancun's mayor Gregorio Sanchez on suspicion of offering information and protection to the Zetas as well as the Beltran Leyva catels.
- 2/1/09 On 1 February, retired Brigadier General Mauro Tello Quinones arrived in **Cancun**. Gen. Tello's task was to weed out corruption in the city's police force; to take the streets back from the criminals. He lasted less than three days at work. On 3 February, together with his bodyguard and driver, he was abducted. The three men were tortured and then driven to a remote jungle location where they were killed with a bullet to the head.